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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the phenomenon of auditor switching. The purpose of this study 
is to further contribute to the auditor switching literature by examining the reasons client 
companies in South Africa switch auditors, where the topic has not previously been 
studied and following a period of rapid and significant change in the auditing 
profession. 
Using previous literature as a foundation, forty-four variables that contribute to auditor 
switching are presented and tested based on empirical data elicited by means of a 
questionnaire survey of sample companies that experienced auditor switching during 
the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 1999 as obtained from Practitioners in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Region. The factors motivating auditor switching were based on a 
questionnaire response of seventy-five companies (response rate 67% ). The empirical 
study also tested whether or not the switch variables thus identified are statistically 
related to auditor switching. 
The findings of this study revealed that audit fees are both the most frequently cited 
reason for switching auditors and found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
of significance. Dissatisfaction over the overall quality of services provided by the 
auditor, lack of communication including the lack of responsiveness to client needs, 
poor working relationship with audit partner followed as switch factors but were not 
found to be statistically significant at 0. 05 level. The findings of this study revealed that 
two other variables, namely, management change and the need for group auditor 
rationalisation, appear to be significantly related to auditor switching at the 0.051evel 
of significance. 
key terms: 
Auditing; Auditor alignment; Auditor change; Auditor-client disagreements; Auditor 
resignation; Auditor solicitation; Auditor switching; Audit opinion shopping; Pricing of 
audit services; Quality of audit services. 
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AUDITOR SWITCHING 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE· STUDY 
A considerable amount of attention has been focussed toward the switching of the 
independent auditor as an aspect of the audit function. Existing empirical studies relate 
exclusively to the USA, UK and Australia (Beattie & Feamley, 1995:228). To date 
there has been no empirical study on auditor switching in South Africa. New 
knowledge, ought therefore, to emerge with regard to auditor switching in South Africa. 
Auditor switching has been a phenomenon of concern both to members of the auditing 
profession and to the public gen·erally, including third parties that rely upon audit 
services rendered by professional practitioners. 
The apprehension on the part of the accounting profession is expressed in the quote 
"Ralph Kent identified auditor displacement as one of the major problems faced by the 
profession" (Carpenter & Strawser, 1971 :55). 
The role of auditing is, therefore, to add credibility to the financial statements and thus 
to enhance the effectiveness of accounting communication needed by our economic 
system. To be effective, accounting communication must be both accurately prepared 
by the sender and believed and acted upon by the receiver. To believe-and act upon 
the information received, the receiver or user must have some way of satisfying himself 
as to its quality (Anderson, 1977:4). Independent auditors lend credibility to financial 
statements by examining the financial information in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and expressing an opinion on its conformity with generally 
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accepted accounting principles. An audit provides reasonable - rather than absolute -
assurance, but that is the highest degree of assurance practicable concerning financial 
information. 
In addition, the increasing interest among both academics and practitioners in the 
phenomenon of auditor switching has grown in recent years (Schwartz & Menon, 
1985:248). This is evident by the escalating number of studies that have researched 
the magnitude and possible causes of the phenomenon of auditor switching in order 
to determine the possible effects on the market for audit services. Schwartz & Menon 
(1985:248) state that a variety of reasons for changing auditors have been suggested 
"but empirical evidence in this area has been both limited and inconclusive". 
Auditor switching may indicate an accounting dispute between the client company and 
the auditor that causes the client to search for an auditor who agrees with the client, 
Leonard M. Savoie, speaking in 1970 at a meeting of The Conference Institute in New 
York, cited by McConnell (1983:6) said "the situation (shopping for accounting 
principles) occurs often enough to be a cause for discomfort to the accounting 
profession". 
The anxiety about auditor switching is based upon the reasons for auditor changes. 
Client companies that switch auditors may be accused of trying to "shop around" for 
auditors who would be obliging to conspire with them in the presentation of their 
financial affairs, as is evident from the following quote: 
"The incidence of auditor change has grown substantially over the past decade, 
with 719 auditor changes being reported in 1987, up by 139 percent from the 
number in 1981. Concern has arisen that such changes may not merely 
respond to changes in the clients or in auditors' service but could reflect 
'opinion shopping', whereby clients attempt to find auditors who will agree with 
their management's accounting policies" (Wallace, 1991:9-10). 
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At times, critics have claimed that client companies "shop around" for auditors who will 
accept accounting methods that other auditors might feel are objectionable 
(Bedingfield & Loeb, 1974:66). 
In addition, Chow & Rice (1982:327) also contend that "policy makers attach 
importance to the ability of managers to shop for auditors. The concern is that 
managers can pressure auditors into giving clean opinions by threatening to switch to 
a new auditor''. If the users of financial statements suspect the client company's 
management of "opinion shopping", the objectivity and credibility of audit reports could 
be questionable. The user, however, should not assume that the auditor's opinion is 
an assurance as to the future viability of the entity nor an opinion as to the efficiency 
or effectiveness with which management has conducted the affairs of the entity (Dunn, 
1996:7). 
Traditionally, an auditor switch could be interpreted as bad news because the switch 
may seem to be motivated by management's effort to avoid a future qualified opinion 
from the incumbent auditor or to manipulate accounting numbers favourably for the 
firm. However, motivation for auditor switches may differ among firms with different pre-
switch audit opinions and with different financial conditions and so are the market 
implications to auditor switches. Thus, some auditor switches may be good news, 
especially if they signal management's confidence for their firms' future financial 
conditions (Goolak, 1993:1X). 
When should a client company change its auditors? Answers to this question vary all 
the way from "immediately'' to "never". A company should not change its auditors 
without a strong reason. The best reason is that the client is no longer satisfied with his 
present auditor. He may think that the incumbent has not kept abreast of the newest 
developments in accounting and auditing, that the scope of the accounting services 
offered has not kept pace with the client's expanding needs, or that another firm, 
perhaps a professional one, is better equipped to perform the required services. All 
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these are understandable reasons for desiring a change. The client must surely be free 
to choose his own professional advisors and no one may abridge that freedom 
(Editorial, 1967:31 ). 
The expectations of auditors when appointed by the companies is that those auditors 
would remain as auditors for life. However, this is not so in view of the number of 
switches that have taken place over the years in terms of the records and statistics kept 
by the Registrar of Companies. Client loyalty cannot be taken for granted. 
Experience in the field has shown that a number of clients have changed their auditors. 
Furthermore, consultations with practising accountants and auditors have revealed that 
the incidence and frequency of auditor switching is of grave concern. 
The loss of clients could impact negatively on auditors. The inference could be drawn 
that there is the same problem with the auditor when his clients switch. If switching 
does not take place it could be perceived that the goodwill of clients is being 
maintained. Auditor switching could also reflect on the public image of the auditing firm. 
If auditors knew of reasons why clients switch they could remedy their shortfalls. 
However, if they are ignorant as to such reasons they will not be able to act. This 
ignorance is, at least, partially attributable to the lack of studies on the subject in South 
Africa. 
A literature review on the phenomenon of auditor switching indicates that most of the 
prior studies have examined only a limited number of factors that may motivate the 
management of client companies to change their auditors. For example, Burton & 
Roberts (1967:31) identified management changes as being a major factor leading to 
auditor changes. Carpenter & Strawser ( 1971 :58 ) found that companies going public 
favoured retaining the services of Big Eight Accounting Firms because of the prestige 
that it might add to the security offering. Some of the reasons include client financial 
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distress (Schwartz & Menon, 1985:248), auditor-client disagreements (Craswell, 
1988:23), auditor mergers (Healy & Lys, 1986:251), audit fees (Simon & Francis, 
1988:255 and Beattie & Feamley, 1995:227), policy implications ( Knapp & Elikai, 
1988:78), personal relationships (Addams & Davis, 1994:38 ), auditor credibility 
(Nichols & Smith, 1983:535) and audit market competition (Beattie & Feamley, 
1998:261 ). An additional factor that may contribute to the occurrence of auditor 
switching is the existence of "white collar crime" (Christensen, 1993:1).This study is 
aimed at obtaining responses from companies regarding their reasons for changing 
auditors. Recent research provides insight on the auditor switching phenomenon, even 
though the results of many of these studies have been inconclusive and somewhat 
inconsistent (Knapp & Elikai, 1988:84). 
Most of the previous research on auditor switching considered only secondary data 
from published sources. This study attempts to investigate the reasons behind auditor 
switches based on currently available data and uses primary sources of data. 
In summary, considerable research has been directed towards identifying the 
magnitude and possible causes of auditor switching. Previous research has identified 
a variety of factors contributing to this phenomenon. 
1.2 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
• AUDITOR : an auditor is regarded as an incumbent where no change in audit 
exists between one financial year and the next. 
• SWITCH refers to changes in auditor. 
• AUDITOR SWITCHING is defined as a change in the audit firm specified in 
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the client company's annual report between the two years of an enquiry. 
• NO CHANGE : changes in auditor due to merger of audit firms or audit firm 
name change is regarded as "no change". 
1.3 IMPORTANCE OF INVESTIGATING AUDITOR SWITCHING 
In South Africa, company law requires every company registered in terms of the 
Companies Act to have an audit, regardless of the cost and regardless of whether or 
not the directors and shareholders wish one. The auditors' duties are laid down in 
Section 300 of the Companies Act 1973 (Jackson & Stent, 2001 :3/38). The South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants has also published a series of standards 
and guidelines to ensure that the auditor's work is of an acceptable quality. The auditor 
has a contractual responsibility towards the shareholders and a moral responsibility 
towards the other readers of the audit report. If the auditor fails in his duties it could be 
of concern to the company which, in turn, could call for his resignation and consider 
switching to another firm of auditors which would provide the reasonable care and skill 
expected of professional people.The success of the world's giant capital markets, 
therefore hinge on whether the general public is confident that it can rely on financial 
statements. Independent auditors play a crucial role in inspiring this confidence, by 
conducting audits to enable them to form and express opinions as to the fair 
presentations in financial statements (Jackson & Stent, 1998:1/2). 
The purpose of an audit is not to provide additional information. It is intended to enable 
users to rely more heavily upon the information which has already been prepared by 
others (Dunn, 1996:7). 
By attesting the reliability of financial statements, the auditor provides assurance to 
users of these financial statements and also helps portray the image of a responsible 
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custodian of the shareholders' interest in the company. 
The auditor who does not pay sufficient attention to how he may help his client to 
survive, may lose his client anyway either because the client fails or because the 
auditor is not able to provide the life-support services and advice required by the client 
(Bourne, 1986:475). Auditors also provide other services during their appointment, 
namely, suggestions for improvements in systems or controls, assistance in the 
preparation of tax returns, tax planning, financial planning, or various types of 
management consultant services. 
There are, however, several "merits "according to the Editorial (1967:32) in retaining 
the same auditor, namely:-
* 
* 
* 
the longer the independent auditor has served his client, the better is his 
knowledge of the client's operation and consequently the sounder is his 
background for offering advice and suggesting improvements in procedures 
and controls; 
being familiar with the previous financial statements will enable the auditor to 
say that the accounting principles were "applied on a basis consistent with that 
of the previous year "; 
a new engagement requires the auditor to devote much "start-up" time to 
develop background financial data, accordingly, the more frequent the rotation, 
the higher the audit fees. 
According to Burton & Roberts (1967:31) the following merits were mentioned in 
maintaining that long association between client and auditor:-
* improved services over a period of time; 
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* 
* 
tax and consulting services can also be best given as the auditor is an expert 
in the client's business; 
continuing relationship tends to reduce audit fees. 
On the other hand there are merits why clients would switch auditors. According to 
Burton & Roberts (1967:31) the following was established:-
* 
* 
* 
from the point of view of the public and outside shareholders, it is argued that 
the employment of the same accounting firm year after year tends to reduce the 
"independence" with which the firm approaches the audit; 
from the client's point of view, it is argued that the contribution of a relationship 
with the same accounting firm prevents the auditor from taking a "fresh look'' at 
the company's financial and accounting practices and planning; 
long relationships cause the· auditor to take the client for granted, and thus 
reduce the level of accounting services offered. 
In 1951, Carman Blough asserted that "the only time a company changes its auditors 
is when [it has] lost confidence in the competence of the old firm" (Hoyle, 1978:70). 
If a client must bear the cost of switching, why does the client decide to change 
auditors? According to Johnson & Lys (1990:281) clients purchase audit services 
from the least cost supplier, and that clients change when the incumbent can no longer 
provide the level and type of services required at the lowest cost. 
Furthermore, Williams (1988:243) discussed both direct costs and indirect costs that 
may be incurred by clients when they decide to change their auditors. These include 
additional client time and staff so that the auditor gains an understanding of the client's 
business operations including the costs of a potential audit failure as a result of the new 
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auditor's unfamiliarity with the client. He also stressed that the costs of switching 
auditors could lead to negative media publicity and might cause shareholders and other 
users of financial statements to be suspicious of the reasons leading to the said switch. 
Crasswell (1988:25-26) identifies the cost of auditor switches as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
ECONOMIC INTEREST - which suggests that clients' economic interest in 
their auditors is as a consequence of significant start up costs involved in 
initial audit engagements which is a function of the size and nature of the 
firm's operations. 
TRANSACTION COSTS - these costs include the search costs of finding a 
new auditor and costs of complying with regulations requiring disclosure of the 
circumstances surrounding the auditor changes. 
COSTS OF DISCLOSING SWITCHES - the possibility that disclosure of 
circumstances surrounding auditor switches could give rise to capital markets 
effects and as such some evidence of negative market reaction was found but 
expressed difficulty in providing an explanation for their result. 
It seems that there are many advantages to be derived from long years of close 
association between client and the auditor. There are also corresponding 
disadvantages in switching auditors. Switching of auditors may create uncertainty in the 
minds of the public and the shareholders - uncertainty both about the company and the 
auditors. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that switching for the sake of switching 
is not necessarily good. Many a switch will inevitably be a switch for the worse. 
A variety of reasons for switching auditors have been suggested, but empirical 
evidence in this area has been both limited and inconclusive. The importance of 
auditor switching is indicative of the articles published and studies undertaken by 
academics over the past three decades in the USA and UK respectively. There are, 
however, reasonable grounds for client companies to switch to new auditors. 
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This study will investigate the factors that contribute to auditor switching in a South 
African context. A systematic examination of the auditor changes which have occurred 
in recent years and reasons for these changes will be of benefit to the accounting 
profession at large. 
1.4 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The increasing volatility of the public accounting profession requires continued 
accounting research. Aspects of this volatility include auditor changes and client -
auditor disagreements which have been reportable events for many companies over 
three decades. The concept of auditor independence in the light of this volatility should 
be of concern both to accounting academics and students alike. 
Recent surveys conducted both in the UK and USA have revealed some insight into 
why clients change their public accountants and auditors. The survey in the UK had 
respondents stating that the reasons they changed accountants was because the only 
time they heard from them was when they simultaneously presented the annual 
accounts and their bill. The position was similar in the USA, where the survey 
pinpointed the primary reason for leaving as a lack of communication, as well as a lack 
of timeliness and lack of responsiveness (Dijkman, 1996:3). 
Research in the late 1960's and early 1970's indicated a number of reasons for auditor 
switches (Burton & Roberts 1967, Carpenter & Strawser 1971, Bedingfield & Loeb 
1974). This research used the questionnaire method to obtain responses from client 
companies regarding why they changed their auditors. Later research tried to link 
certain hypothesized variables to the auditor-switch phenomenon by using empirical 
data of different time periods (Chow & Rice 1982, Williams 1988, Johnson & Lys 
1990, Roberts,Giezen & Jones 1990, Teoh 1992, Chaney, Jeter & Shaw 1995 & 
1997, Gregory & Collier 1996, Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens 1996, Pragasam & 
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Sands 1996, Lennox 1999, Dunn, Hillier & Marshall 1999, Raghunandan & Rama 
1999). These studies used statistical models to test the proposed relationships. 
However, the findings from previous research were often conflicting or less consistent 
as to which variables were related to auditor switching. In addition, these studies used 
secondary data and used different types of statistical tools to test for the hypothesized 
association between the various variables and auditor switching. 
It is important to investigate the reasons that influence a client company's management 
to switch auditors. The determinants of auditor switching can only be ascertained by 
obtaining responses from client companies who were involved in the auditor-switch 
decisions by means of a mail survey questionnaire and then analysing these data with 
the appropriate statistical tools. 
In spite of the large number of clients using the services of auditors and a number of 
them switching, no research has been undertaken in this country in that regard. Due 
to the lack of studies on auditor switching performed and reported in South Africa, the 
nature of the dilemma is such that these studies could be indicative of a phenomenon 
which exists in South Africa and, indeed, many other countries with similar accounting 
and auditing standards and economic environments. 
To what is a most complex and controversial problem, the study offers no simple 
solutions - but, hopefully offers an awareness of some of the issues that surround the 
dilemma that faces auditors from time to time when confronted with the possible 
reasons for an auditor switch by client companies. 
The study could provide useful information to public accountants and auditors in 
practice in preventing breakdowns in their relationship with client companies. The study 
is motivated by a desire to increase the understanding of the auditor-change 
phenomenon in both the academic and business environments. 
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1.5 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Auditor switching, including resignations, removals and the selection of a new auditor, 
has been the focus of attention of academics, practitioners and regulators for a number 
of years. It is an important corporate event which deals with the fundamental 
relationships between an auditor and management and an auditor and shareholders. 
These relationships are linked to the questions on the auditor's independence and the 
auditor's legal responsibilities to the shareholders (Dunn, Hillier & Marshall, 1999:95). 
Most companies without exception review their auditor's performance and decide 
whether to retain or switch to another, either of a similar size as previously or of a 
different size, depending upon the estimation of their needs and the appraisal of their 
current auditors. The purpose of this study is to contribute to an understanding of the 
reasons that lead to the breakdown in the relationship between client companies and 
their auditors and which then cause client companies to switch their auditors. 
The purpose of this study is to further contribute to the auditor switching literature by 
examining the reasons client companies change their auditors in a country where 
auditor switching has not been studied and following a period of rapid and significant 
environmental change within the auditing profession (Beattie & Feamley, 1995:228). 
Using the previous literature as a foundation, forty-four variables that contribute to 
auditor switching are presented and tested on the empirical data collected by means 
of a questionnaire survey of sample companies that experienced auditor switching 
during the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 1999 as obtained from Practitioners in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Region (see Table 4.3). 
What gets public accountants and auditors into trouble with clients and third parties? 
The answer to this question is of keen interest to members of the public accounting 
profession. The purpose of this study is to make that question more specific and to 
gather and analyse evidence that might provide answers (St. Pierre & Anderson, 
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1984:242). 
The study is motivated by a desire to increase our understanding of the auditor 
switching phenomenon by considering the detected auditor-switch factors as a possible 
variable influencing auditor switching. 
The secondary purpose of the study includes:-
* 
* 
Ascertaining if the previously researched factors (variables) are significantly 
related to auditor switching when client companies are dissatisfied with their 
current auditors; and 
Identifying characteristics of client dissatisfaction with current auditors that will 
assist both the current auditor and the successor auditor in assessing the 
potential determinants of auditor switches. 
As a result of this study, the body of knowledge on auditor switching may be 
broadened, and the understanding of some of the informal conditions behind the 
auditor switching phenomenon may be strengthened. 
1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Despite the merits and demerits on this subject, there has been little published 
evidence, in South Africa, about current company practice on auditor switching. 
Because the issues involved are of considerable significance, both in terms of the 
satisfactory fulfilment of the attest function and in terms of maximum service to clients, 
it was felt that a systematic examination of auditor switching which has occurred in 
recent years, together with the reasons for these changes, would be worthwhile. 
The overall objective ofthis study is to extend an understanding ofthe range offactors 
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that influence auditor switches. More specifically, the objectives may be listed as:-
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
To document the declared reasons by client companies in South Africa for 
switching to a new audit firm. 
To consider the position of trust between the client company and their auditors 
which, when breached, causes client companies to change their auditors. 
To develop a general understanding of auditor switching by client companies. 
To investigate the association, if any, between the declared reasons for change 
and the direction of change by type of practice (i.e. to/from Nationai/Non-
Nationai(Local) audit firm). 
To establish the criteria client companies apply in deciding to change their 
auditors. 
To make concrete and meaningful recommendations, ansrng out of the 
empirical study/investigation, to the auditing profession at large in South Africa. 
An additional objective was to ascertain if any evidence could be found on auditor 
changes, where companies were seeking to exploit the economic relationship between 
them and their auditors in such a way as to threaten the independence of the auditor's 
attestation function. Without independence, an attestation to the shareholders and the 
public, including third parties, is of little worth, and the greater threat to the appearance 
of an auditor's independence is based upon this economic relationship. The auditor's 
livelihood, however, is dependent upon the fees paid by his clients, and economic 
pressures, therefore must necessarily exist. These pressures, however, are not 
necessarily directly opposite to independence. The auditor's reputation for fairness and 
independence is an important part of the service which he sells to his clients, and it 
seems likely that this reputation has an economic worth in excess of the fees from any 
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single client (Burton & Roberts, 1967:32). 
The analysis of the data will be achieved through the use of descriptive statistics as 
well as inferential statistical techniques using the Statistical Package of Social 
Sciences (SPSS). This computer program was deemed appropriate as a statistical tool 
for analysing the variables. 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope of the researcher's consultations with audit firms was limited to certain firms 
in the KwaZulu-Natal Region only, and of their client companies, that experienced 
auditor switching during the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 1999. 
A further refinement of the scope of the study was influenced by the following :-
* 
* 
* 
Previous research findings of surveys undertaken which, although limited in 
nature, offer insights into auditor switching for South African companies. 
The emphasis in the present study is on the determination of and investigation 
into the factors contributing to auditor switching in South Africa. 
The present study underpinned an empirical investigation involving the use of 
a questionnaire designed for the survey. The survey method thus comprised of 
a mailed questionnaire to the selected sample respondents. 
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1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In keeping with the objectives outlined, the research methodology for the study 
provided both primary and secondary data. 
1.8.1 SECONDARY DATA 
The secondary data involved a literature review as a basis for the examination of the 
theoretical framework as explained mostly in international articles and a few local 
articles, survey findings in related fields of study, and in accredited publications. These 
were subject to a further analysis against the existing studies on auditor switching , and 
their impact on South African companies that experienced a change in auditors. It is 
envisaged that a more holistic picture would emerge from this study which would 
enable practitioners to revisit their clients pertaining to areas of shortcomings. 
1.8.2 PRIMARY DATA 
The primary data collected formed the empirical research, using a structured 
questionnaire which was administered to the respondent sample. The target population 
meeting the selection criteria, i.e. companies which experienced auditor switching, was 
obtained by communicating with Professional Practitioners in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Region. A more detailed discussion of the research method is found in Chapter 4 
which explains the research methodology and design. 
The data was collected by means of a questionnaire survey administered to the 
executives of the sample companies. 
The data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) in 
compiling tables and cross-tabulations. Statistically analysed data were subjected to 
the non-parametric, Chi-square test for Independence at the traditional .05 level of 
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significance. 
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research was subject to certain limitations which are discussed in this section. 
These limitations may influence the validity of the study and, consequently, should be 
considered when one interprets the results. 
* 
* 
* 
There is presumed to exist a large variety of items with which to measure (test) 
constructs (Cooper & Schindler, 1998:38), therefore this study is limited by the 
use of only a sample of those items. Further replicates of construct measures 
are necessary to confirm reliability and validity of the test results. 
The study considered only companies that switched auditors based on 
information from Practitioners in the KwaZulu-Natal Region. Thus, the 
respondents were not representative of all companies that experienced auditor 
switching, during the said period, in South Africa. Care should be exercised in 
making generalisations of the research findings to other companies in South 
Africa. 
Auditor switching is a complex phenomenon. The possibility exists that officials 
responsible for changing auditors in the company may have delegated the task 
of responding to questionnaires to a subordinate who may not be fully 
qualified to provide appropriate responses. It is, however, considered that such 
instances were in the minority. 
1.10 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The present research sought to investigate the factors that contribute to auditor 
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switching wherein several theoretical variables were examined for their potential 
determinants on auditor switches. This was the first known study of auditor switching, 
in South Africa, using the client- company's view of the factors that contributed to 
auditor switching and employed "primary" data as opposed to "secondary'' data. The 
research was completed using the Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS). 
It is envisaged that both the auditors and their clients will benefit from the findings of 
this study. The increase in knowledge about the factors that contribute to auditor 
switching can provide useful information to audit firms in preventing breakdowns in the 
relationships with their clients and in devising new marketing strategies to maintain and 
increase their practice. 
The tentative conclusions drawn from this study, therefore, will provide considerable 
benefits to all stakeholders. Overall, this study is expected to provide readers with an 
improved insight into the phenomenon of auditor switching. 
1.11 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The Chapters presented in this study are as follows:-
Chapter 1 serves to introduce the study as well as provide a background for the issues, 
prior research, the importance of the topic and the research methodology. 
Chapter 2 focusses on the history and development of auditing and auditor switching 
in the UK, USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand incorporating the 
origins of auditing, the history of auditing, the development of auditing from 1844 to 
date, and the evolution of auditor switching from its origins to the said period to date. 
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on the topic of auditor switching. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology and the design used and explains how 
the respondent sample was drawn. It includes a detailed discussion of the collection of 
primary data for the empirical study. The Chapter also presents an analysis of the 
results using the appropriate statistical tests. 
Chapter 5 concludes with the salient findings of the empirical survey, contribution of 
the study and makes recommendations for future research. 
1.12 CONCLUSION 
It is anticipated that this study will provide useful strategies for auditing firms in South 
Africa. It will facilitate in making the auditing profession, in South Africa, aware of 
certain aspects of implementation with which they may not be familiar. It will also 
provide the opportunity of forging stronger relationships between the auditor and his 
client. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND AUDITOR 
SWITCHING 
2.1 THE ORIGINS OF AUDITING 
As a topic, the history of auditing has received relatively limited attention in South 
Africa. The purpose of this chapter is to satisfy the historical curiosity about auditing 
and auditor switches over the years. A brief review of the history of auditing provides 
a basis for analysing and interpreting the changes that have taken place in audit 
objectives and techniques during the Middle Ages, the Feudal System, the 
Renaissance Period, and from the Industrial Revolution to date, particularly as pertains 
to the UK, USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The evolution of 
audit objectives and techniques is significant when we consider the factors responsible 
for auditor switching. 
Audit changes, as significant events, occur in the environment in which they exist. 
While the nature of future auditing is uncertain, the probability of further change is a 
certainty, especially as our society becomes even more complex as each element of 
society becomes increasingly independent (Bailey, 1979:1). 
2.2 THE HISTORY OF AUDITING AND AUDITOR SWITCHING 
The historical development of auditing and auditor switching highlights the evolution 
of this discipline. 
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2.2.1 AUDITING DURING THE MIDDLE AGES AND CHANGES THEREIN 
The history of auditing dating as far back as the Middle Ages, approximately, five 
hundred years ago, when the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans utilised systems of check 
and counter-check on the accounting of officials to whose care public funds had been 
entrusted (Anderson, 1977:6). Traces of accounting in early civilisation became 
apparent where one person was entrusted to some extent with the property of another, 
and there was a need to check upon the fidelity of the former (Boyd, 1968:74). The 
method of checking on the person's fidelity initially took place "orally ", for example, 
a servant telling his master what he had done to protect and develop crops, land and 
cattle. The master would " listen " to such accounts of stewardship and even question 
the servants, that is, the master was the " listener or auditor" (Puttick & Van Esch, 
1998:2). If the master was not satisfied with the "accuracy and reliability'' of the 
information from the servant he would switch the task of stewardship to another 
servant, thus introducing the concept of "fraud prevention" by the quaestors known 
as treasurers (Brown, 1962:697). Those audits were also intended to assure the 
absence of fraud, emphasizing arithmetical correctness and compliance with authority 
given to the custodian (Pound, Willingham & Carmichael, 1989:6). 
As the art of "writing " evolved, and later on bookkeeping, auditing also evolved with 
it, growing from merely "listening to oral accounts of stewardship" into the checking 
of written records. 
Evidence of such checking was first established by the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans 
who utilised the systems of "check and counter check" on the accounting of officials 
in whose care public funds had been entrusted. The ancient records of auditing were 
confined to public accounts (Anderson, 1977:6-7 and Bigg, 1961:1). Let us now 
consider the different approaches used for checks and counter checks. The Egyptians 
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imposed a check by requiring that fiscal receipts be recorded by two officials, the 
Greeks instituted a system of checking public accounts by means of checking-clerks 
whereby the accounts of public officials were scrutinized at the expiry of their term of 
office, and the Romans recognised the corrective distinction between the official who 
authorises revenue and expenditure and the official whose duty it is to handle cash by 
developing a system of check and counter checks among the various officials (Boyd, 
1968:74). 
The auditing principle of" verification" was also introduced during this period. Bailey 
( 1979: 1-2) makes reference to an example of an audit function during the Middle Ages 
where ancient rulers used two scribes, who kept independent records of the same 
transactions, to ensure that the Ruler was not defrauded. The results of their work were 
subsequently compared. If differences were found to exist, they were summarily 
dismissed from their posts and replaced by others, thus introducing the concept of 
switching. This audit approach was characterised by a 100% testing. During this 
period auditing was primarily "fraud-preventive" (Brown, 1962:697). 
The Greek and Roman practice of accounting had a significant impact on the 
development of accounting and auditing as employed by the English Exchequer and 
Royal Wardrobe. The Exchequer also employed a system of check by means of 
maintaining separate records. At the Exchequer a great roll was compiled from the 
dictation of the Treasurer, a second roll was written out by the Chancellor's clerk, and 
a third roll was kept by a representative of the king. These rolls were independently 
kept records which had to agree in every respect with each other, thus ensuring a 
complete check at the end of the year. At the audit, every discrepancy between the 
rolls was adjusted and settled (Boyd, 1968:74-75). If the Exchequer was dissatisfied 
with the custodians who were responsible for the keeping of their records, they were 
replaced. 
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During this period we also encounter the auditing principle of "vouching" for the first 
time. This audit ensured that the Crown's revenue was duly accounted for by the 
sheriff, and provided for the examination of vouchers for all of his expenditure (Boyd, 
1968:75). If the sheriff was unable to account for the Crown's revenue he would be 
replaced by a more competent person, again comparable to the present day auditor 
switching. 
Dicksee (1892:288) reflects a remarkable similarity in the duties of the present day 
auditor to those of the auditor about 700 years ago regarding the significance and 
value of the auditor's independence, and the acknowledgement of professional 
competence, which is evident from the manor quotation from Walter of Henley: "Tretyce 
off Housebandry'' 
It is not necessary to speak to the Auditors about making audits, for they ought to 
be so prudent, and so faithful, and so knowing in their business, that they have 
no need of others' teaching about things connected with the accounts (cited by 
Dicksee, 1892:288). 
Auditing was introduced at governmental level during the audit of the City of Pisa in 
1394 where the audit was designed to test the accounts of the government officials to 
determine whether or not defalcation had taken place. The emphasis here was on the 
presentation of accurate accounts (Brown, 1962:697). If it was found that defalcation 
had taken place the said officials would be changed, i.e. once again the concept of 
switching is highlighted. 
A review of the literature relating to the early history of auditing and auditor switching 
reveals nothing concerning the existence of internal control which has become of 
utmost importance to every audit. 
CHAPTER lWO : HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDJnNG AND AUDITOR SWITCHING PAGE 23 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
2.2.2 AUDITING DURING THE FEUDAL SYSTEM 
During this period there appears to have been a stagnation in accounting and auditing 
as no significant developments seem to have taken place. 
2.2.3 AUDITING DURING THE RENAISSANCE PERIOD 
The Renaissance Period, saw a great increase in international trade generally, first in 
Italy and later in other European countries which led to the evolution of a system of 
accounts of record-keeping (Bigg, 1961 :1). In 1494, an Italian priest, Fra Luca Pacioli 
published a treatise in which he described the system of double-entry bookkeeping 
making reference to the importance of "internal controls "for the first time and 
recommended that the books be audited for" internal check" (Anderson, 1977:7). 
The Renaissance period around the turn of the 15th century gave rise to the auditor 
conducting audits of private enterprise with his primary objectives being the discovery 
of fraud and the detection of accounting errors (Swemmer, 1987:32). 
According to Woolfs "A Short History of Accountants and Accountancy'' (cited by 
Puttick & van Esch, 1998:4) Italy can claim to be the first country to establish a 
Society of Accountants, the Collegia dei Raxonati, founded in Venice in 1581. Italy 
was the first country to recognise the desirability of demonstrable competence in its 
accountants and auditors (Dickinson, 1979:3). 
Fitzpatrick's "The Story of Bookkeeping, Accounting and Auditing", March 1939, (cited 
by Brown, 1962:697) commented on early audit objectives as follows: 
Auditing as it existed to the 161h century was designed to verify the 
honesty of persons charged with fiscal responsibilities. 
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At the beginning of the 16th century the importance and credibility of the audit 
profession had slipped into a period of decay and stagnancy. Particularly, in England, 
and generally in Europe, the audit profession became one treated with contempt and 
made them a laughing stock because of the apathy with which auditors were 
accountable for their actions (Swemmer, 1987:32). 
In conclusion, this period saw the evolution of the system of double-entry bookkeeping 
by Fra Luca Pacioli and the importance of internal control for the first time received 
some attention. The auditor became involved in the audit of private enterprises with his 
main objective being the detection of fraud. This period also saw the auditing 
profession slipping into a period of decay and stagnancy due to the apathy with which 
auditors were perceived under public scrutiny. 
2.2.4 AUDITING DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
Two significant changes in attitude occurred during this period. Firstly, it was 
recognised that an orderly and standardised system of accounting was needed for both 
accurate reporting and fraud prevention. Secondly, there was a general acceptance of 
the need for the independent review of accounts for both large and small enterprises 
(Brown, 1962:697). 
The most significant development during this period was the rise of the professional 
public auditor. Up to this point in time virtually all audits had been performed by 
persons selected for their general honesty and integrity rather than their qualifications, 
if any (Swemmer, 1987:65). 
During the Industrial Revolution, as many business concerns grew in size, their owners 
began to use the services of hired managers. With this separation of the ownership and 
the management groups, the absentee owners turned increasingly to auditors to protect 
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themselves against the danger of unintentional errors as well as fraud committed by 
managers and employees (Whittington, Pany, Meigs & Meigs, 1992:7). Where 
auditors were unable to protect the owners from unforeseen errors and fraud committed 
by managers and employees, the owners switched their auditor for another auditor 
who would be able to protect the owners' interests. 
The introduction of Joint Stock Companies and stimulus provided by the Industrial 
Revolution in England, soon made it essential that those conducting a business should 
account clearly and honestly to the shareholders. This led to the auditor being 
employed to act as an agent for the shareholder because of necessity and out of this 
need grew the accounting and auditing profession (Puttick & van Esch, 1998:4). 
The Industrial Revolution, however, gave rise to large-scale commercial and industrial 
enterprises and the need for non-public audits became more obvious with this 
development taking place (Anderson, 1977:7). 
There is no record of the work of auditors, in South Africa, until1797 when Mr Barrow 
came to the Cape as an Auditor General under the governorship of Lord Macartney 
(Noyce, 1954:3). 
One of the factors that influenced the growth of the profession in Britain was the 
enactment in 1844 of the Companies Act which required the registration of all 
companies and also the monitoring of the activities of company directors (Swemmer, 
1987:65). 
In conclusion, auditing during the period of the Industrial Revolution thus developed 
from audits performed by persons selected for their honesty and integrity to that of a 
professional public auditor. There was a general acceptance of the need for an 
independent review of accounts to be done by an auditor. The industrial and financial 
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crises and the enactment of the Companies Act 1844 exerted some influence on the 
growth of the accounting profession in Britain. 
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND AUDITOR SWITCHING FOR THE 
PERIOD 1844- 1930 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During this period the UK was the main contributor to the development of auditing. The 
development of auditing in the USA, Australia, and New Zealand has its origin from 
British antecedents (Pound, Willingham & Carmichael, 1989:6). 
Littleton's "Accounting Evaluation to 1900 (cited by Swemmer, 1987:65) states that the 
most notable development during the 19th and 20th centuries was the rise of the 
professional public auditor. Up to this point in time nearly all audits had been performed 
by persons chosen for their general honesty and integrity rather than for any specific 
qualifications which they may have possessed. During the 19th century, however, the 
professional accountant appeared and quickly replaced his "amateur'' predecessor. 
Auditing procedures conducted during these times were concerned with a detailed 
examination of the accounting records, and test checking was considered as an audit 
tool depending upon the strengths of internal controls in existence. A 1 00% check both 
then and now, especially for large organisations, was being precluded (Swemmer, 
1987:66 and Whittington et al 1992:8). 
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2.3.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The development of limited companies in the 19th century and the passing of the first 
British Companies Act, in 1844, gave rise for a need to have an independent 
examination of accounts to safeguard shareholders' interests once a separation 
between the providers of capital for a business (shareholders) and management 
(directors) could be determined (Attwood & Stein, 1986: 12). If the shareholders found 
that their interests were not being adequately safeguarded by management they would 
replace the incumbent auditor with another auditor who would provide protection for 
them against management. The Joint Companies Act stipulated that the directors 
provide annually to the shareholders a balance sheet setting forth the state of affairs 
of the company. The Act provided for the appointment of auditors, to give a fair picture 
of the company affairs, who were empowered to examine the company records during 
the year and required to report on the correctness and adequacy of the accounts and 
balance sheet (Anderson, 1977:7). 
Langhout (1961 :3) and Attwood & Stein (1986:12) state that the practice at first was 
to appoint the majority shareholder as auditor because of his vested interest in the 
welfare of the company, but as time passed shareholders ceased to be appointed from 
their own body because of greater reliance being placed on the integrity of members 
of the Society of Accountants. During the period 1850 to 1905 audits usually consisted 
of a complete review of all transactions and preparation of corrected accounts and 
financial statements. This was expensive, inefficient, and did not provide satisfactorily 
for the strengthening of weak areas in subsequent financial periods (Brown, 
1962:698). 
The Companies Act 1856, which replaced the 1844 Act, introduced the idea that the 
auditor need not be a shareholder, thus encouraging the development of professional 
auditors (Attwood & Stein, 1986:12). The appointment of an auditor, however, was 
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not mandatory at this stage. 
The 1860's witnessed another development that shaped the auditing profession, 
namely, the separation of management and ownership. As the ownership group 
became less involved in the day-to-day affairs of the business, it became eviaent that 
some method of review had to be established to determine the stewardship and to 
guard against the possibility of fraud. This review function required someone with 
special skills and someone independent of the business firm. In Britain this need for a 
professionally trained independent auditor was formalised with the passage of the 
Companies Act of 1862 (Bailey, 1979:3). 
The Companies Act 1879 made it compulsory for banking companies to appoint 
auditors, and the Companies Act 1900 extended this requirement to all companies 
(Attwood & Stein, 1986:12). This -gave rise to auditor switches to professional 
practitioners. 
By 1895 there was evidence of sampling being used as an implementation of testing 
as an auditing procedure in Britain. In the London & General Bank case of that year the 
following statement was made by the presiding judge in Me Millan's "Evaluation of 
Internal Control", December 1956, (cited by Brown, 1962:698):-
where there is nothing to excite suspicion, very little inquiry will be reasonable and 
quite sufficient; and, in practice, I believe businessmen select a few cases 
haphazard, see that they are right and assume that others like them are correct 
also. 
The 1900 Act was a prominent milestone in the history of company auditing, introducing 
as it did compulsory audits, auditor independence from the directors, and the standard 
form for an audit report. Despite all this, however, the basic objectives of the audit 
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remained as before, namely:-
• the detection of fraud, 
• the detection of technical errors, 
• the detection of errors in principle. 
These objectives remained relatively the same in the United Kingdom for the next 30 
years (Anderson, 1977:8). If client companies found the incumbent auditors lacking 
in the above objectives they would switch auditors to another who was able to satisfy 
their needs. 
A significant event in the history of auditing occurred during the first third of the 20th 
century. This period saw the growth of the enterprises as well as the user groups 
interested in the well being of the business. With the expansion of the user group, there 
was a change in the objective of an audit. The detection of fraud and the determination 
of stewardship no longer satisfied shareholders and others who were more interested 
in the financial condition and profitability of the firm. These groups demanded that 
auditors certify the correctness of the financial statements, and the audit profession 
responded accordingly (Bailey, 1979:3 and Whittington et al1992:8). Where auditors 
were unable to certify as to the correctness of the financial statements of their clients, 
the business would change their auditors to another who was willing to do so. Yet 
again the concept of auditor -switching manifested itself. 
The auditor's concern until this point in time was the balance sheet, and not the profit 
and loss account, and it was not until the advent of the Company Act 1929 that the 
audit report was extended to cover the profit and loss account, and not until the 
Company Act 1948 that disclosure requirements for profit and loss were introduced 
(Attwood & Stein, 1986:12-13). When clients were dissatisfied with their current 
auditors over incorrect reporting and disclosures they changed auditors as so often 
CHAPTER 1WO : HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND AUDITOR SWITCHING PAGE 30 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
happens today where there are disagreements over audit reports. 
2.3.3 USA AND CANADA 
The contributions of the English and Scottish Chartered Accountants formed the basis 
of the audit profession both in Canada and the United States (Anderson, 1977:8, 
Brown, 1962:699 and Moyer, 1951 :1). 
The techniques of sampling also appeared in the United States about 1895 in Staub's 
"Auditing Developments During the Present Century ", 1942 (as cited by Brown, 
1962:698) 
With the rapid growth of American business following the Spanish-American War, 
the increase in size of many enterprises and the auditing of larger concerns, there 
developed the necessity for making the audit one of selected tests of accounts 
rather than an endeavour to examine all the transactions of the period. 
Brown (1962:699) stated that the primary objective of auditing was still the detection 
of fraud; the auditor switched to testing instead of detailed verification as it was not 
possible to check every transaction because of the ever growing companies. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, as companies grew in size over the ensuing years, 
detailed checking was replaced by tests of transactions. Testing became the norm by 
1930, but little attention was given to internal control. Only limited external evidence, 
however, was examined as part of most audits (Anderson, 1977:9). 
Ten years after the tum of the 20th century, the American auditing profession 
progressed independently of its origins as the objectives and approach of the British 
auditors were found to be unsuitable for American business (Brown, 1962:699). This 
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change occurred partly because the American audit arose not from statutory 
requirements but from the demands of banks and other lenders for some independent 
check on the creditworthiness reflected in the company's balance sheet. This resulted 
in American auditors developing a "balance sheet audit" approach in contrast to the 
"clerical checking" which had been the starting point of UK and Canadian audits 
(Anderson, 1977:9). 
With the financial crash in 1929 and publicity given to corporate failures during the 
ensuing depression, the audit pattern in the USA changed abruptly. The growing 
emphasis on fair presentation of financial information was specifically reflected by the 
introduction of mandatory audits (Anderson, 1977:9). Client companies therefore 
changed their auditors due to the their auditor's failure to give them proper advice and 
in addition the introduction of mandatory audits gave rise to a move to a more 
competent audit firm. 
This change in attitude of auditors was, no doubt, influenced to a certain extent by the 
numerous lawsuits instigated involving fraud in firms that had been audited by public 
auditing firms, for example, the McKesson-Robbins and Ultramares cases (Swemmer, 
1987:66). The client companies were dissatisfied with their present auditor's services 
due to the lawsuits against them and consequently switched their auditors. 
2.3.4 AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
The Australian and New Zealand auditing practice also had its origin from British 
antecedents rather than American, with the result that audits in these countries were 
essentially a "constructive" process of tracking transactions through from primary 
documents to the annual accounts (Murphy, 1956:67 and Pound, Willingham & 
Carmichael, 1989:6). 
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2.3.5 SOUTH AFRICA 
In South Africa, over a century and half ago, the auditor had become a recognised 
office which was not always occupied by persons of specialised training, but generally 
by those of standing in the community (Noyce, 1954:4). 
The services of an auditor were needed because of the large financial deals, 
amalgamations, flotations, the limited liability company and also mining companies, 
together with the need for protection of the public (Noyce, 1954:4). This resulted in 
a shift in emphasis of company needs to an auditor who was knowledgeable in complex 
financial matters. 
Towards the end of the 19th century there began the formative period of the auditing 
profession in South Africa. In 1894 the first professional accounting and auditing body 
was established in the Transvaal under the name of the Institute of Accountants and 
Auditors in South Africa, and others followed thereafter (langhout, 1961 :3). 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND AUDITOR SWITCHING FROM 
1930 TO THE PRESENT 
2.4.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
By 1930 the statutory audit had led to a rapid growth in the profession but auditing was 
still based on the concept of transaction checking and had only recently changed from 
a detailed to a test basis (Anderson, 1977:9). 
Auditors and business managers gradually began to accept the proposition that a 
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careful examination of relatively few transactions selected randomly would give a cost 
effective and reliable indication of the accuracy of other similar transactions. In addition 
to sampling, auditors became aware of the importance of effective internal control. 
Auditors found that by studying the client's system of internal control they could 
identify areas of strength and weaknesses and apply their tests accordingly. This 
change in the audit approach was not due to the developments within the profession 
but rather to the growth and complexity of the businesses being audited. Along with 
the change in the audit approach there was also a change in the audit objective 
(Whittington et al 1992:8 and Bailey, 1979:3). If clients were not in favour of the 
above audit approach they switched their auditors to another who would accommodate 
them. 
By the 1940's the audit objective had shifted from one of fraud detection to an 
assessment of fair presentation, placing reliance on internal control (Anderson, 
1977:10). Clients once again switched their auditors where this shift in objective was 
acceptable. 
In the UK audit reporting on the income statement became mandatory after the 
promulgation of the Companies Act 1947 (Puttick & van Esch, 1998:119). 
The advent of computers in the 1950's and statistical sampling techniques in the 1960's 
had significant effects on auditing methods but did not alter the auditing objectives. 
Reliance on controls (including computer controls) and the use of testing (including 
statistical sampling and computerised selection) continued to form part of the auditor's 
methods of meeting the attest function (Anderson, 1977:10; and Whittington et al 
1992:9). Auditors who were unable or unwilling to adapt to these revised audit methods 
were switched by clients to auditors who did meet that function. 
Accounts receivable confirmation and physical observation of inventory counts in the 
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UK was adopted as mandatory in professional pronouncements in 1967 and 1968 
whereas the McKesson-Robbins case, in 1939, led to the extension of USA audit 
procedures to include the confirmation of accounts receivable and the physical 
observation of stock-counting (Anderson, 1977:10). 
2.4.2 USA AND CANADA 
In the USA development had been somewhat less rapid when compared with that in the 
UK. The pattern of voluntary audits to meet creditor requests had been the testing of 
internal evidence as to assets and liabilities (the "balance sheet audit") rather than 
transaction testing (Anderson, 1977:9). 
Mandatory audits were introduced in the USA only after the enactment of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Companies registered under the SEC were required to 
produce audited financial statements with the auditor's report covering both the 
balance sheet and the income statement (Puttick & van Esch, 1998:119). 
From 1930 onwards, developments in the USA caused this country to replace the UK 
as the dominant outside influence on the Canadian profession (Anderson, 1977:10). 
In 1933, it was agreed by most auditors that the normal audit was mainly concerned 
with the determination of fairness of reported financial statements but they disagreed 
as to the role of tests designed to detect fraud (Brown, 1962:701 ). This disagreement, 
once again, caused auditor switches by client companies. 
By the 1940's it was clear that the primary objective of an audit was to determine the 
fairness of reported financial statements. Testing was the rule, not the exception, and 
the degree of testing decided upon was largely dependent on the effectiveness of 
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internal control (Anderson, 1977:10). 
In 1941 the SEC urged the inclusion of a reference to "generally accepted auditing 
standards" in the USA's auditors' reports and it is thus became necessary for the 
profession to define such standards (Anderson, 1977:10). 
Between 1940 and 1960 emphasis shifted to the determination of fair presentation of 
financial statements with a corresponding de-emphasis on fraud detection (Brown, 
1962:701). 
From 1960 to date the objective of the independent review of financial statements was 
largely to express an opinion as to the fairness of the representations made in the 
financial reports. To do so an auditor needs to have sufficient audit evidence (Brown, 
1962 :702). Where audit opinions were found to be not acceptable by client companies, 
they switched their auditors to another auditor who would be willing to compromise with 
them. This remains a common occurrence today. 
The evaluation of internal control effectiveness became the most important part of the 
auditor's program for evaluating the fairness of financial statement presentations 
(Brown, 1962:703). 
Nielson (1960:584) concluded by stating that auditing in the future will place more 
emphasis on internal control techniques that have been designed to ensure a 
reasonable amount of accuracy and less emphasis on what happened in the past. 
2.4.3 AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
While developments in Australia were previously influenced by the UK system, in 
recent years the USA appears to have had a greater impact on auditing activities. This 
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is reflected more through developments within the profession rather than statute 
(Pound, Willingham & Carmichael, 1983:9). 
From about the mid 1980's there have been major changes in the structure of the 
accounting profession as well as in the institutional arrangements for the regulation of 
accounting in New Zealand (Velayutham & Perera, 1996:451). 
2.4.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
The development of auditing and auditor switching needs to be examined in the South 
African context. 
2.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa has been selected for specific attention because the development of the 
accounting and auditing profession in this country, by comparison with those 
countries previously mentioned, has received fairly limited attention. Also, little or no 
research has been undertaken in the area of auditor switching in South Africa. 
The development of the auditing profession in South Africa during recent times 
remained largely under the influence of the UK although activities in the USA also 
impacted to a certain extent. 
Between 1934 and 1949 various attempts were made to pass Bills to provide for the 
registration of accountants and auditors for controlling legislation over the accounting 
and auditing profession but none became law (Jackson & Stent, 1998:1n). 
A Bill was enacted on 18 June 1951 and became statute as the Public Accountants' 
and Auditors' Act No. 51 of 1951 (now No. 80 of 1991 (PAAB, 1994:31). The Act 
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provided statutory uniformity in that only persons registered in terms of the Act could 
practice as an accountant or auditor or hold himself out or allow himself to be held out 
as an accountant or auditor in public practice (Puttick & Van Esch, 1998:7). 
According to Puttick & Van Esch (1998:7) in 1979 a move was made towards 
unification by the creation of a National Institute, namely the establishment of the 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA). The Institute's main 
purpose is to promote the long-term interests of its members in South Africa ( PAAB, 
1994:30). 
2.4.4.2 THE FUTURE OF ACCOUNTING EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND 
OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THEREON 
2.4.4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present structure of the accounting and auditing profession in South Africa is 
characteristic of dissension and fragmentation (IRCA, 1997:3). 
A number of attempts were made over the years to unify the stakeholders, namely, the 
four provincial societies, the SAICA and the PAAB, in the profession, but these were 
unsuccessful (Jackson & Stent, 1998:1/8). 
There was a perceived need to transform the profession, with the initiative for 
transformation being aimed at a unified, coordinated registered profession that would 
be representative of the South African population and be regulated in terms of a single 
law (IRCA, 1997:3). 
In 1991, (IRCA, 1997:5), in response to the above perceived need, the PAAB, a 
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statutory body, initiated a project called the Future of Accounting Education in South 
Africa (FAESA). 
2.4.4.2.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROFESSION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The PAAB continued the consultative process of the FAESA Project in a 
spirit of transparency and openness including the formation of an Interim 
Representative Council of Accountants (IRC) (IRCA, 1997:7). 
The IRC's brief was to consider the recommendations in the FAESA 
Report and to draft legislation to give effect thereto (IRCA, 1997:9). 
SAICA announced late in 1996, its support for a "draft Bill" called the 
Registered Accountancy Profession Act (I RCA, 1997:8 and Jackson 
& Stent, 1998:1/8). 
The proposed Registered Accountancy Profession Act will repeal the 
entire Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act, as well as the Municipal 
Accountants' Act and Section 60 of the Close Corporation Act. When it 
becomes law, the entire South African registered accountancy profession 
will, for the first time in the history of this country be regulated by a single 
national law (IRCA, 1997:3 & 23). 
Some of the important characteristics of the proposed new Registered 
Accountancy Profession Act are:-
* the establishment of a four- tiered structure to provide multiple entry 
levels to the accountancy profession:-
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Tier 1 Specialist tier (for the Registered Auditor (RA ), 
Tier 2 Financial Accountant tier, 
Tier 3 Generalist tier, and 
Tier 4 Foundation tier. (IRCA, 1997:32) 
* The Act seeks to broaden the base of the accounting profession (as 
distinct from restricting it to Chartered Accountancy) and to facilitate 
the upward mobility of accountants through a series of Tiers to the top 
accountancy qualification (Jackson & Stent, 2001:1/8). 
It is hoped that this new structure will make the accounting profession accessible to all 
persons who have the ability and desire to become an accountant or auditor. It is 
expected that during 2001 the Accountancy Profession Bill will be introduced in 
Parliament for scrutiny and comment, and that the Representative Council of 
Accountants will effectively come into operation in the year 2001 (Jackson & Stent, 
20o1:1n). 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the history and development of the auditing profession was reviewed 
from its origin to its present form. The countries that had the greatest impact and 
influence on the auditing profession world wide were the UK and the USA In South 
Africa the UK was the greatest contributor towards influencing the growth of the 
profession in this country. 
This chapter views "auditing" and "audit-switching" in ancient times where the accounts· 
of an estate or manor were checked by having them called out by those who had 
compiled them to those in authority, to its evolution to its present status where they are 
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reviewed by independent professional auditors and reported thereon for the members 
of the company. Auditor changes were also found to exist in ancient times where the 
Rulers, or those in authority, when dissatisfied with those persons holding key control 
positions replaced (switched) them by another more competent person or persons. 
Auditing methods and techniques were not developed overnight, but have grown and 
developed over the years switching from "orally " to "writing ", "check and counter 
check" to "verification and vouching " to the Renaissance Period where double-entry 
bookkeeping, in Italy, was published by Fra Luca Pacioli so as to meet the needs of 
auditing. 
Auditing then was carried out by persons selected for their honesty and integrity whilst 
presently, auditing is a process, carried out by suitably qualified persons, whereby the 
accounts of business entities are examined in such detail as to enable the auditor to 
express an opinion thereon regarding their accuracy and fairness. Where Rulers and 
clients were not satisfied with the work done by their incumbent auditors, they would 
switch over to another auditor who would be able to satisfy the enterprises's needs 
more efficiently and effectively. In the UK, the passing of the British Companies Act 
1844 provided for the appointment of the majority shareholder as auditor and the 
passing of the Companies Act 1856, which replaced the 1844 Act, introduced the idea 
that the auditor need not be a shareholder. The passing of the Companies Act 1900 
introduced compulsory audits for all companies. In the USA mandatory audits were 
introduced, after the 1929 depression, only after the creation of the SEC in 1934. The 
change in attitude of auditors was, no doubt, influenced to a certain extent by the 
numerous lawsuits being investigated involving fraud in firms that had been audited by 
public accountants. 
In South Africa the formative period of the auditing profession began towards the end 
of the 19th century. In 1951, the Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act 51 of 1951 (now 
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No.80 of 1991) was promulgated which provided statutory uniformity in that only 
persons registered under this Act could practice as an accountant and auditor. A new 
act to be known as the Accountancy Profession Act is expected to be promulgated in 
2001 which Act is expected to repeal the entire Public Accountants' and Auditors' Act, 
as well as the Municipal Accountants' Act and Section 60 of the Close Corporation Act. 
Auditing is still evolving , and as new problems appear it will of necessity be further 
modified and improved to meet the needs of the auditing profession. 
The next chapter will review the relevant literature relating to auditor switching over 
the years. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Auditor choice is determined by the client's qualities and requirements, potential 
auditor's qualities, and the auditing environment. For a company to switch its auditor, 
there needs to be a significant change in one (or more) of the afore-mentioned factors, 
since switching costs (direct or indirect) are frequently material. This study on auditor 
switching has concentrated on determining what are the contributing factors that 
resulted in clients switching their auditors. Previous studies on auditor switching 
identified certain potential explanations of the motivations behind such decisions. 
The following is a summary in chronological sequence of the major studies that have 
been undertaken in this area : 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 BURTON & ROBERTS (1967) 
These authors first studied the reasons for auditor changes among the largest USA 
corporations. The principal objective of the study was to systematically examine auditor 
changes that had occurred in recent years and the reasons for such changes. An 
additional objective of the study was to determine if any evidence could be found, in 
auditor changes, that corporations were seeking to exploit the economic relationship 
between them and their auditors in such a way as to threaten the independence of the 
auditors' attestation function. They examined 83 auditor changes from 620 Fortune 500 
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companies during the period 1952 through 1965 which were made up as follows:-
* 
* 
* 
* 
from large accounting firm to large accounting firm 
from small accounting firm to large accounting firm 
from small accounting firm to small accounting firm 
from large accounting firm to small accounting firm 
39 
31 
8 
5 
The authors sent out questionnaires to the management of the 83 companies which had 
changed their auditors and asked them to specify the principal reasons for the auditor 
change. The principal reason was a "change in management". In most cases this 
meant a major change in the top executive governance of the corporation. New 
management often will seek a complete "new deal" and commonly bring in new 
auditors. The second most frequent reason for change was a stated "need for 
additional services" primarily concentrated in the switches from small to large firms. 
Where there were changes among firms in the same size category, the need for 
additional services was usually a specified need, such as, the need for particular . 
overseas expertise or special geographical location. However, in five cases 
"dissatisfaction with current services" was listed by companies as the primary 
reason for change. 
This finding is supported by the research findings of Eichenseher & Shields (1983) 
and Addams & Davis (1994). In nine cases changes came about as a result of the 
need for "new financing". Their results also indicated that "audit fee and disputes 
over accounting principles" were not the primary reasons for auditor changes. They 
identified only six cases in which accounting principles were judged to be the principal 
reason for auditor change. No evidence was found in favour of opinion shopping. The 
authors concluded that most corporations prefer to employ the same auditors over long 
periods of time. In addition, Burton & Roberts (1967), stated that their examination of 
the reasons for change in auditor did not show any evidence that there was any threat 
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to the attestation function, since a change in accounting principle was hardly the main 
reason for auditor switching. Burton & Roberts (1967) findings are supported by 
Carpenter & Strawser (1971) and a study by an ad hoc committee of the AICPA 
(1971) and Chow & Rice (1982). Burton & Roberts ( 1967) findings consider "audit 
fees" as being the less significant variable surrounding auditor changes which opinion 
was consistent with the findings of Schwartz & Menon (1985), and Addams & Davis 
(1994). 
3.2.2 CARPENTER & STRAWSER (1971) 
The authors conducted a study regarding the displacement of auditors when 
corporations first issued securities nationally. They reported their findings on 
investigating a sample of corporations that had "gone public". The purpose of their 
study was to identify the extent of the CPA firm's displacement which arose as a result 
of. the SEC filings in the cases of corporations making their first public offer. The 
authors made reference to a study undertaken by the ad hoc committee of the AICPA 
(1971) where it was found that 165 firms participated in an SEC filing. Of these165, 
there were 103 instances of CPA firm displacement reported to the AICPA study with 
95, 1% of the displayed firms being replaced by "national" firms. Carpenter & 
Strawser (1971) also conducted a similar study of displacement of auditors of 379 
corporations which had "gone public" for the first time during the last quarter of 1969 
and the first quarter of 1970. The corporations were classified on the basis of whether 
the CPA firm was a national firm, a regional firm or a local firm. Questionnaires were 
sent out to the chief financial officers of these corporations. They found that local and 
regional firms were often replaced by national firms when a client "goes public". They 
concluded that the reasons for the change were the "prestige, reputation and greater 
technical ability" of the national firm ( 1971 :58). Thus their study tends to support the 
conclusions of the AI CPA study. Large auditor firms tend to lend greater credibility to 
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financial statements used in assessing the value of securities. 
3.2.3 BEDINGFIELD & LOEBB (1974) 
Bedingfield & Loeb analysed changes in auditors by type of practice (. ie. national firm 
or non-national firm) of the prior and new auditor. The objective was to determine the 
variables that contributed to auditor switching when the client company was required 
to report the switch to the SEC. The authors surveyed 250 companies by examining 
the 8-K reports of registrants for the period between November 1971 and February 
1973 by sending out questionnaires to businesses to establish the reasons for 
auditor switches. The authors gathered some interesting information on the 141 usable 
questionnaires returned. Some of the most frequent reasons provided by the 
respondents were as follows: 
1. The audit fee was too high. 
2. We disagreed with the auditors on certain accounting matters. 
3. We were not satisfied with the services provided by the auditors. 
4. Management wished to have a national auditing firm. 
5. Merger of our corporation with another corporation. 
6. Investment bankers insisted on a national auditing firm. 
7. We wanted the parent corporation and all subsidiaries to have the same auditor. 
8. The former auditors trained their juniors at our expense. 
9. Bankers or creditors insisted on a national auditing firm. 
10. We felt we might get better services if we rotated auditors (1974:68). 
From the results of the 141 companies that were analysed, they found that, except for 
switches from non-national CPA firms to national CPA firms, the significant reasons 
for changes in auditors as indicated by respondents in order of importance were (1 ), 
(3), (S)and (2) and the less significant reasons included (10) and (9) respectively. The 
authors concluded that "we did not find an overwhelming tendency for companies that 
CHAPTeR THREE : REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE PAGE 46 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
changed auditors to select a national firm as the new auditor''(1974:69). Bedingfield 
& Loeb's results indicated that "audit fees" was the significant variable surrounding 
auditor switching, which is consistent with the findings of Eichenseher & Shields 
(1983) and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998). Bedingfield & Loeb's second most 
frequent variable "dissatisfaction with auditors' services" is consistent with the 
findings of Eichenseher & Shields and Addams & Davis (1994), whilst "disputes 
over accounting principles" was consistent with the findings of Burton & Roberts 
(1967), and Fried & Schiff (1981) but inconsistent with the findings of Williams 
(1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), and Beattie & Feamley (1995) and (1998). However, 
Bedingfield & Loeb's other significant variables "mergers" and "management 
change" were considered to be consistent with the findings of Beattie & Feamley 
(1995 &1998). These findings were inconsistent with those of Burton & Roberts 
( 1967) that" audit fee competition" and "dissatisfaction with current audit services" 
were not the major factors in audit switches. For switches from non-national CPA firms 
to national CPA firms, their findings were consistent with those of AICPA (1971) and 
Carpenter & Strawser (1971 ), namely, that management, investment bankers and/ 
or "creditors desired a national CPA firm for their image". However, the findings 
relating to "rotation policy'' were consistent with the findings of Burton & Roberts 
(1967). 
3.2.4 FRIED & SCHIFF (1981) 
The authors carried out an investigation of whether the changes in auditors were 
associated with the changes in the listed share prices of client companies. The authors 
were specifically interested in the problem of the market reaction to the mandatory 
disclosure of auditor changes and disagreements, if any, on accounting and auditing 
issues during the past 18 months that client companies may have had with their 
displaced auditors. The data, names of companies that switched auditors in the four 
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year period 1972 through to 1975, was obtained from Corporate Profiles and Index of 
Corporate Events. The authors found a "negative market reaction" to 48 auditor 
switches but was unable to explain what had motivated this reaction. The findings are 
consistent with the research of Dunn, Hillier, & Marshall (1999) but inconsistent with 
the research of Nicols & Smith (1983) who found no significant market reaction to 
auditor changes. The authors concluded that "our results would seem to be inconsistent 
with the SEC requirement for a company to enumerate and describe disagreements 
with its auditors on accounting and auditing issues" (1981:338). 
3.2.5 CHOW & RICE (1982) 
Chow & Rice examined the association between qualified audit opinions and auditor 
switching. The purpose of their study was to establish the extent to which management 
may use auditor switches to pressure auditors into issuing clean opinions. They used 
a sample from all companies that had qualified opinions in 1973 and all companies that 
changed auditors between the 1973 and 197 4 fiscal year -ends from the 1973 and 197 4 
volumes of the Leasco Disclosure Journal. A Chi-square test for independence was 
used to examine the association between qualified opinions and auditor switching. The 
results of the Chi-square test indicated that auditor switching was not independent of 
receiving a "qualified opinion"(1982:328). In addition to the existence of a qualified 
opinion, Chow & Rice also considered certain other variables that might influence 
a firm to switch auditors: 
1. a management change, 
2. some merger activity, 
3. new financing, 
4. an accounting dispute with the auditor, and 
5. any other item identified by management as reason to switch auditors. 
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A conditional logit analysis was used to test the association between qualified audit 
opinions and auditor switches. The authors found that "qualified opinion" was the only 
variable significantly correlated with auditor switches which opinion is consistent with 
the research findings of Smith (1986), Crasswell (1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), 
Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996) and Pragasam & Sands (1996), when also 
compared with the less significant variables such as "management change, mergers, 
new financing", etc. However, a separate analysis of the data indicated that companies 
in certain industries were more likely to receive qualified opinions, and that certain audit 
firms were more likely to issue qualified opinions (1982:332). Teoh's (1992:7) model, 
by contrast, posits a region related to cost/benefit analysis where "no firm will switch 
auditors because the likelihood of a clean opinion from a new auditor is too low''. 
Further chi-square analysis showed that "firms that switched auditors after a qualified 
opinion were not more likely to receive a clean opinion in the following year when 
compared to the qualified firms that did not switch"(1982:334). Although the Burton & 
Roberts ( 1967) study failed to resolve whether accounting standards played a vital part 
in auditor switching, it did identify other variables such as "management changes" and 
"new financing", which influenced a firm's choice of auditors. These findings are 
supported by Carpenter & Strawser ( 1971) and a study by the ad hoc committee of the 
AICPA (1971). In addition, the results relating to "mergers" were consistent with the 
results of Bedingfield & Loeb (1974). Chow & Rice's findings are inconsistent with 
the findings of Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams (1988) , Haskins & Williams 
(1990), and Beattie & Feamley (1995) where "qualified opinion" was a less 
significant variable for auditor switching. 
3.2.6 De ANGELO (1982) 
De Angelo examined auditor switching in the oil and gas industry. The author used the 
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time periods 1973 to 1974 and 1976 to 1977 in his study. A sample of 246 firms in 
publicly-held segments of the oil and gas industry was used. A Chi-square and a z-test 
for comparisons of proportions in paired samples was employed to test the above 
sample of 246 firms. The results identified a preference for companies to choose an 
auditor who encouraged an accounting method that was consistent with the method 
favoured by management. 
3.2.7 EICHENSEHER & SHIELDS (1983) 
The authors empirically examined the conditions of demand in the market place for 
audit services. The authors attempted to identify the product dimensions (audit) which 
appeared to be most important in decisions made by the buyers of audit services. The 
sample defined all Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clients who had 
switched their auditors during the period 1 January 1976 to 30 September 1977. A 
questionnaire was sent to the Chief Financial Officers of each of the 349 USA 
Corporations which had reported changes in auditors during the stipulated period. A 
CPA firm's "services" were characterised as a package of attributes and the 
respondents were presented with a questionnaire and asked to rate both the displaced 
firm and the new CPA firm along certain dimensions. The attributes that were 
specifically considered were the following: 
1. ethical standards, 
2. reputation, 
3. industry expertise, ' 
4. audit team experience, 
5. geographical coverage, 
6. fees, 
7. working relationship, 
8. meeting deadlines, 
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9. technical qualifications, 
10. accessibility of the CPA firm, and 
11. range of services provided. 
The respondents first evaluated the terminated CPA firm on each of the eleven 
attributes, and then were required to rate the replacement CPA firm with identical forms. 
The respondents were asked to specify their reasons for changing auditors so that their 
responses could be compared with the results from the attribute analysis so as to 
assess the degree of similarity between the test results and the volunteered reasons 
for the change. After ranking the responses of each respondent on the above attributes 
for both the "hired" and "fired". CPA firms, and using a one-tail Kolmogoror-Smirnov 
two-sample test, a procedure comparing the ranks of a given attribute across "hired" 
and "fired" CPA firms, the authors found that for all companies in the sample "fees" and 
"working relationships" appeared to be the two most significant contributors to auditor 
switches, followed by technical qualifications and accessibility of the CPA firms. For 
auditor switches in the Big Eight CPA firms category, the authors found that "fees" and 
"working relationships" were also the most important elements to the clients and were 
independent of the client size, but unusually, they were relatively less important to small 
clients. Accessibility to the CPA firms was found to be significant only to the large client 
firms. When comparing auditor switches among the CPA firms of different sizes, "fees" 
was to be the most important element whilst the significance of other attributes in this 
context appeared to vary substantially as a function of the client size. Further, the 
respondents' volunteered reasons for change were in high agreement with their 
attribute rating, namely," fees", "working relationships" and "accessibility'' being 
deemed most important. The less significant variables included "industry expertise", 
"technical qualifications", "reputation", etc. The authors concluded by stating that 
"empirical tests results are, nonetheless consistent with the notion that price levels 
(fees) are important in all buying (auditor selection) contexts, but that the importance 
of various non-price CPA-firms attributes is dependent upon both client size and CPA 
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firm comparison contexts"(1983:33). Eichenseher & Shields results indicated that the 
"audit fees" variable was consistent with the findings of Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) 
and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) but inconsistent with the findings of Burton & 
Roberts (1967), Schwartz & Menon (1985) and Addams & Davis (1994) as regards 
auditor change. However, Eichenseher & Shields' (1983) opinion with regard to the 
other significant variable, "working relationship", is consistent with the findings of 
Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) and Addams & Davis (1994). 
3.2.8 NICHOLS & SMITH (1983) 
The authors argued that "if product differentiation exists, ceteris paribus, auditor 
changes between these two classes of audit firms should be associated with changes 
in the market valuation of the client firm". They stated that a change from a Big Eight 
auditor to a non-Big Eight auditor(B-N) should produce a negative market reaction 
whilst a change from a non-Big Eight auditor to a Big Eight auditor (N-B) should 
produce a positive market reaction(1983:536). Nichols & Smith (1983) used a sample 
of 22 firms that switched from Big Eight auditors to non-Big Eight auditors, and 29 firms 
that switched from non-Big Eight auditors to Big Eight auditors during the period 1973 
through to 1979. They analysed the Form 8-K and Wall Street Journal index to 
determine the earliest date the information concerning auditor change became publicly 
available. They examined the B-N and N-B groups' mean standardized residuals for 
the period four weeks before and three weeks after the announcement date to 
determine if they were significantly different from one another. The authors found that 
"the direction of the market reaction to a change in auditors was consistent with the 
prediction of the Dopuch-Simunic (D-S) model (i.e. the market appeared to react 
generally positively to a change from a non-Big Eight auditor to a Big Eight auditor and 
vice versa); however, the magnitude of the difference in the reactions was not 
statistically significant"(1983:543-544). Thus they concluded that their results did not 
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provide strong support for the D-S hypothesis of product differentiation. Fried & Schiff 
(1981) and Dunn, Hillier & Marshall (1999) observed a negative market reaction to 
audit switches in this instance which is contrary to the findings of Nichols & Smith 
(1983) as described above. 
3.2.9 McCONNELL (1984) 
McConnell carried out a study on the possibility that related disagreements between 
the auditor and his client would give rise to auditor switches. The study reported on the 
relative disagreement involvement rates experienced by both the Big Eight and non-Big 
Eight audit firms as predecessors and successors to auditor switches. A final sample 
of 728 companies was obtained for this study which consisted of all public companies 
that filed Form-K indicating a change in auditor during the five years ended 1978, as 
reported in the SEC News Digest. The author computed a Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient to test the strength of these relationships on the predecessor 
versus the successor ranks. The application of the Chi-square analysis revealed, 
contrary to that of Bedingfield & Loeb ( 197 4) and Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley 
(1993) that the Big Eight firms were more often both predecessors and successors to 
auditor switches involving disagreements. The rank-order test of the Big Eight 
predecessor and successor disagreement rank indicated a moderate inverse 
correlation. 
3.2.10 SCHWARTZ & MENON (1985) 
The authors examined the motivation for failing firms to switch auditors. They 
considered that "financial distress" can influence auditor switches since financial 
distress may be correlated with such factors as audit qualifications, reporting disputes, 
management changes, audit fee, and insurance needs which give rise to auditor 
switching. The authors argued that "the failure to control for economic condition might 
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have confounded the results of some earlier studies"(1985:249). Data were gathered 
by examining annual reports, 1 0-Ks, and proxy statements for the period 197 4 through 
to 1982. A sample of 132 bankrupt firms along with a matched-pair sample of non-
bankrupt firms was used to compare the incidence of auditor switching between failing 
and healthy firms. The sample of failing firms included only those companies whose 
shares were publicly traded in the years prior to bankruptcy on either the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMSE) during the years 
1974 to 1982. 
The authors applied the Chi-test for independence of classification to determine 
whether the tendency for failing companies to switch auditors was different from that 
of non-failing companies. The results of the tests indicated that financially distressed 
companies had a higher incidence of auditor switching (1985:260). The results of the 
other variables, namely, audit qualification and management changes did not show any 
statistical significance towards auditor switching. The results did show that there was 
a tendency for financially distressed companies to move to a different class of auditors 
(i.e. From Big Eight to non-Big Eight and vice versa). The authors concluded that the 
incentives behind auditor switching can vary according to the financial condition of the 
company. Schwartz & Menon's (1985) results were consistent with the findings of 
Haskins & Williams (1990) and Lennox (1999) that "financial distress" was one of 
the significant variables that contributed to auditor switching. These findings are also 
consistent with that of Chow & Rice (1982) who included "management changes" as 
one of the independent variables in their conditional logit model but failed to find the 
variable significant. Burton & Roberts (1967) and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998), 
however, used questionnaires as their data gathering instruments and identified 
"management changes" as one of the major causes for auditor switching. Whilst 
management changes evidently do give rise to auditor switches, that factor alone failed 
to explain the surveyed auditor switching in the sample of companies. Schwartz & 
Menon's (1985) results also found that the less significant variable "audit 
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qualification" was consistent with the research findings of Williams ( 1988), Haskins 
& Williams (1990), Beattie & Feamley (1995 &1998) and Pragasam & Sands (1996) 
whilst the less significant variable "audit fees" was consistent with the findings of 
Burton & Roberts (1967) and Addams & Davis (1994) but inconsistent with the 
research findings of Bedingfield & Loeb (1974), Eichenseher & Shields (1983), and 
Beattie & Feamley (1995) in this regard. 
3.2.11 HEALY & LYS (1986) 
Healy & Lys examined the reaction of clients of non-Big Eight audit firms to "mergers" 
of their auditors with Big Eight firms. They postulated that a non-Big Eight audit firm's 
clients will retain a Big Eight acquirer following a merger if they benefit from the Big 
Eight firm's specialised services and/or reputation. Clients that do not have these 
economic incentives to retain the Big Eight firms are more likely to change to another 
non-Big Eight audit firm following the merger (1986:251). The authors selected a 
sample of 110 clients from two of the largest mergers in the auditing industry, the 
merger of J.K. Lasser & Co. with Touche Ross & Co. in 1977 and the merger of S.D. 
Leidesdorf & Co. with Ernst & Ernst from the 1976 and 1978 volumes of Who Audits 
America and were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and OTC (Over the Counter) Exchange. 
They tested the hypothesis that "the probability that a client remains with a Big Eight 
auditor that acquires its non-Big Eight auditor is a function of the client's size, growth 
in size, and its future plans for issuing new debt or equity"(1986:257). A variety of 
statistical tools was used in the tests ranging from simple percentage to logit 
probability. The authors found that clients that are large and have high asset growth 
rates prior to the merger are likely to remain with the Big Eight firm to take advantage 
of its specialised services and geographic network of offices. Clients that are small and 
have a low asset growth are likely to return to another non-Big Eight audit firm 
( 1986:263). They also found certain evidence that the clients that issued long term debt 
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after the merger were more likely to remain with the Big Eight firm to take advantage 
of its reputation and thereby lower investors' information costs in assessing audit 
quality. 
3.2.12 SMITH (1986) 
Smith attempted to determine whether or not the types of audit reports issued for the 
periods surrounding the auditor switch remained consistent with the existence of 
"auditor opinion shopping". Data was gathered from several sources, covering the 
period 1 November 1977 to 31 December 1982, namely, companies listed on the major 
stock exchanges data tapes, OTC provided by Compustat and from the National 
Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS). Smith analysed 139 cases where 
an auditor switch followed a previous year's "subject to" opinion to provide evidence 
on the above issue. In Category 1 he found 100 cases where the successor auditor 
issued a qualified opinion as had the predecessor auditor. In Category 2 he found 39 
cases where the predecessor issued qualified opinions, but the successor issued an 
unqualified opinion. Smith further classified the 39 cases of Category 2 into four 
groups: 
1. The predecessor had apparently agreed with the successor and had reissued 
its report as unqualified. This agreement was generally due to the resolution 
of the uncertainty (15 cases). 
2. The successor's report indicated that the predecessor had reissued the report 
as unqualified, although the predecessor's report was not presented with the 
comparative financial statements (5 cases). 
3. The predecessor's report was reissued with qualifications, while the successor's 
report was unqualified (13 cases). 
4. The successor's report indicated that the predecessor's report was qualified. 
No indication with respect to reissuance was provided (6 cases)(1986:98). 
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The author found that groups 3 and 4 above gave some indication of the possibility of 
opinion shopping. In addition, he classified group 3 companies further to see whether 
the uncertainty that required qualification by the predecessor had changed in the year 
of the auditor switch. There appeared to be only five cases of disagreement between 
the predecessor and successor auditors about the need for qualification which he 
considered to indicate the possibility of opinion shopping. Smith (1986) found that 
firms switched auditors after receiving "qualified opinions", which opinion was 
supported by the findings of Chow & Rice (1982), Crasswell (1988), Johnson & Lys 
(1990), Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996). These 
findings were, however, contradictory to those of the Schwartz & Menon (1985), 
Williams (1988), Haskins & Williams (1990), and Beattie & Feamley (1995) research 
findings. 
3.2.13 SIMON & FRANCIS (1988) 
The authors carried out a study to determine both the existence and degree of "audit 
fee cutting" on 1984 audit fees of 214 public companies switching auditors during the 
period 1979 to 1984. They used a control sample of 226 firms that did not .switch 
auditors over the same period in order to estimate price cutting. Continuing 
engagement audit fees were based on those 226 firms. The firms identified for testing 
were obtained from the 4th to the 16th Editions of Who Audits America (Data Financial 
Press) for the period 1979 to 1984 and for which financial statement data was available 
in public sources (Moody's manuals, OTC manuals etc.). Data on audit fees for firms 
switching auditors were gathered by means of questionnaires. The authors tested for 
the presence for price cutting for the second through the sixth years as well as the 
initial engagement year to determine whether price cutting persisted beyond the initial 
year, and if so, to determine when audit fees returned to the normal (control sample) 
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level for a continuing engagement (1988:256). Univariate tests (t-tests and Mann-
Whitney U-tests) were applied to the sample. The test results revealed that firms that 
switched auditors had lower audit fees in the first two years after the switch but that 
fees returned to normal levels within 3-4 years. They also found no evidence that 
auditor reputation was a compensating factor for discounts or lower audit fees in the 
first year. The authors concluded that "price cutting" systematically occurs and is 
economically significant (1988:267). These results are consistent with "low balling" 
predictions from Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990) and Gregory & Collier (1996) that 
price cutting does indeed occur. Butterworth & Houghton's (1995) results showed, 
however, that price-cutting was not observable, as a general phenomenon, that is, there 
was no general, system-wide price-cutting. 
3.2.14 CRASWELL (1988) 
Craswell investigated the association between "qualified opinions" and auditor 
switches in Australia. He analysed the factors that were likely to affect the managers'. 
decision to switch auditors. In hypothesizing the association between qualified 
opinions and auditor switches, he found that there were costs associated with receiving 
a qualified opinion and switching auditors. Likewise he stated that auditors had an 
economic interest in the specialised knowledge that they had acquired in respect of 
their clients and both auditor and client had an incentive to maintain that established 
relationship between themselves. The data base was obtained by examining the annual 
reports of companies listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange during the period 1950 
through to 1979. The author only considered first-time qualifications in his final sample 
of 638 companies. A control group of industrial companies that did not receive a 
qualified opinion for the same period was also selected. The sample was also 
partitioned according to whether an auditor switch occurred within one year. The data 
reflected that the proportion of auditor switches for companies with first-time 
qualification was significantly greater than was the case in respect of the control group 
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of unqualified companies. The evidence is consistent with an association between 
auditor switches and qualified audit opinions (1988:27). It was also found that the 
proportion of companies that obtained clean opinions after switching auditors was 
greater than the respective proportion for companies that did not change auditors. 
Craswell (1988) concluded by stating that managers' decisions to switch auditors had 
been presumed to be based upon the costs and benefits of alternate actions. A number 
of potential costs associated with audit qualifications and auditor switches were 
identified and the available evidence on the nature of those costs was reviewed. It 
appeared that the costs of the qualification were directly related to the seriousness of 
the qualification. Consequently, following serious qualifications, managers would have 
an incentive to switch auditors if, by doing so, they anticipated avoiding the costs of the 
qualifications (1988:30). Chow & Rice (1982), Smith (1986), Johnson & Lys (1990), 
Roberts, Glezen & Jones, (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996) provided 
evidence that auditor switches are more likely to occur following a qualification while 
Schwartz& Menon (1985), Williams (1988), Haskins& Williams (1990), and Beattie 
& Feamley (1995) determined that a higher proportion of those companies that had not 
received a prior qualified audit finding had switched auditors. 
3.2.15 WILLIAMS (1988) 
Williams developed a theoretical model to explain auditor switching. The purpose of 
the research was to examine only those changes which relate to switches between a 
relatively homogenous group of auditors in order to improve the quality of principal 
assurances or to seek accommodating auditors (1988:252). The author used three 
theoretical concepts of ten variables to help explain why certain events trigger a change 
in auditors:-
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1. Change in client contracting environment was affirmed by: 
* management changes, 
* percentage of change in common stock, 
* percentage change in sales. 
2. Auditor effectiveness was to be tested by using: 
* auditor's percentage of industry market share, 
* longevity on the audit engagement. 
3. Damage to client's reputation was measured by: 
* client received negative media publicity, 
* client received a first-year qualified opinion, 
* client changed accounting principles, 
* percentage change in return on assets, 
* percentage change in earnings per share. 
A matched-pair design was used to compare clients who changed auditors with similar 
clients vvho did not change auditors during a five year period. The criteria used to select 
a final sample of 186 companies in the experimental group comprised of companies 
that: 
1. changed auditors between 1977 and 1982; 
2. had changed from one Big Eight to another Big Eight auditor; 
3. were registered on the NYSE or AMEX , and 
4. had changed auditors for reasons other than a merger, mandatory rotation policy or 
subsequent to the declaration of bankruptcy. 
The matched pair of "control group" of companies that were registered on the NYSE 
or AMEX but did not change auditors between 1975 and 1983 was developed. The 
author collected publicly available data on the ten operational variables above for both 
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the 186 experimental and control groups respectively and applied the logistic 
regression (logic) model to test the correlation between auditor switching and the 
independent variables as indicated above. The results identified three determinants for 
classifying a potential auditor change: 
• Auditor's industry market share, 
• Longevity on the audit engagement, 
• Client received negative media publicity. 
The model correctly classified 66, 1 % of the companies of the 186 matched-pairs in 
respect of the above three variables. The results of a validation sample of the firms that 
changed auditors during the test period 1983 to 1984 supported the earlier findings. 
The variables management changes, percentage in changes in common stock or sales, 
qualified opinion, dispute over accounting principles, percentage change in return on 
assets and percentage change in earnings per share were not found to be related to 
auditor switching in his research. The author concluded by supporting the contention 
that auditor switching was not caused by companies "shopping around" f~r a lenient 
auditor. Companies that changed auditors appeared to be either dissatisfied with the 
quality of the predecessor auditor or perceived that the successor auditor could provide 
superior audit efficiencies. In addition, Williams (1988) determined that, companies 
that wanted to improve their monitoring system had a tendency to switch 
auditors(1988:259 ). The less significant variables "management changes", "qualified 
opinion", and "accounting disputes" were consistent with the research findings of 
Schwartz & Menon (1985), whilst the variable "qualified opinion" was inconsistent 
with the research findings of Chow & Rice (1982), Smith (1986), Roberts, Glezen & 
Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), Krishnan, Krishnan & 
Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996), and" management changes" was 
inconsistent with the research findings of Burton & Roberts (1967), Bedingfield & 
Loeb (1974), and Beattie & Feamley (1995). 
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3.2.16 JOHNSON & LYS (1990) 
The authors investigated the simulated correlation between changes in clients' 
financing, investing, and operating characteristics, and the auditor changes by these 
clients. They argued that the incumbent auditor's competitive advantage for an existing 
client can be impaired over time due to changes in the client company's operations and 
activities, thus causing the client to switch to a less costly supplier. A sample was 
extracted from auditor changes reported by Disclosure Journal (January 1973 through 
to April 1975) and Who Audits America (January 1976 through to December 1982). 
Data was also obtained from Compustat Tapes. The authors computed the Spearman 
(rank order) correlation coefficient between each variable and relative size of audit firm. 
They found that the variables "asset growth rate", "post auditor switching", "new 
financing", "pre-auditor switch income", "client size" and "leverage" were 
significantly correlated with changes to auditors of different sizes. The significant 
variables "asset growth rate" and "new financing" are consistent with the research 
results of Chaney, Jeter, & Shaw (1997). The results ofthe logit coefficient estimates 
were consistent with the results of the Spearman correlation above. Auditor switching 
could generally be attributed to cross-temporal changes in client characteristics and 
differences in audit firm costs. The authors concluded that "our results imply that 
"audit qualifications" and "accounting disputes" do not (on average) have a 
dominant impact on the direction of auditor realignment" (1990:306). The results of 
this research were consistent with the findings of Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams 
(1988), and Beattie & Feamley (1995) as regards "audit qualifications" and 
"accounting disputes" but inconsistent with the research findings of Chow & Rice 
(1982), Smith (1986), Crasswell (1988), Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, 
Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and 
Pragasam & Sands (1996) pertaining to auditor switching. 
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3.2.17 HASKINS & WILLIAMS (1990) 
Haskins & Williams study was motivated by a desire to increase their understanding 
of the auditor switch phenomenon. The authors were motivated because they found 
very few studies which had investigated: 
1. the contingent nature of various auditor-switch factors, 
2. the relative levels of importance of those factors, and 
3. the combined classification power of those factors as they apply to intra-Big Eight 
auditor switches. 
Their study developed a broad-based descriptive model for classifying intra-Big Eight 
auditor switches that addressed the above-mentioned issues. They observed the 
following ten independent variables in their study: 
1. financial distress, 
2. client size based on sales, 
3. audit opinion, 
4. change in ownership, 
5. initial public stock offering, 
6. client growth based on changes in sales, 
7. audit-firm expensiveness, 
8. degree of audit-firm industry specialisation, 
9. audit-firm quality, and 
10. audit-firm prestige.(1990:60-61) 
The authors used data from a sample of 5154 publicly traded companies from the 
Disclosure Online Database, the SEC News Digest, and Who Audits America. The 
study investigated only SEC-registered companies audited by the Big Eight firms during 
1985 and 1986. The data was analysed by using the RPA (Recursive Partitioning 
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Algorithm) statistical package, namely, the CART model (which is a sequence of binary 
partitions, resembling a decision tree, depicting splits in the independent variables). 
The model so presented was validated and correctly classified 56% of the companies 
switching auditors. Their findings indicated that the significant variables, "client 
financial distress", "size", and "growth", along with "audit-firm expensiveness" and 
"industry dominance", were found to be the most important factors associated with 
auditor switches, whereas "audit firm quality'' and "percentage change in client 
ownership" were moderately important. The three other variables included in the 
model- "audit-firm prestige", "audit opinion", and the existence of an "initial public 
stock offering" by the client- were found to be relatively unimportant auditor-switch 
factors. The authors concluding remark was that "one of the major research findings 
of this intra-Big Eight auditor change study is that auditor change determinants appear 
to be contingent on the presence of other factors"(1990:70). Haskins & Williams 
(1990) results were consistent with the research of Schwartz & Menon (1985) and 
Lennox (1999) where "financial distress" was the significant variable and also with 
Williams (1988) where "industry dominance" was one of the significant variables for 
auditor switching. The impact of the less significant variable "qualified opinion" was 
consistent with the results of the research of Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams 
(1988), and Beattie & Feamley (1995). 
3.2.18 ROBERTS. GLEZEN & JONES (1990) 
The authors investigated the determinants of an auditor switch in the public sector 
using the data from a public independent schools district in Texas, USA They 
hypothesized that public-sector auditor switches may be influenced by "fee 
consideration". The dependent variable was equal to one if the school district switched 
auditors and zero otherwise. Together with audit fees, the study also applied the 
following explanatory variables that could be associated with public-sector auditor 
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switch: 
1. report of internal accounting control noncompliance, 
2. report of school board noncompliance, 
3. report of administrative noncompliance, 
4. preceding year's audit fee expressed as a percentage of the study year's audit fee 
(year of switch), 
5. bonds issued in the year following the switch, 
6. size of school districts, 
7. percentage change in school board membership for two preceding years, and 
8. school district superintendent changed in the preceding year. 
Data sources for the study were obtained from the Texas School Directory for the 
period 1980-1981 through 1984-1985, Bench Marks for School District Budgets in 
Texas for the period 1981-1982 through 1984-1985, the Readers Digest 1986 Almanac 
and Yearbook for Texas School Districts. A control group of no-switch school districts 
was also used in this study. The data was analysed by using a stepwise logistic 
regression model to investigate the relationship between auditor switches and the 
explanatory variable identified above. The results of the investigation indicated that the 
variables (1 ), (2) ("adverse audit reports"), (4) and (6) were significantly related to 
auditor switching, but "changes in managemenf' was not. The authors concluded 
"that auditors may be replaced for reporting information that reflects negatively on the 
school board, also the relationship between auditor change and a reduction in audit 
fees may imply that "low balling" activity occurs in the Texas school district audit 
market"(1990:227-228). Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990) findings concerning 
"adverse audit reports" are consistent with the findings of Chow & Rice (1982), 
Smith (1986), Craswell (1988), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), Krishnan, 
Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996) whilst Simon & Francis 
(1988) considered "price-cutting" to be significant for auditor switches. Roberts, 
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Glezen, & Jones (1990) findings concerning "qualified opinions" and "management 
changes" are, however, less significant variables in the studies of Schwartz & Menon 
(1985), Williams (1988), Haskins & Williams (1990), Johnson & Lys (1990) and 
Beattie & Feamley (1995). 
3.2.19 WILSON & GRIMLUND (1990) 
Wilson & Grimlund examined the importance of an auditor's reputation in relation to 
the client's decision to retain or change auditors. Their examination was based upon 
the impact of diminished reputation of an audit firm's market share. All published 
editions of Who Audits America were used to gather information for the study regarding 
client reaction to the SEC actions. A sample of 18 audit firms that had received 
disciplinary actions and charges of substandard auditing involving Big Eight and 
second tier public accounting firms by the SEC for the 11 year period 1976-1986 was 
used (1990:45). They adopted the approach of comparing the status of the affected 
firms after the SEC action to their status before the action. The audit firms market 
share for the action year and the following year were computed. These measures were 
effected to ascertain whether the market share had diminished. The authors 
concluded that "the results of the study provide evidence that an SEC action has an 
adverse effect on a public accounting firm's market share and client base"(1990:59). 
Such firms also had more difficulty in retaining their clients than did other audit firms. 
3.2.20 MENON & WILLIAMS (1991) 
The authors carried out an investigation into the belief that initial public offerings 
(I PO's) by client companies repeatedly lead to auditor switches towards audit firms with 
greater perceived credibility. The study considered auditor credibility in I PO's from the 
perspective of the client and the investment banker. The sample for the study 
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consisted of all companies that filed a final prospectus with the SEC in1985 and 1986 
for their initial public offering of common stock. Data for the study was obtained from 
the Registered Offerings Statistics (ROS) tape maintained by the SEC and secondary 
sources, namely, Going Public: The JPO Reporter, Who Audits America, and the Public 
Accounting Report (PAR) list of auditors of IPO's. Auditors were classified into 3 
categories: Big Eight, National, and Local (in descending order of credibility). Two 
separate analyses related to auditor choices around the time of the IPO's were 
conducted. The Chi-Square test revealed that there was a higher incidence of auditor 
switching in the I PO sample when compared with auditor switching among public 
companies. Menon & Williams (1991), in addition, used a logistic regression model 
to test for the hypothesized association between credibility-increasing auditor switches 
and the following variables: 
1. investment banker class, 
2. the percentage of stock ownership dilution caused by the offering, 
3. the type of offering, 
4. the post-offering size of the firm, and 
5. the increase in the size of the firm. 
The regression test revealed that companies with prestigious investment bankers were 
more likely to switch from local auditors to more credible auditors for the I PO. They 
concluded that "clients that select larger auditors tend to be those that employ 
"prestigious investment bankers" and make "firm commitmenf' offerings" 
(1991 :330). 
3.2.21 De FOND (1992) 
De Fond conducted a study to explore the association between changes in client firm 
agency costs and auditor switching. The data for the study was obtained from the 1Oth 
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Edition of Who Audits America (June 1983) giving a sample of 131 companies that 
experienced auditor switching. The study explored the relationship by examining 131 
auditor changes for an association between changes in auditor quality and changes in 
agency conflicts around the time of the auditor switch. The statistical technique of 
principal components analysis was used to model the changes in auditor quality as a 
combination of size, brand-name, industry expertise, and independence. The agency 
conflicts were proxied by leverage, management ownership, and size of short-term 
accruals. Changes in agency conflicts were measured over a period spanning two 
years before the auditor change through to two years after the change. The results of 
the study provided support for the hypothesis that "changes in management 
ownership" and "leverage" were associated with changes in audit quality, 
independently of changes in firm growth and security issues. The association also 
revealed that managers seemed to switch auditor in anticipation of some agency 
conflicts and in reaction to others. 
3.2.22 TEOH (1992) 
Teoh examined the qualification decision of the auditor faced with the possibility that 
the client will change auditors if a qualified opinion were to be issued. The author 
considers two types of auditors: mechanical and strategic. A mechanical auditor 
assesses the client's situation and issues an opinion, without considering the 
possibility of a switch by the client. A strategic auditor, however, engages in a cost-
benefit analysis, specifically balancing the costs of the loss of the client (if a switch 
follows the issuance of a qualified opinion) against the costs of litigation associated with 
the issuance of an incorrect opinion. The client, on the other hand, is fundamentally 
assumed to switch after a qualified opinion if costs are sufficiently low or if a firm value 
is sufficiently high. Teoh's model encompasses an interesting fundamental theory, 
"the incentive to switch auditors comes from the positive revaluation of the firm by 
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investors because a new audit partially reveals an initial adverse audit assessment 
error, and a consequential partial revelation of the firm's favourable information" 
(1992:8). This theory implies that there are differences in quality across auditors, and 
might imply that new auditors are modestly more mindful than continuing auditors. 
Teoh concluded by saying that "auditor dependence arising from the manager's threat 
of dismissal changes the information conveyed by the audit opinion" (1992:17). The 
author showed that when switches are costless, investor reaction could be negative 
even when the auditor did not collude with management. This contradicted the opinions 
of previous studies which argued that the market reaction to auditor switches was 
negative because the firm was seeking to influence the auditor (eg. Fried & Schiff 
(1981), Chow & Rice (1982), Schwartz & Menon (1985), and Matsumura, 
Subramanyan & Tucker (1997). 
3.2.23 ANDERSON, STOKES & ZIMMER (1993) 
The authors conducted a study that investigated the relationship between attributes of 
corporate takeover and the decision to retain or switch the auditor of the acquired 
company when the takeover was successful. A final sample of 60 Australian takeovers 
that occurred between January 1978 and June 1985 was selected from the Centre for 
Independent Studies Takeover Data Base. Excluded were those takeovers for which 
both the acquires and the acquiror had the same auditor before the takeover. A two-
year window following the takeover was used to identify whether or not the acquiror's 
auditor replaced the acquires's auditor. The authors applied Univariate tests on the 
independent variables for takeover sample. The study analysed the 60 takeovers and 
measured the impact of auditor size as it related to the impact on efficiencies of scale. 
It also measured the asset similarity of the acquiror and the acquires using two 
measures. The first measure employed a rating from a horizontal merger (assets 
similar) to a conglomerate rating (assets diverse). The second measure compared the 
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acquiror's and the acquiree's secured debt to equity ratio to proxy asset similarity. The 
results of the study reflected that 44 of the 60 acquirors elected to switch to their 
existing auditor rather than to deal with two separate auditors, lending general support 
to the concept of economies of scale. There was no support, however, for the increased 
effects due to the acquiror's auditor being larger than the acquiree's auditor. Support 
for the influence of assets similarity was mixed. The greater the diversity of the 
acquisition, the greater the likelihood of switching to the acquirors's auditor (1993:65). 
The authors concluded that future research could attempt to directly measure the 
concept in terms of attributes of the audit firms themselves, rather than those of their 
clients (1993:73). 
3.2.24 DHALIWAL, SCHATZBERG & TROMBLEY (1993) 
The authors empirically investigated the relationship between economic performance 
of client firms and the occurrence of auditor-client disagreements which lead to auditor 
switches. Two groups of 71 samples were used in this study: firstly, the treatment group 
(disagreement) which consisted of all clients listed on the daily Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) tapes pertaining to businesses that changed auditors during 
the period 1 January 1973 to 31 December 1982, and secondly, the control group (no 
disagreement) which consisted of companies from the same industry as the 
disagreement firms which changed their auditors during the ten-year period, but did not 
report a disagreement. The authors argued that economic incentives for auditors and 
their clients were such that the economic condition of the client firm might be inversely 
related to the likelihood of auditor-client disagreement. Specifically, a client that 
experienced weak or dwindling financial performance might face increased costs from 
engaging or contracting constraints. Client's management might prefer an auditor who 
permits the client to inflate earnings. The auditor, however, would face increased costs 
in this situation, as the auditor's risk of litigation and loss of reputation increases for 
such a client. If the auditor does not accede to the proposed accounting which inflates 
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earnings, the conflict between the auditor and the client might only be resolved by a 
client decision to switch auditors. Univariate tests were applied to the two sets of 
samples. The results of the study indicated that "auditor-client disagreements" 
preceding auditor switches were correlated negatively with the economic performance 
of the client firm. Particularly, clients who switched auditors and disclosed a 
disagreement displayed poorer operating performance and higher debt levels in years 
prior to: 
1. clients who switched auditors without a disclosed agreement or, 
2. a common industry group of clients. In addition, many of the measures declined during 
the period leading up to the disagreement. 
The nature of the disagreements that were reported were: 
1. Revenue recognition 38% 
2. Asset valuation 11 o/o 
3. Footnote disclosure 11 o/o 
4. Expense recognition 7% 
5. Opinion qualification 7% 
6. Other 26% 
The authors reported that "the results are too weak to conclude that disagreement 
clients are changing to smaller auditors (a possible proxy for lower audit quality) 
relative to the no-disagreement clients" (1993:36). The following studies have also 
examined auditor switching and/or auditor -client disagreements, Fried & Schiff ( 1981 ), 
Chow & Rice (1982), Nichols & Smith (1983), McConnell (1984), Smith (1986), 
Crasswell (1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996) but there 
was little theoretical or empirical research regarding the economic factors and rationale 
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underlying auditor-client disagreement followed by auditor switching contained therein. 
3.2.25 ADDAMS & DAVIS (1994) 
Addams & Davis surveyed what criteria private companies used in selecting audit 
firms and further what such companies reasons were for switching audit firms. The 
authors surveyed the INC 500, the 500 fastest growing, private companies in America. 
The INC Magazine selected the 1992 INC 500 from 21 000 candidates, a criteria for 
selection being that the company must have been independent and privately held. 
Because of the population size, sampling was not used. Instead, the researchers 
attempted to contact the CEO's of all 500 companies. A questionnaire was sent out to 
the CEO's which requested them to rate the importance of the following 12 factors 
relating to the selection of the audit firm: 
Factors for choosing audit firms following the survey of INC 500 CEO's showing 
results in descending order of importance: 
1. Personal relationship established between audit firm's key people and the company's 
key-decision makers during course of proposal process, 
2. Quality of audit firm's service team to be used in engagement: technical expertise, 
3. Fee proposed, 
4. Quality of audit firm's service team to be used in engagement: industry expertise, 
5. Oral presentation quality (following written proposal), 
6. Broad range of services available with audit firm, 
7. Size of audit firm, 
8. Written proposal quality, 
9. Recommendation from friend or contact in another organisation, 
10. Acquaintance of member of audit firm with key employee or member of board of 
directors of company, 
11. Location of audit firm's offices, and 
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12. International services available with audit firm. 
Topping the list of four key factors that were pertinent was "personal relationship". 
Addams & Davis's (1994) findings are consistent with that of Beattie & Feamley 
(1995 &1998), Fleming (1996), and Behn, Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson 
(1997) that a personal relationship is one of the most important attributes that a client 
looks for when he is searching for an auditor. CEO's placed considerable importance 
on the relationships between the audit firm's key people and the company's key 
decision-makers during the course of the proposal process. "Technical expertise" was 
revealed to be an important factor that companies would expect of their audit team, 
which aspect is consistent with the research findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995) but 
inconsistent with the findings of Behn, Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson (1997). 
Small, growing companies expect the assigned audit team to have excellent technical 
credentials. "Fees" was not the dominant factor when selecting an audit firm but a 
significant variable for auditor switching, which is consistent with the findings of Beattie 
& Feamley (1998) but inconsistent with the research findings of Fleming (1996). 
Similarly "quality of industry expertise" of the assigned audit team ranked fourth, 
indicating that the importance CEO's place on the auditors' understanding of their type 
of business is consistent with that of the research findings of Behn, Carcello, 
Hermanson & Hermanson ( 1997) but inconsistent with the research results of Beattie 
& Feamley (1995). The authors found that the less significant characteristics "size of 
audit firm" and "geographical location of offices" are consistent with the research 
findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995). 
In addition the CEO's were asked to rate the relative importance of 10 factors relating 
to their switching to another firm: 
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Factors for changing audit firms following the survey of INC 500 CEO's . Results 
in descending order of importance. 
1. Not sufficiently proactive in delivering services to company, 
2. Lack of responsiveness to audit firm's service, 
3. No new ideas to help company, 
4. Inadequate understanding of company's business, 
5. Fees too high for value of services received, 
6. Inadequate communication between audit team and company personnel, 
7. Change of personnel on audit team assigned to company, 
8. Dispute over accounting issues, 
9. Interpersonal clashes between audit team and company personnel, and 
10. Periodic rotation of CPA firms important to company (1994:40). 
Of the INC 500 CEO's responding to the survey, 58% stated that their company had 
switched audit firms during the previous five years. On top of the list of reasons for 
switching was "not proactive/not service driven". CEO's thus indicated that poor 
service can be fatal. The first and second factors for switching to another auditor 
centred on the audit firm not being proactive and not responsive. Closely aligned with 
these two service related factors was "no new ideas" which rated third closely behind 
"responsiveness". Just as CEO's rated "industry expertise" in the selection process, 
the factor "inadequate understanding of the company's business" ranked fourth 
among the reasons for switching audit firms. These four factors were placed higher than 
"audit fees" in the overall rankings of the CEO responses. The CEO's rated "fees" as 
the fifth most important factor in switching audit firms. While the cost of services 
rendered played a role in retention, fees was not the dominant issue. The results of the 
survey indicated that meeting client needs was the overwhelming issue. The authors 
concluded by stating that "client loyalty cannot be taken for granted. Although fees are 
naturally important, practitioners should spend less partner/manager time number-
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crunching to manipulate the audit fee 'just a bit lower' on each engagement. Rather, 
more emphasis should be placed on training managers and staff in cultivating clients, 
enhancing present relationships, and staying on the cutting edge technically in 
order to proactively assist a firm in its questfor greater profitability" (1994:41 ). Addams 
& Davis's (1994) survey findings concerning auditor changes by client companies 
refers to "not proactive/not service driven" as the significant variables attributable to 
auditor switching which findings are consistent with the research of Bedingfield & 
Loeb (1974) and Eichenseher & Shields (1983) whilst "fees", "disputes over 
accounting issues" and "periodic rotation policy" were determined to be less 
significant variables surrounding auditor switching by Burton & Roberts (1967). The 
authors found "audit fees" to be a less significant variable surrounding auditor 
switching which is also consistent with the research of Burton & Roberts (1967) and 
Schwartz & Menon (1985) but inconsistent with the findings of Bedingfield & Loeb, 
Eichenseher & Shields, and Beattie & Feamley (1995 &1998) where "audit fees" 
was determined to be the significant variable surrounding auditor switching. 
3.2.26 KRISHNAN JAGAN (1994) 
Krishnan Jagan carried out a study which focussed on the auditor's opinion 
formulation process for switching and non-switching clients in the year prior to the 
switch. The study examined the possibility that auditor switches were triggered not by 
the receipt of qualified opinions but by the auditor's use of conservative treatment for 
certain of his clients. A final sample of 2989 observations for 1986 and 1987 
respectively was drawn from the Disclosure Inc. Database. An ordered probit model 
of the qualification decision was estimated by the author, with different threshold values 
for prospective switchers and non-switchers measuring different judgements applied 
to the two groups of clients. The findings revealed that auditors treat switchers more 
conservatively (than non-switchers) in the opinion decision, after controlling for 
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differences in clients' financial conditions. The author concluded that "switching rates 
seem to be higher when qualified opinions are based on a conservative application of 
standards" (1994:214), that is, when the quality level is higher than that desired by 
managers. The evidence indicated that audit opinions do not improve after switches 
which suggests that "opinion shopping" was generally futile. Chow & Rice (1982) 
suggested that opinion shopping is also a motivation for client-initiated auditor 
switches. Opinion shopping takes place when the client initiates a change in auditors 
with a desire to obtain a different opinion than the one expressed by the incumbent 
auditor. The author finds, however, that it is not the desire to receive a different opinion 
that motivates the change in auditors but rather the conservatism of the incumbent 
auditor which triggers a switch in audit firm. Even when there is no opinion shopping, 
there also could be factual disagreement between the client and the auditor which could 
lead to a switch. The following studies also determined that auditor-client 
disagreements, were significant factors in auditor switching: Fried & Schiff (1981), 
Nichols & Smith (1983), Smith (1986), Johnson & Lys (1990), Roberts, Glezen & 
Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), Krishnan, Krishnan & 
Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996). 
3.2.27 BUTTERWORTH & HOUGHTON (1995) 
The authors investigated the relationship between auditor switching and audit fees, 
whether or not auditor change was associated with price-cutting. The research was 
based on a population of all publicly listed companies under the control of the Western 
Australian Division of the Australian Securities Commission in the region, and not on 
a sample, and the model developed for the research allowed for control of potentially 
confounding variables. The data used in this research was based on 268 companies 
that fulfilled the selection criteria extracted from a computerised data base of Annual 
Reports of 433 Western Australian companies during 1987 and 1988. A multiple linear 
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regression model of "audit fees" was used to test for "price-cutting". The results of 
the investigation rejected the proposition that new auditors will charge significantly less 
than incumbent auditors. It was observed, however, that auditor switching was 
associated with increases in the total of audit and non-audit service fees paid to the 
auditor. The results showed that "as a general phenomenon, "price-cutting" was not 
observable, that is, there was no general, system-wide price-cutting" (1995:340). By 
contrast, Simon & Francis (1988) and Gregory & Collier (1996) findings showed a 
significant association between auditor switching and "price-cutting" in the early years 
of engagement. 
3.2.28 CHANEY, JETER & SHAW (1995) 
The authors carried out a study that provided evidence regarding the association 
between direct solicitation activities and the dominance of large audit firms in the audit 
market. Clients may switch from a non-Big Eight auditor to a Big Eight auditor for 
varied reasons including: 
1. Internal changes that took place within the client which made realignment to a larger 
auditor desirable. 
2. Brand name demand. 
3. Large audit firms' predatory activities. 
Previous research on realignment activities (Johnson & Lys, 1990 and Francis & 
Simon, 1987) between large and small audit firms supported the idea that clients of 
small audit firms change to a large audit firm either to take advantage of available 
economies from specialised audit technologies or to be associated with the brand name 
of the large audit firm. A final sample of 5949 clients (3886 clients in the allowed market 
and 2063 clients in the banned market) was selected from the Compustat Annual 
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Industrial tape for the period 1980 through to 1988. The hypothesis was tested in its 
null form as the policy of allowing direct solicitation, as opposed to banning solicitation. 
The client-auditor realignment, previously made reference to the period before the 
realignment decision (allowed market) and after referred to the period after the decision 
(banned market). The logistic regression analysis of the model presented was used to 
test the null hypothesis that the likelihood of client-auditor realignment did not differ 
between clients operating in the banned and allowed markets. The results indicated 
that there was no empirical evidence that client-auditor realignment from non-Big Eight 
auditors to Big Eight auditors occurred more frequently in the markets that allowed 
direct solicitation when compared with markets restricting direct solicitation. Whilst the 
Big Eight had indeed dominated the audit market in the 1980's , there was no evidence 
that this growth had been associated with direct solicitation activities. The results 
provided positive evidence that "solicitation" did not play a role in the displacement 
of smaller audit firms by larger firms. The authors concluded that their "findings suggest 
that the controversial move toward allowing more aggressive marketing techniques by 
auditors has not hurt the competitive position of smaller firms. In particular, the policy 
of allowing solicitation does not appear to have increased the dominance of Big Eight 
auditors over non-Big Eight auditors" (1995:32). 
3.2.29 BEATTIE & FEARNLEY (1995) 
The authors explored the importance of audit firm characteristics and the factors that 
motivate auditor change. They identified 29 potentially desirable auditor characteristics 
and elicited their relative importance. They also identified 26 stated reasons for 
consideration of a change in auditors, the main reasons for considering a change and 
reasons for not subsequently changing auditors. Beattie & Feamley drew a sample 
from the population of domestic officially listed and USM Companies in the UK and 
Ireland as at 30 April 1992. A systematic sample of 300 companies was obtained from 
Extel Financial Ltd. A closed-form questionnaire containing six sections was sent out 
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to the sample companies. Responses from 210 listed UK Companies were received. 
The responses pertaining to section 2 of the questionnaire identified the following three 
most important audit firm characteristics: 
1. The integrity of the firm. 
2. Technical competence of the firm. 
3. Quality of working relationship with audit partners (1995:231). 
The findings provided empirical support that firms enjoyed a reputation that made them 
more acceptable to third parties, that they were more likely to possess specialist 
industry knowledge and finally, the proximity of their location. Beattie & Feamley's 
(1995) research finding regarding one of the most important auditor characteristics, 
namely, "integrity of the firm" was inconsistent with the findings of Behn, Carcello, 
Hermanson & Hermanson (1997) and Beattie & Feamley (1998). "Technical 
expertise" findings were consistent with the research results of Addams & Davis 
(1994) but found to be inconsistent with the research of Behn, Carcello, Hermanson· 
& Hermanson (1997) whilst the "quality of working relationships with audit 
partners" was consistent with the research of Addams & Davis (1994), Fleming 
(1996), Behn, Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson (1997) and Beattie & Feamley 
(1998) with regard to choosing audit firms. Beattie & Feamley's (1995) findings in 
respect of the less significant auditor characteristics "size of audit firm" and 
"geographical location of offices" were consistent with those of Addams & Davis 
(1994). 
The results of section 3 of the questionnaire, which asked respondents to indicate how 
seriously they had considered changing their auditors over the past 5 years were as 
follows: 
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1. 34% had not considered a change in auditors at all, 
2. 24% had considered the matter very seriously, 
3. 11% seriously, 
4. 1 0% fairly seriously, and 
5. 21% casually (1995:235). 
The 139 companies cited a total of 467 reasons, an average of 3, 3 contributory reasons 
each. Of the 139 companies that had considered switching their auditors, 
37 ( 27% ) did actually effect a change, the most important reasons being: 
* level of audit fee, 
* dissatisfaction with audit quality (ie. Auditor's ability to detect problems), and 
* changes in company's top management. 
102 ( 73% ) did not effect a change, reasons being: 
* incumbent auditor offered reduced audit fee, 
* avoidance of disruption and loss of management time, 
* incumbent auditor offered improved quality of service, and 
* change of audit partner. 
It can be said that "audit fee levels" were both a key precipitator of a "switch" and a 
key factor in retaining the status quo. The authors concluded that the study had two 
main limitations which they suggested required further research. "Firstly, it should be 
emphasized that the study has investigated the reasons for the consideration of change 
and not the reasons for actual changes. Secondly, this study is based on the analysis 
of declared responses, collected by means of questionnaires. Corroboration of these 
results using publicly available secondary data is desirable" (1995:238). Beattie & 
Feamley (1995), Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) and Eichenseher & Shields (1983) 
consider "audit fee levels" as being the significant variable for auditor switches 
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whereas the surveys done by Burton & Roberts (1967), Schwartz & Menon (1985) 
and Addams & Davis (1994), considered "audit fees" as not being the dominant 
factor for auditor change. The variable "changes in managemenf' was considered 
by1995 both Beattie & Feamley (1995), and Burton & Roberts (1967) to be 
significant with regard to auditor switching but was considered to be less significant by 
the findings of Chow & Rice ( 1 ~82), Schwartz & Menon ( 1985), and Williams ( 1988). 
Beattie & Feamley (1995) found the variable "disagreement with audit opinion" to 
be relatively insignificant to auditor switching which is consistent with the research 
findings of Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams (1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), and 
Haskins & Williams (1990). 
3.2.30 GREGORY & COLLIER (1996) 
Gregory & Collier carried out an investigation to determine whether there exists any 
evidence of a reduction in audit fee following a switch in auditors. They also wished to 
establish if there was any evidence of price recovery that took place in later years, 
which would have been compatible with the idea of "low-balling". The authors 
developed two cross-sectional regression models of UK audit fees based on a sample 
of listed UK companies, to investigate the association between auditor switching and 
low-balling. The first model was of the logarithmic form whilst the second used 
untransformed data and inter-active variables. The sample comprised firms which were 
members of the Financial Times All Share Index (FTASI) in 1991 which had a 
continuous record of the name of the auditor for the period 1987 to 1991 and also 
accounting records for the said period. The final sample consisted of 330 firms. The 
results indicated that a switch in auditor over the previous 3 years had resulted in a 
significant and negative effect on the level of the audit fee charged. Whilst some fee 
reduction persisted for 4 to 5 years after a switch, it did not appear, at the 5% level, to 
be significant and the size of the total reduction was around 9%. The finding of a "fee 
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reduction" in the initial years of an audit engagement, followed by some attempt to 
recover a "normal" fee later on was consistent with the results of the research of Simon 
& Francis (1988) to the effect that "fee cutting" was the significant factor for auditor 
switching, but inconsistent with the research results of Butterworth & Houghton 
(1995). The finding provided empirical support for the "low-balling" argument in so far 
as that the reduced fee had been associated with genuine efficiency gains on the part 
of the audit firm. The authors applied an additional control for the efficiency gain 
argument by comparing the effect of a voluntary change in auditor with an involuntary 
change. The result "strongly suggests that there is no fee reduction associated with 
such changes, providing further evidence in support of a "low-balling" model of 
behaviour" (1996:25). They further investigated whether the type of change made any 
difference to the fee reduction experienced. There was a clear trend among sample 
companies to change to a Big Six firm. The authors concluded that, "for our sample, 
these fee reductions do not persist in the longer term, and that the initial discount varies 
according to the type of auditor change (voluntary compared to involuntary) and 
whether or not the switch is between 'Big Six' firms "(1996:27). 
3.2.31 KRISHNAN, KRISHNAN & STEPHENS (1996) 
The authors conducted a study to test the hypothesis that a two-way causation existed 
between the auditor rendering a qualified opinion and the client's propensity to switch 
auditors. The study examined the possibility that the causation between the audit 
opinion and switching might run in both directions. The authors modelled the 
relationship between the audit opinion and the auditor switch as a two-way (or 
simultaneous) relationship, with the audit opinion influencing the switching, and with 
switching influencing the audit opinion decision. They estimated a simultaneous 
equation model audit opinion and switching to separate the two effects. Their study 
tested the argument that a qualified opinion triggers a switch by a client company, so 
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that the "opinion" is the independent variable and the "subsequent switch" as the 
dependent variable. Data for the empirical model was obtained from publicly-traded US 
Companies from the September 1988 version ofthe Disclosure Inc. database. The final 
sample had 1878 observations and the fiscal year-ends ranged from 1986 to1988. The 
univariate tests applied to the sample "suggests that switchers and companies with 
qualified opinions have some similar characteristics"(1996:229). However, the 
qualification model estimates revealed that the receipt of a qualified opinion was itself 
influenced by client switching. The results confirmed previous findings of a "qualified 
opinion's" positive effect on the propensity to switch auditors by Chow & Rice (1982), 
Smith (1986), Craswell (1988), Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, 
Schatzberg & Trombley ( 1993), and Pragasam & Sands ( 1996). Further, the authors 
found that "qualification" was not exogenous to the switching process, which finding 
was consistent with similar opinions expressed by Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams 
(1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), Haskins & Williams (1990), and Beattie & Feamley 
(1995). The authors found that "a client receiving a qualified opinion is more likely to 
switch auditors than one who receives an unqualified opinion"(1996:234). They 
concluded that further research of the simultaneous relationship between switching and 
prior year audit opinion was required before a conclusive policy implication could be 
obtained. 
3.2.32 PRAGASAM & SANDS (1996) 
Pragasam & Sands conducted a study to examine the relationship between an audit 
qualification and audit switching. The existence of such a relationship might raise 
questions about the auditor's independence as well as his ability to counter 
management pressure and issue an objective audit report. Data for the study was 
obtained from Who Audits Australia which contains the largest collection of publicly 
available audit data on Australian companies. Data for analysis, were extracted from 
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three additional sources: firstly, the Australian Graduate School of Management's 
micro-fiche records for the top 500 companies; secondly, annual reports obtained 
directly from a number of publicly listed companies; and finally, the Australian Stock 
Exchange micro-fiche records for the remaining identified companies. The authors 
reviewed 2641 companies annual audit reports. From an analysis of the reports 
issued between 1988 through to 1991 for publicly listed companies on the Australian 
Stock Exchange, it was found that the receipt of an "audit qualification" was a factor 
that influenced companies to switch auditors for the subsequent period. It was also 
presumed that companies that switched their auditors on receipt of a qualified opinion 
were more likely to acquire an unqualified audit opinion for the subsequent period than 
if they had retained the incumbent auditor. However, the audit opinion subsequent to 
the switch was independent of the type of initial qualification prior to the switch. The 
results of the analysis also implied that a switch from a non-Big Six to a Big Six auditor 
was more likely to result in an unqualified opinion. The reasons suggested by the 
authors for this unexpected result "include increased competition and the 
appropriateness of using the audit firm size solely as a surrogate for audit quality'' 
(1996:240). Pragasam & Sands's (1996) results concerning "audit qualification" 
were consistent with those of the research carried out by Chow & Rice (1982), Smith 
(1986), Craswell (1988), Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & 
Trombley (1993), and Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996) but inconsistent with 
the research findings of Swartz & Menon (1985), Williams (1988), Johnson & Lys 
(1990), Haskins & Williams (1990), and Beattie & Feamley (1995). 
3.2.33 KWON (1996) 
Kwon carried out a study to examine the effect of the impact of competition within the 
client industry on the choice of audit firms operating within the same industry. The study 
considered the demand-side viewpoint (the client company's demand for audit firms 
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different from their competitors' audit firms) in order to understand the nature of 
competition in the audit industry. The data was selected from the December 1989 
version of Disclosure Online Data base, listed on the NYSE, ASE, or OTC and audited 
by a US audit firm, resulting in a final sample of 3820 client companies audited by 135 
audit firms. The findings revealed that "as the client industry is more (less) 
concentrated, the clients' preference to use audit firms different from those of 
competitors increases (decreases), reducing (increasing) the likelihood that one or few 
audit firms will dominate the servicing of client firms in the industry" (1996:53). Kwon 
(1996) concluded that further research should be done in examining the reaction of 
client companies to mergers of their audit firms and with firms which were associated 
with the client company's competing firms. 
3.2.34 FLEMING ( 1996) 
Praxair Inc., an industrial gas company, switched auditors when it spun off from Union 
Carbide in 1992. According to Robert H. Brewer, director of audits for Praxair Inc., the 
company went through a two-phase selection process. Firstly, the company evaluated 
the candidates qualifications on a global basis. Secondly, Praxair asked the remaining 
candidates to dig deeper into the company's operation and provide a price quote on 
what the audit would cost on a global basis. Brewer and Praxair ended up with a 
substantial savings over what it had paid before but added that actual fee did not have 
an impact on the selection. Instead, the choice was "the firm that was best fit and 
who could provide the services" Praxair were looking for globally. Praxair switched 
to a new auditor and Brewer argued that "we did not come out of the process feeling 
that changing auditors disrupts your business. At some point in the future, we'll step 
back again and see if we are still with the right people" (1996:76). 
According to Bonnie L. Erikson, assistant controller of the Kendall Group, the Kendall 
CHAPTER THREE : REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE PAGE 85 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
Company switched its auditors because "the lead engagement partner was moving 
up in the firm and would not be able to perform the audit". In the selection process, 
it was clear that "fees" was not going to be an issue. Erikson said that "the capabilities 
of the lead partner and the chemistry between him or her and the Tyee management 
in Exeter, New Hampshire, and the resources of the CPA firm's Boston office, which 
would be running the audit world wide, were among the most important factors in 
making the decision"(1996:77). Erickson said that along with reasonable fees and 
consulting possibilities, in addition , an important consideration was whether the auditor 
could identify weaknesses in the internal control systems, and offer practical 
recommendations. 
The research findings of Fleming (1996) ,as stated above, concerning what drives the 
auditor change process from an industry perspective are consistent with the research 
findings of Addams & Davis (1994), Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998), and Behn, 
Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson (1997). 
3.3.35 MATSUMURA, SUBRAMANYAM & TUCKER {1997) 
The authors modelled the going concern opinion ( GCO) process through a set of three 
interrelated games. Each game introduced an additional layer of uncertainty in the 
behaviour in the replacement auditor. The games captured the strategic interaction 
between the auditor, the client, and a replacement auditor. The overall structure of the 
three games was: the incumbent auditor had to choose either GCO or CO (clean 
opinion) based upon their expected payoff subject to the information, after having 
considered the client's response to their action. In the case where the incumbent 
auditor was expected to choose GCO, the client considered the option of either 
replacing him or retaining him. The results indicated that the likelihood that the client 
would switch auditors decreased both in the later probability of business closing down 
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and in the likelihood that the replacement auditor would issue a GCO. The authors 
assumed that the client's decision to replace the auditor was made after communicating 
the auditor's findings to the client, but before the issuance of a public report on the 
client's position. In contrast, Teoh (1992) assumed that auditor switches take place 
after the public audit report, and consequently focuses on investor reaction to the 
switch. The authors stated that the "incumbent is more conservative about choosing 
GCO when the auditor population is less likely to issue such reports or when higher 
judgement error leads to a lack of consensus among auditors"(1997:751). They 
concluded by stating that the apparent conservatism of the auditors to issue going 
concern qualifications came about due to other reasons which could be the higher error 
in judgement and self-fulfilling prophecy. 
3.2.36 BEHN. CARCELLO. HERMANSON & HERMANSON (1997) 
The authors carried out a study to investigate the relationship among client satisfaction, 
attributes of audit quality, auditor switching, and controller work experience. The focus 
of the study was not on ranking firms, but on rigorously examining the potential drivers 
of client satisfaction. The authors sent a questionnaire to controllers of Fortune 1000 
Companies and asked them to evaluate the auditor's performance on the 12 attributes 
of audit quality, and their overall level of satisfaction with both the audit firm and the 
audit team. They used the following model in their study: 
Total client satisfaction is a function of: 
12 Audit Quality Attributes:-
AQ1 - Audit team and firm experience with client 
AQ2 - Industry expertise 
AQ3 - CPA responsiveness to client needs 
AQ4 - CPA firm compliance with general audit standards (technical competence) 
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AQ5 - Independence 
AQ6 - Due care 
AQ7 - CPA firm commitment to quality 
AQ8 - CPA firm executive involvement 
AQ9 - Conduct of audit field work 
AQ1 0 - Involvement with audit committee 
AQ11 - Ethics/Accounting and auditing knowledge 
AQ12 -CPA firm personnel maintain sceptical attitude. 
New Auditor 
Controller Work Experience 
Client Size 
Audit Opinion 
The dependent variable in this study was "total client satisfaction". The satisfaction 
variable provided a measure of total client satisfaction with the audit. A final sample 
of 434 companies was used for empirical testing. Multivariate testing was applied to 
the sample and the results from estimating the regression model indicated that the 
overall model was significant, and it explained approximately 61% of the variance in 
total client satisfaction. Six ofthe audit quality attributes (AQ3, AQ8, AQ10, AQ9, AQ2, 
AQ1) were positively associated with "total client satisfaction". In particular, "auditor 
responsiveness to client needs" is consistent with the research findings of Addams 
& Davis (1994), Beattie & Feamley (1995 &1998), and Fleming (1996). The other 
attribute requisite found to create high client satisfaction appears to be "executive 
involvement' in the audit which is consistent with the findings of Beattie & Feamley 
(1995 & 1998), and Fleming (1996) who dealt with the example of the client company 
which stated that as the lead engagement partner would no longer be available to 
service the client, they perceived a switch in auditor was necessary to look at what 
other audit firms had to offer by way of service. The attribute "industry expertise" was 
consistent with the research of Addams & Davis (1994) but inconsistent with the 
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findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995) regarding total client satisfaction. There was 
a negative relationship between auditor skepticism (AQ12) and client satisfaction. This 
finding demonstrates the demanding task that auditors confront in balancing client 
preferences with societal and professional uncertainty. Finally, five attributes of audit 
quality (AQ4, AQ5, AQ6, AQ7 and AQ11) had no significant relationship with client 
satisfaction. The less significant variable "technical competence" was found to be 
inconsistent with the research findings of Addams & Davis (1994) and Beattie & 
Feamley (1995 & 1998). The authors found that client satisfaction was greater during 
the first few years after a switch in auditors, and found some evidence that satisfaction 
is greater when the controller had previous work experience with the auditor. The 
positive association between auditor switching and client satisfaction appeared to be 
attributable to satisfaction with the audit firm. Conversely, the positive association 
between controller work experience and client satisfaction appeared to be determined 
more by satisfaction with the audit team. The control variables, "client size" and 
"opinion", were not significantly associated with client satisfaction. The overall pattern 
of results emphasizes the important roles of communication and relationships in 
promoting client satisfaction. The three factors greatly associated with client 
satisfaction involve communication. "Responsiveness requires good listening skills, 
while executive involvement in the audit and interaction with the audit committee help 
to satisfy the client's need for effective two-way communication with the audit firm. In 
terms of relationships, clients are more satisfied when the relationship is new (an 
auditor change has just occurred) or when the client controller has a special 
relationship with the audit firm, that of former employee"(1997:22). The authors 
concluded that many firms can provide an audit opinion, but their clients want much 
more than just an opinion. "They want: responsive, proactive involvement in their 
business; executive involvement; staff continuity; industry expertise, and effective 
communication and planning through the engagement"(1997:22). 
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3.2.37 WELLS & LOUDDER (1997) 
Wells & Loudder investigated the information content of auditor resignations. The 
SEC requires that Form 8-K not only report a switch in auditor, but also to disclose if 
the switch was due to the resignation of the previous auditor. The authors addressed 
in their investigation whether the disclosure of a resignation was value-relevant. A final 
sample of 86 auditor resignations were obtained from the 8-K filings contained in the 
Lexis database during the period 1988 to 1991. The authors used the market to test the 
hypothesis to estimate abnormal returns. The results of the investigation supported the 
hypothesis that significant negative returns were realised by shareholders when the firm 
announced that the auditor had resigned. The results suggested that the 
announcement of an auditor resignation has information content for the market. Wells 
& Loudder's (1997) findings support the conclusion of Krishnan & Krishnan (1997) 
and Raghunandan & Rama (1999) that resignations and dismissals can have different 
ramifications for market value and should be examined separately. The authors 
concluded that "the results may be interpreted as supporting the need for continued 
mandatory disclosure of resignation"(1997:144). 
3.2.38 CHANEY. JETER & SHAW (1997) 
The authors argued that solicitation influenced realignment decisions if clients did not 
invite non-incumbents to submit proposals, and if net economies were available. The 
authors restricted their empirical tests to clients of the Big Eight audit firms. The client 
companies in their sample either retained their Big Eight auditor or switched to another 
Big Eight auditor. They also presumed that audit quality was constant across the Big 
Eight audit firms and focussed on cost efficiencies (inefficiencies) as a determinant of 
client-auditor realignment. A cross-sectional sample of Big Eight audit firm client 
companies were drawn from allowed markets (markets permitting direct uninvited 
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solicitation) and banned markets (markets prohibiting such practices). A final sample 
of 12442 client companies was selected from the Compustat Annual Industrial Tape for 
the period 1980 through to 1988. The results showed that realignment occurred more 
frequently in the allowed market than in the banned market. Chaney, Jeter, & Shaw's 
(1997) results revealed that client changes in "growth", "rate of return", and "external 
financing" were positively associated with client realignment which are consistent with 
the research findings of Johnson & Lys (1990). The authors concluded that "the 
evidence presented here suggests that allowing direct solicitation in the audit market 
leads to improved client-auditor alignment and reduced inefficiencies "(1997:451). 
3.2.39 KRISHNAN & KRISHNAN (1997) 
The authors carried out a study to test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates 
auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client 
companies that dismissed their auditors: one compared with the resignation companies 
on industry and year, and the other compared on year alone. The authors selected a 
final sample of 141 resignation companies that were available on the Compustat and 
CRSP during the period September 1989 to June 1995 editions of Disclosure Inc. 
database. The empirical results revealed that resignation companies differed from 
dismissal companies and resignations occurred more frequently than dismissals for 
financially distressed client companies with a greater variability in stock returns. 
Krishnan & Krishnan's (1997) findings regarding "resignations" are consistent with 
the findings of Wells & Loudder (1997) and Raghunandan & Rama (1999) to the 
effect that the announcement of an auditor resignation has information content for the 
market. Resignations were also found to be positively associated with auditor tenure, 
and auditor independence. They also constructed a litigation proxy based on a prior 
prediction model and found the proxy to be positively associated with the probability 
that the auditor would resign rather than be dismissed. Their analysis was consistent 
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with the concerns expressed by the accounting profession that auditors would resign 
rather than be dismissed from the engagement. The authors concluded that "our 
findings suggest that auditors' decision to resign from engagements is consistent with 
auditors adjusting their portfolios to lower litigation risk" (1997:558). The conclusion 
is also consistent with the research of De Fond & Subramanyam (1998). 
3.2.40 BOKUS & GIGLER (1998) 
Bokus & Gigler proposed an economic rationale for auditors resigning from the 
engagements of "risky clients" and they used that rationale to examine claims that 
increases in expected auditor liability had given rise to an increase in auditor 
resignation. They devised a theory that explained how an incumbent auditor rationally 
resigned an engagement due to the fact that any attempt at risk-adjusted pricing left the 
auditor with only unprofitable clients, and how successor auditors who knew less about 
the client than the incumbent auditor could profitably accept the engagement of a client 
whose previous auditor had rationally resigned. The authors concluded that "the model 
shows that auditor resignations arise when there are both potential successor auditors 
who face lower liability than the incumbent auditor and client firms who privately know 
whether they have a hidden risk"(1998:73). 
3.2.41 De FOND & SUBRAMANYAM (1998) 
De Fond & Subramanyam conducted a study that analysed discretionary accruals for 
a sample of 503 firms that switched auditors during the period 1990 to 1993. The 
sample was selected from the 1993 Standard and Poors Compustat for the four year 
period 1990 to 1993 which contained auditor changes during the said period. The 
results showed that discretionary accruals were significantly income increasing during 
the last year with the former auditor and were also significant during the first year with 
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the successor auditor. Moreover, auditor switches seemed to be motivated by the firms' 
litigation risk and auditors' preferences for conservative accounting choices. Research 
carried out by Krishnan & Krishnan (1997) suggested that a likely auditor response 
to intense client "litigation risk" is to resign from the engagement which suggestion is 
consistent with the above findings of De Fond & Subramanyam (1998). This is 
consistent with the pertinent rarity of reported resignations as compared with client-
initiated removals. 
3.2.42 BEATTIE & FEARNLEY (1998) 
The authors carried out a study which focussed on auditor-client realignment and 
related pricing issues. Increased competition was believed to have resulted in 
tendering, audit fee discounting, low-balling, opinion shopping, and audit firm mergers. 
The recent phenomenon of "audit tendering" had renewed interest in the factors that 
influenced auditor switching. Tendering had been precisely identified as a means by 
which independence was jeopardized. Direct significance of that behaviour were real 
decreases in audit fees and an increase in auditor switching. A sample of 508 
companies was extracted from the population of domestic officially listed and Unlisted 
Securities Market companies in the UK and Ireland as at 30 April 1992. The authors 
used the questionnaire instrument to obtain an insight into the factors which influenced 
auditor-client realignments in the new environment and also suggested the relative 
influence of economic and behavioural factors. The authors applied the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney non-parametric test and the Chi-Squared test to the samples. The 
results showed positive, statistically significant associations between unsolicited 
approaches and the consideration of either an auditor switch or the conduct of a 
competitive tender. "Fees" was the most commonly specified reason for considering 
auditor switch which is consistent with the research findings of Bedingfield & Loeb 
(1974), Eichenseher & Shields (1983), and Beattie & Feamley (1995) but 
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inconsistent with the research findings of Burton & Roberts (1967), Schwartz & 
Menon (1985), and Addams & Davis (1994). "Fees" was also the most commonly 
specified factor influencing the selection of a new auditor which is consistent with the 
research of Addams & Davis (1994) but inconsistent with the findings of Fleming 
( 1996), whereas the "chemistry of the relationship with senior audit firm personnel" 
was ranked as more important than service issues in new auditor selection which was 
consistent with the findings of Addams & Davis (1994), Beattie & Feamley (1995), 
Fleming (1996), and Behn, Carcello, Hermanson & Hermanson (1997). Various 
important relationships between the reasons for change and both company size and 
type of change were specified. Unusually smaller companies, and companies switching 
from a non-Big Six firm, were found more likely to change due to the need for a broader 
range of services and the influence of third parties. 
It has been argued that placing the audit out to "tender" is simply a technique employed 
for renegotiating the audit fee with the incumbent auditor. When selecting firms to 
tender, however, the expectation of a reduced audit fee was not a top priority. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of a study undertaken by Beattie & Feamley 
(1995) which reported that low absolute level of "audit fee" was ranked in order of 
importance as being 22"d out of 29 audit firm characteristics. The existence of 
significant price competition in the tendering process was exhibited by the willingness 
of audit firms that were included in tenders to quote substantially below the current fee 
level. The findings indicated that 55 % of auditor switches had been effected by means 
of a tender, with the incumbent auditor having only an 18% chance of retaining the 
client. The various stages of the tender process appeared to be dominated by the 
finance director, with audit committees having a restricted role. "Tenders" were an 
effective "fee cutting" mechanism in the year of switch. The authors concluded that 
"in particular, in-depth interviews with changers would provide additional insights into 
the behavioural aspects of auditor change and the nature of the tender process. 
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Additionally, further research could explore the extent to which auditor changes are 
averted by fee reductions from the incumbent"(1998:284). 
3.2.43 LENNOX (1999) 
Lennox conducted a study which allows rational auditors to report strategically in 
response to client companies switch decisions and previous reports. It explains stylised 
empirical facts for the UK, USA and Australia-failing companies were more likely to 
switch auditor, companies are more likely to switch following qualified reports, and post-
switch reports were more frequently qualified than pre-switch reports. Data was 
collected from microfiche copies of annual reports for 1036 UK quoted companies 
between 1987 and 1994. The model predicted a two-way relationship between auditor 
switching and audit reporting-companies strategically used auditor switching to avoid 
receiving qualified reports, and a switch exogenously increased the probability of a 
qualified opinion. Lennox (1999) concluded that "since theory and empirical evidence 
indicates that a switch is a signal of "financial distress", it is invalid to assume that, 
had companies made different switch decisions, they would have received the same 
reports as they received prior to switch decisions"(1999:20). This conclusion is 
consistent with the research of Schwartz & Menon (1985) and Haskins & Williams 
(1990) that failing companies are more likely to switch auditors than non-failing 
companies. The author felt that further empirical research is required to investigate 
whether switching affects audit reporting through signalling effects, and also needs to 
test the opinion-shopping hypothesis by comparing the reports companies could 
have received had they made different switch decisions. 
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3.2.44 DUNN, HILLIER & MARSHALL (1999) 
The authors carried out a study to provide evidence on the information contents of 
auditor resignations by examining the market reaction to auditor-instigated changes. 
The study was based on a sample of events where the auditors involved expressly 
stated that they were resigning from office. This provided a clear insight into how the 
market would react to auditor switching where there was a high probability that there 
had been a breakdown in the relationship between the auditor and management. A 
final sample of 88 public companies was extracted from the Registrar of Companies 
from a listing of all companies from which the auditor resigned during the period 1988 
to 1993. Analysis of the daily data suggested that there had been a negative reaction 
to the auditor resignation on the date of the resignation letter. The resignation analysis 
suggested that the loss of a Big Six auditor could indicate to the market that the auditee 
suffered a greater loss of credibility. The authors attempted to identify the factors 
affecting the negative reaction, namely: 
1. Auditor size, 
2. Conflicts between auditor and the company, 
3. Audit risk, 
4. Financial risk, and 
5. Company growth. 
The authors used the OLS regressions to relate market reaction on the date of the 
auditor resignation to the above variables investigated. They found that only the 
"auditor size" variable was significant in the direction predicted. Big Six firms were 
often seen to provide more credibility than their smaller competitors, thus the loss of a 
Big Six auditor would precipitate a greater (negative)" market reaction" and thus cause 
a greater loss of credibility. Fried & Schiff (1981) also reported a negative market 
reaction to auditor changes but could not explain what had motivated this reaction, 
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whilst by contrast Nichols & Smith (1983) found no significant market reaction to 
auditor changes. The authors concluded that "companies that experience auditor 
resignations tend to perform poorly on average after the resignation"(1999:107). 
3.2.45 RAGHUNANDAN & RAMA (1999) 
The authors examined the market for audit services when the predecessor auditor 
resigned from the engagement, by examining an experimental sample of156 companies 
with auditor resignations and a control sample of 375 companies with auditor 
dismissals. While many previous studies of auditor switches have examined auditor 
dismissals by the client, only a few studies have precisely focussed on auditor 
resignations. Data was obtained from the Public Accounting Report, which maintains 
a database of auditor changes, comprising a list of all auditor changes involving 
resignations during the three-year period from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1996. 
For the control sample, a list of companies changing auditors was obtained (through 
dismissals as opposed to resignations) in the period 1994-1996 from the CD-SEC disks 
for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. Relevant information about the old and new 
auditor, as well as the financial data, was also obtained therefrom. The Chi-square 
test was applied to the samples. The results showed that, after controlling for client 
size and three litigation risk factors (client's financial stress, industry membership and 
proportion of total assets in receivables and inventory), the likelihood of a Big Six firm 
serving as the successor auditor was lower when the auditor switch was caused by the 
resignation of the predecessor. The results are also consistent with the suggestion 
made by Wells & Loudder (1997) and Krishnan & Krishnan (1997) that researchers 
examining issues related to audit markets need to independently examine the two types 
of auditor alignment, and stated that large audit firms were hesitant to accept clients 
that were ascertained to be risky. The authors' results supported the suggestions that 
"the implications of auditor resignations are different from auditor dismissals, and 
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provide supporting evidence for the suggestions that supply-side incentives should be 
considered in examining the market for audit services"(1999:124). 
3.3 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of the major studies on auditor switching revealed conflicting results and 
the lack of a reliable model to explain auditor switching. Included among the variables 
identified as being related to auditor switching were the following factors such as 
management changes, additional audit services, client mergers, disputes over 
principles, technical disagreements, audit fees, qualified opinions, financial distress, 
industry expertise, size, client's reputation, professional standards, negative media 
publicity, longevity of the engagement, clients going public, low balling, auditor 
resignations, litigation risks, market reactions, etc. The literature review, however, 
disclosed several of these very same factors as being relatively insignificant to 
auditor switching, specifically management changes, disputes over principles, audit 
fees, client mergers, qualified opinions, technical expertise, financial distress, and size. 
Among the significant factors there are two aspects that were common to more than 
one study, namely, audit fees and qualified opinions. Among the less significant 
factors, there are several that were common to more than one study, namely, merger, 
audit fees, management changes, disputes over principles, qualified opinions, and 
rotation policy. Accordingly, the two significant factors found to be common to more 
than one study were also found to be relatively insignificant in more than one study. 
3.3.1 AUDIT FEES COMPETITION 
Where there is a discrepancy among auditors in charging audit fees, managers or 
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CEO's may have incentives to switch auditors. Therefore one potential explanation for 
auditor switching may be to obtain lower fees, the results of the study by Bedingfield 
& Loeb ( 197 4) indicated that audit fee was one of the most important factors in causing 
auditor switches. Eichenseher & Shields (1983) found audit fees to be one of the 
most significant contributors to auditor switching. Beattie & Feamley's (1995 & 1998) 
research also found audit fees as being a key precipitor of auditor switches. "Lower 
fees" appeared to be the most dominant incentive given for auditor switches among 
small firms. However, it may not be the major motivation for changing auditors among 
large corporations. Burton & Roberts (1967) found audit fee competition not to be a 
major factor in auditor switches. Schwartz & Menon (1985) found audit fees to be less 
significant to auditor switching. Addams & Davis's (1994) survey was made up of 
private companies which found fees not to be the dominant factor for auditor switching 
which is in contradiction to this study which also used private companies. It is therefore 
contended that audit fees appears to be an important factor in influencing auditor 
switches primarily because a client-expects good valueforthefee rendered by auditors. 
3.3.2 QUALITY OF SERVICES PROVIDED 
Client companies which are not satisfied with the quality of services provided by their 
auditors is the second most frequent reason for auditor switches. Poor services can 
be fatal. Small, growing companies clearly expect some quality in the services 
rendered by their auditors as they are paying for services that they are not receiving 
which leads to auditor switching to another firm that would be able to provide quality 
services. Bedingfield & Loeb's (197 4) results compare favourably with this study that 
dissatisfaction over audit services is deemed to be a second significant variable 
surrounding auditor switching. Addams & Davis's (1994) survey findings revealed that 
the number one reason for auditor switching centred on the auditor not being proactive 
in rendering services to the clients. Addams & Davis's (1994) findings, like this study, 
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reported reasons from mostly privately held companies for switching auditors. On the 
other hand Burton & Roberts's (1967) sample of companies were among the largest 
US Corporations during the period 1955 to 1963. They found that auditor switches only 
took place when their current auditor could not provide the services they needed which 
appeared to be a secondary reason for auditor switching. Again, it is argued that these 
differences in results may possibly be due to the composition of the population of 
companies examined. Further, clients expect quality services from professionals which 
if not provided would result in auditor changes taking place by client companies. 
3.3.3 MANAGEMENT CHANGES 
When a change in management occurs, it is expected that the new management will 
seek a complete "new deal" and commonly bring in new auditors. The new auditors 
would listen to the new management (for the sake of obtaining the audit) and possibly 
effect, for example, a write down of assets, which the former auditors were not willing 
to approve. Burton & Roberts (1967) found that the most frequent principal reason 
for auditor switching was a change in top management. Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) 
found that management wanting a national audit firm for their reputation was the main 
reason in switching from a Local to a National audit firm. Beattie & Feamley's (1995 
& 1998) results showed that management changes within the client company were also 
common destabilising influences for auditor switches which is consistent with the 
findings of this study as the fifth principal reason for auditor changes. Management 
change was included as a variable for auditor switches by Chow & Rice (1982), 
Schwartz & Menon (1985) and Williams (1988) but failed to find the variable 
significant to auditor switches. This corroborates the view that when management 
changes, new executives may well request an auditor switch because the existing 
auditor could have been too closely associated with the former management or 
because the new executives seek "fresh ideas". New management might also hire a 
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new auditor with whom it has had favourable dealings in the past. 
3.3.4 LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO CLIENT NEEDS AND POOR WORKING 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH AUDIT PARTNER I STAFF 
When an auditor makes insufficient effort to assist the client to address concerns, 
anticipate problems, or take the initiative to in providing guidance, the client 
management may choose to switch auditors. The auditors need to familiarise 
themselves with the client's business, they also need to suggest ways to save tax, 
provide advice and also make recommendations to overcome shortcomings. 
Eichenseher & Shields (1983) found working relationships to be a significant factor 
for auditor switching, which is consistent with the findings of this study. Addams & 
Davis's (1994) survey findings showed that auditor switching centred on the audit firm 
not being proactive and responsive to client needs. The auditor did not take the 
initiative to resolve the problems in the company and help the company grow. Beattie 
& Feamley (1995 & 1998) on the other hand did not find poor working relationship with 
audit partner I staff significant to auditor switching which is contrary to the findings of 
this study. Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) used listed companies in their sample 
study which did not rate high the above variable as a cause for auditor switching as 
compared to the smaller companies in this study. It is thus proven that a good 
relationship between an auditor and his client is essential for continuity. If the 
relationship becomes strained auditor switching could result. 
3.3.5 QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINION 
An incentive for switching auditors may be the perceived difference between auditors 
in issuing qualified opinions. If certain audit firms tend to issue more qualified opinions 
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than do others, one would expect that clients of those firms would have incentives to 
switch to another audit firm which is less inclined to issue qualified opinions. Chow 
& Rice (1982) posited that companies anticipating the receipt of a qualified opinion are 
more likely to change auditors than those not anticipating such an opinion. Teoh 
(1992) concluded that "auditor dependence arising from the manager's threat of 
dismissal changes the information conveyed by the audit opinion". Smith (1986) found 
that companies switched auditors after receiving a qualified opinion. Craswell (1988) 
concluded that managers' decisions to switch auditors had been presumed to be based 
upon the cost and benefits of alternate actions. Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990) and 
Pragasam & Sands (1996) found adverse audit reports significant in auditor switches. 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996) qualification model estimates revealed that 
the receipt of a qualified opinion influenced auditor switching. On the other hand 
research findings by the following, Schwartz & Menon (1985), Williams (1988), 
Johnson & Lys (1990), Haskins & Williams (1990) and Beattie & Feamley (1995) 
found that qualification of an audit report was not exogenous to auditor switching. 
There is some support for the argument that managers of large businesses, as 
compared to that of smaller businesses are concerned about the market reaction to 
auditor qualification which could impact negatively on the business undertaking. Prior 
studies indicated that there is a difference among auditors in issuing audit opinions 
(Craswell, 1988:31). This may provide incentives for managers to gain a more 
favourable auditor's opinion by switching auditors. Companies strategically use 
switching to avoid receiving qualified reports. 
3.3.6 CLIENT MERGER/TAKEOVER BY ANOTHER COMPANY 
Clients are occasionally lost when they sell their company or are taken over by larger 
businesses. Bedingfield & Loeb ( 197 4) and Beattie & Feamley ( 1995 & 1998) found 
mergers to be a frequently cited reason for acquired companies to change auditors. 
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The population of companies examined, in this study, were mainly privately held 
companies and 11% indicated that client merger/takeover was responsible for auditor 
switching. 
3.3. 7 CHANGE IN AUDIT PARTNERSHIP 
Anytime a service provider (auditor) changes on the account, the client relationship is 
put in danger. Beattie & Feamley's (1995 & 1998) findings revealed a change in audit 
partnership to be a less significant factor to auditor switching. There is general 
consensus with the findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) as this study also 
found a change in audit partnership to be less significant to auditor switching. 
3.3.8 NEED FOR GROUP AUDITOR RATIONALISATION 
It would be preferable to have one audit firm conduct the audit for the entire group of 
companies instead of having different audit firms for companies within the group. Better 
control could be exerted in terms of meeting deadlines, uniform standards maintained 
in terms of reporting and the implementation of policies and procedures. The results 
of this study found the need for group auditor rationalisation (0.002) to have a 
significant relationship at the 5% level of significance (Table 4.3). This view is 
supported by Beattie & Feamley's (1995 & 1998) survey findings where a stated 
reason for auditor switching was the need for group auditor rationalisation. However, 
this view was found to be contrary to the findings reported by Bedingfield & Loeb 
(1974) and Fried & Schiff (1981). 
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3.3.9 AUDIT FIRM LACKED INDUSTRIAL SPECIALISATION OR 
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
Some audit firms simply lose clients because they have made too many technical errors 
for the client to accept. Clients are paying for audit services which should be free of 
errors. This view is supported by Haskins & Williams (1990) and Beattie & Feamley 
(1995 & 1998) where the lack of technical capacity or industrial specialisation was one 
of the stated significant factors for auditor switching. This view was not supported, 
however, by Eichenseher & Shields (1983) or this study's sample population, which 
consisted mostly of private companies. 
3.3.1 0 FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
An incentive behind auditor switching can vary depending upon the financial condition 
of a client company. Schwartz & Menon (1985), Wilson & Grimlund (1990), Haskins 
& Williams (1990) and Lennox (1999) concluded that failing (financially distressed) 
companies are more likely to switch auditors than non-failing companies. Thus there 
appears to be a positive association between deteriorating financial conditions and 
auditor switching as failing businesses are more likely to switch auditors in the hope 
that better advice may be forthcoming. 
3.3.11 DISAGREEMENT ON CERTAIN ACCOUNTING MATTERS 
Management's purpose in changing accounting methods is frequently to accomplish an 
earnings goal, that is, to increase or decrease reported earnings in the current year, 
rather than to achieve "better'' financial reporting. One of the surprising findings of this 
study is the small degree of importance CEO's placed on the disagreements over the 
accounting treatments arising during audits. Burton & Roberts (1967), Bedingfield 
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& Loeb (1974) and Fried & Schiff (1981) found the above variable to be a significant 
factor for auditor switching, while Williams (1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), Addams 
& Davis (1994) and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) were of the opinion that 
disagreement over accounting principles was less significant to auditor switching. This 
finding is in sharp contrast to the contention that clients routinely switch their auditors 
to "buy" an unqualified opinion. 
3.3.12 OTHER REASONS 
The following were some of the other reasons advanced ansrng from studies 
undertaken and which were related to variable factors for auditor switching, namely: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
High turnover of audit engagement staff 
Write down of fixed assets and I or inventory 
Audit Committee 
Rotation policy 
Personality clashes with audit partner 
Need for audit firm with a local/ domestic office 
The above reasons for auditor switches may not be significant, yet are factors that 
gave rise to auditor switches. One can conclude that the above factors provided 
conflicting and confusing results, due to the nature of the sample population, 
methodical limitations, timing ofthe research and other factors. Further research in this 
area is necessary to move towards the classification of earlier results and to examine 
the limitation. 
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter 3 discusses prior studies on auditor switching. Auditor switching, including 
dismissals, resignations and the selection of a new auditor has been the focus of 
attention among practitioners and academics for many years because the credibility of 
the auditing profession is dependent upon the public's confidence in the auditor's 
ability to maintain an independent mental attitude in all matters relating to an audit 
(Dunn, Hillier & Marshall, 1999 : 95), and the auditor's independence is often curtailed 
by the risk of being replaced by another auditor. "The perception of a lack of 
independence has been widely cited as a significant element in the decline of the 
auditor's public image" (Shank, 1978:63). It can be seen that auditor independence 
has inspired a significant amount of empirical research in auditor switching and the 
factors identify with it, as is evident from the above literature review. 
The review of the major studies on auditor switching reported conflicting results. There 
is no consensus among all the prior studies about the factors that influence client 
companies to switch their auditors. Several studies contradicted the findings of one 
another, hence, the current study attempts to investigate the factors that contribute to 
auditor switching in South Africa. There is, therefore, a need for continued research 
into auditor switching factors because of the conflicting results, and the lack of a 
general doctrine to explain auditor switching. 
In addition to the conflicting results, prior research had several limitations. The only 
statistical tool employed by early research was simple percentages. This limitation was 
compounded by the use of small sample sizes. As accounting research evolved, more 
sophisticated statistical techniques were employed. Certain research, however, was 
also limited by the use of brief time periods for sample selection. In contrast this 
research covered the time period 1998-1999 and employed the statistical tools of Chi-
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square test for independence with a sample size of 75 companies in the KwaZulu-
Natal Region that experienced auditor switching. 
In conclusion, most of the previous studies used historical, secondary data, in reaching 
their conclusions, that is, these studies examined the foundation of the empirical 
relationship between the frequency of auditor switching that had already taken place 
and the presence or lack of empirical factors at the time of the switch. Even the studies 
that used primary data obtained their information from client company's management 
on auditor switches that had taken place many years before the study was conducted, 
and thus, there is the probability that the respondents may have had some problem in 
remembering which could have, in tum, influenced the accuracy of their responses. 
This could give cause to subjective bias or defects in the research design and 
methodology. In this dissertation, this problem is counteracted by obtaining current 
data from the client companies in an endeavour to achieve objective clarification of 
earlier results. 
In the following chapter, the empirical investigations and findings will be presented 
and discussed as they pertain to a sample extracted from the South African economic 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research design includes important design issues in empirical research. In the 
following section the various steps in the research process are identified and 
discussed. 
4.1.1 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
An empirical investigation was undertaken in conjunction with the literature review in 
order to determine the incidence of the factors that contribute to auditor changes in 
South Africa. The study focuses on auditor switching, in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
Region, from the perspective of client companies, that is, the Chief Executive or 
Manager. The practice and decisions of these individuals are empirically probed. The 
extent to which companies consider switching their auditors and the main reasons for 
auditor switching are explored. The ideal would have been to test the viewpoints of the 
auditors of these companies and to compare these with the responses from their client 
companies, but this was not possible due to various limitations in terms of the 
confidentiality of the respondent's data. Such a study would benefit the auditing 
profession in South Africa as it would create an awareness of aspects of 
implementation with which they may not be familiar. 
This chapter outlines the objectives and methodology of the study. It incorporates a 
description of the subjects of the population and the techniques applied. The 
measuring instrument adopted and the statistical tests used to analyse the data are 
described. The chapter also provides an analysis and interpretation of the results. 
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4.1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The aims of the study, as previously listed in Chapter 1, were as follows: 
• To investigate the factors that contribute to auditor switching in South Africa. 
• To consider the role of trust between the auditors and their client companies 
which, when violated causes companies to switch their auditors. 
• To formulate the general understanding of auditor switching by client companies 
in today's business world. 
• To analyse the as~ociation, if any, between the declared reasons for switching 
and the direction of change by type of practice (eg. to/from a National/Local 
Firm). 
• To establish what criteria are used by client companies to decide in order to 
switch auditors. 
• To assist both client companies and audit firms to identify the causes for auditor 
displacement so that they can work together to lessen its incidence. 
4.1.3 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
According to Martins, Loubser & VanWyk (1996:251-252) "a population or universe 
is the aggregate of all the elements, whilst the survey population is the aggregate of 
elements from which the sample is selected". The target population refers to the group 
of !)efsons or companies who form the object of the survey and from which conclusions 
are drawn (Bailey, 1994:83). The sampling unit refers to the entity which is the focus 
of the survey. The sum total of~all the sampling units form the target population. 
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A sampling frame is required to select sampling units and this could be obtained from 
telephone directories, yellow pages and membership lists of organisations. The 
sampling frame makes up a complete list of all the units from which the sample is drawn 
(Martins, Loubser & VanWyk, 1996: 252). 
The target population for this survey comprises of client companies in both the public 
and private sectors. The list for the target population with a particular bias towards 
those companies involved in auditor switching was not available. After careful 
consideration, the researcher decided to communicate directly with auditing firms to 
make an appeal to kindly furnish the researcher with the names of those companies 
that experienced a change in auditors. According to Dillon, Madden & Firtle 
(1994:220) "a sample is a subset of the target population from which the information 
is gathered to estimate something about the population". By studying the sample the 
researcher may draw conclusions or make inferences about the target population. The 
reason for selecting a sample can be attributable to various factors, the most important 
factor being, that it is not possible to study every element in the population. Sampling 
can be highly accurate if it is done with care, "sampling possesses the possibility of 
better testing, better supervision, and better processing than is possible with complete 
coverage" (Cooper & Schindler, 1998:216). A possible advantage of a sample over 
a full population is that "the sample may achieve a greater response rate and greater 
cooperation in general from respondents and thus may be more accurate" (Bailey, 
1994:86). Therefore, studying a sample is likely to yield reliable results and also 
• 
facilitate in data collection. 
4.1.4 PROCEDURE USED TO OBTAIN TARGET POPULATION AND 
SAMPLE 
The researcher obtained the names of Professional Practitioners from The KwaZulu-
Natal Society of Chartered Accountants, the telephone directories and yellow pages. 
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The managing partners of the respective practising firms were telephoned and briefly 
informed of the importance of this research together with the need for their assistance 
in this study. Some practitioners agreed to assist in this research project whilst others 
felt that they could not divulge the names of new appointments or resignations of their 
client companies as it was of a confidential nature. Those practitioners who agreed to 
form part of the research project were sent a fax addressed to the managing partner, 
explaining the terms of reference, and also appealing to them to forward the names of 
their client companies, current or former, together with their registered addresses, 
names of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO}, and the telephone numbers of those 
clients that experienced auditor switching during the period 1 January 1998 to 30 June 
1999. Details pertaining to 124 companies that changed their auditors during the said 
period were received from 14 Practitioners from the KZN Region. Twelve companies 
had to be eliminated from the population due to missing details thus leaving a target 
population of 112 companies. In compiling the list for the target population the aim was 
to obtain accurate information for those 112 companies. Because of the limited 
population size, sampling was not used in this study. Instead the researcher attempted 
to contact the CEO's of all112 companies as the units of the sample for the survey. 
In compiling the composite schedule, each company belonging to the target population 
was numerically tabulated with the name of the company, address and postal code to 
ensure that it contained accurate and complete information, and that there was no 
duplication. 
Based on recognised data-collection techniques and selection (refer to Appendix A, 
pages 163 to 171) the mail survey questionnaire method was used (refer to Appendix 
Bon page 172 (Covering letter) and Appendix Con pages 173 to 175 (Questionnaire)) 
and administered by the researcher to facilitate data capture and analysis. 
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4.2 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The results of the analyses of data collected are presented in this chapter. 
4.2.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The primary purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of auditor 
switching by considering the detected audit switch factors as a possible variable 
influencing auditor switching. 
The secondary purpose included: 
* 
* 
Ascertaining whether certain previously researched variables are significantly 
related to auditor switching when the switch factor is detected. 
Identifying characteristics with a switch factor that will assist both the current 
and the successor auditor with the goal of providing increased knowledge about 
the phenomenon of auditor switching by client companies. 
The statistical program used for the analyses and presentation of data in this study is 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 6.1 for Windows. 
The analyses of the results are presented in two sections. Section 1 consists of 
Descriptive Statistics which uses frequency tables and a display chart to provide 
information on key variables in this study. Section 2 is based upon the application of 
Inferential Statistics. The nature of the data accessed in this study was in nominal form 
and this necessitated the use of the more specific non-parametric Chi-square test for 
independence. The Chi-square (x~ test is used to test whether there is a relationship 
between two or more variables in a given study (Aaker, Kumar & Day, 1998:46). A 
simple technique for describing sets of relationships is the cross-tabulation. A cross-
tabulation or contingency table is "a joint frequency distribution of two or more sets of 
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variables" (Zikmund, 1994:620). The contingency table set determines whether or not 
two categorical variables are related and is sometimes also referred to as the 
independence of classification test for nominal data (Hanke & Reitsch, 1991 :359). 
The preliminary presentation and analysis of the results of the study begins with a 
presentation of the response to the study, followed by Section 1 which uses descriptive 
statistics to discuss the sample and key demographics. Thereafter, the Chi-square 
tests are presented and analysed in Section 2 in order to enhance the quality of the 
study in terms of statistical significance. 
4.2.2 THE RESPONSE RATE 
The sample for this study was obtained from Professional Practitioners in the KZN 
Region in respect of 112 client companies that had experienced auditor switching. 
Of the 112 questionnaires that were mailed, 75 usable responses were completed and 
returned. This represents a response rate of 67%. The response rate of 67% is 
considered adequate considering the sensitive nature of the reasons for auditor 
switching. 
TABLE 4.1 RESPONSE RATE OF AUDITOR SWITCHING BY CLIENT COMPANIES 
No. Percentage 
Questionnaires mailed 112 100% 
Less: Questionnaires not returned by companies 35 31% 
: Questionnaires returned unanswered (1) 1 1% 
: Incomplete response (2) 1 1% 
NET SAMPLE ANALYSED 75 67% 
(1) Company moved with no forwarding address. 
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(2) Company no longer in business. 
Table 4.1 illustrates a breakdown of the questionnaire responses. Thirty-five 
companies did not return their questionnaires. Two questionnaires were returned to 
the researcher, namely, one was unanswered whilst the other was incomplete. 
Furthermore, the response rate of the study compares favourably with the response 
rate of similar studies: 
• Carpenter & Strawser (1971 :56) 43,5% 
• Bedingfield & Loeb (1974:67) 57,4% 
• Eichenseher & Shields (1983:27) 24% 
• Addams & Davis (1994:38) 45% 
• Beattie & Fearnley (1995:230) 70% 
• Beattie & Fearnley (1998:271) 65% 
From the high response rates obtained, the researcher is of the opinion that response 
bias is not a threat to the validity of the results of this study, given the limitations 
discussed by Wallace & Mellor (1988:130-132). In addition, all respondents were 
Chief Executive Officers (CEO) with high integrity and would therefore be objective in 
the auditor choice decision of switching audit firms. 
4.2.3 SECTION 1 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section of the study focusses on statistics which provide an overview of the 
sample profile accessed in the present study. Statistical data are presented in the form 
of a frequency table and a pie chart in terms of the number of occurrences, 
percentages, and auditor switches. Meaningful results are also contexualised within 
the objectives of the study to provide some insight into the choice of audit firms by the 
CEO's of switching client companies as perceived by respondents. 
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Table 4.2 classifies 75 auditor switches in the study sample by the direction of the 
switch in terms of type of practice. In constructing this table, auditing firms were 
classified by type of practice into National and Non-National (Local ) groups. 
TABLE 4.2 THE DIRECTION OF AUDITOR SWITCHES BY TYPE OF PRACTICE 
NEW AUDITOR 
SWITCHED TO SWITCHED TO ROW 
PRIOR AUDITOR NATIONAL FIRM NON-NATIONAL TOTAL 
(LOCAL) FIRM 
SWITCHED FROM NATIONAL FIRM 11 ( 14,7 %) 17 ( 22,6 o/o) 28 ( 37,3 %) 
SWITCHED FROM NON-NATIONAL 11 ( 14,7 %) 36 ( 48 %) 47 ( 62,7 %) 
(LOCAL) FIRM 
COLUMN TOTALS 22 (29,4 %) 53 ( 70,6 %) 75 ( 100 %) 
As may be observed from Table 4.2, most of the switches were towards Non-National 
firms. A possible reason for this direction is deemed to be that the study sample is 
composed of relatively small companies which are more likely to select a Local firm as 
auditor. 
Table 4.2 shows that Non-National firms had the most clients before (having 47 clients 
(62,7%)compared to 28 clients (37,3%) for National firms)and after (having 53 clients 
(70,6%) compared to 22 clients (29,4%) for National firms) the reported changes in 
auditors, i.e. the Non-National (Local) firms secured a net increase of 6 clients (7,9%). 
This increase in Local firms favour is similar to the findings made by Bedingfield & 
Loeb (1974:67) in their study of auditor changes. They observed that the National 
Firms' dominant position (in the sense of having most of the clients) before the auditor 
change (178 clients compared to 62 clients for Non-National firms) was significantly 
decreased after the change in auditors (166 clients compared to 74 clients for Non-
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National (Local) firms). One possible reason for the increase for Local firms of 12 
clients is that Bedingfield & Loeb (1974), were dealing with a broad spectrum of 
companies of different sizes. Thus, due to the nature of the companies in their study, 
there might not have been as much pressure to change to a National firm when 
compared to Burton & Roberts's (1967) and Fried & Schiff's (1981) studies. The 
reduction of National firms, in this study, differs from the findings made by Burton & 
Roberts (1967:32-34) and Fried & Schiff (1981 :328-329) in their studies of auditor 
changes as follows: 
Burton & Roberts (1967) observed that the Big Eight firms's dominant position (in the 
sense of having the most clients) before the auditor change ( 44 clients compared to 39 
clients for Non-Big Eight firms) was significantly enhanced after the auditor change (70 
clients compared to 13 clients for Non-Big Eight firms), an increase of 26 client 
companies by the Big Eight firms over the Non-Big Eight firms. One possible reason 
for the differences in the findings might be that Burton & Robert's (1967) were dealing 
with the largest companies in the USA It is perfectly understandable that, over a 
period of time these companies would tend to move towards the larger accounting firms. 
Fried & Schiff (1981 ), in addition, observed that the dominance of the Big Eight firms 
over the Non-Big Eight firms before the auditor change (39 clients compared to 9 clients 
for Non-Big Eight firms) was increased after the auditor change (44 clients compared 
to 4 clients for Non-Big Eight firms, i.e. an increase of 5 clients by the Big Eight firms 
over the Non-Big Eight firms). Yet again, the reason for the move towards the Big Eight 
firms seems to be that this researcher's sample was composed of relatively large 
companies which, as before, were more likely to select National firms than Non-
National firms. 
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FIGURE 4.1 AUDITOR SWITCHES BY TYPE OF PRACTICE 
CHANGE OF COMPANY AUDITORS 
~ National to National 
D Local to Local 
• National to Local 
Local to National 
Pie charts are an alternative method for presenting frequency distribution. The larger 
the slice of the pie, the greater the frequency (Dillon, Madden & Firtle, 1994:41 0). The 
pie chart in Figure 4.1 graphically depicts the overall switch rating for the four types of 
auditor switches. It can be seen that the largest switch is 48%, where clients moved 
from Local to Local firms as the study sample is presumably composed of small 
companies, followed by a switch from National firms to Local firms of 22,6%, possibly 
due to better services, lower audit fees, or other reasons on offer from the Non-
National firms. Thereafter the switch from National to National and Local to National 
are both 14,7% respectively, which could be due to the switching firms' retaining the 
status of their auditors as per management's decision. 
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4.2.4 SECTION 2 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
This section uses inferential statistics for the presentation and analysis of empirical 
data, with the aid of the Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) computer 
programme. 
A contingency table was set up and tested using the Chi-square test for 
independence of classification. A significant value for Chi-square would mean that 
switching was not independent of each variable. Table 4.3 shows the contingency 
table with the count for each cell, expressed as a percentage, distributed in the 
respective rows and columns in terms of switching occurrences, and both the Chi-
square results, namely, the Computed Chi-square value (x 2) and the significance 
level· (p) at 3 degrees of freedom. 
The tests clearly support the notion that changing auditors is not dependent on any one 
factor as several other factors might also influence a client company in the decision to 
switch auditors. 
The initial analysis of the sample of 75 auditor switches revealed that at least 32 
( 44 -12 = 32 ; no response to switch-variable) different reasons were represented with 
the following being the most common: 
• The audit fee was too high for services provided was the dominant type of auditor 
switch variable, representing 31% of the sample. 
• We were not satisfied with the audit firm's quality of services provided was the 
second important variable causing auditor switches, with 25% of the sample. 
• Thereafter, lack of communication, including lack of responses to our needs and 
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• poor working relationship with audit partner/staff followed, with 18% each 
respectively. 
It should be recognised that a number of reasons cited overlap to some extent. For 
example, dissatisfied with the range of services provided by the auditor (number 1 0) 
may contribute to an overall dissatisfaction of audit quality (number 2). 
4.2.4.1 REVIEW OF RESULTS 
Table 4.3 below, presents reasons why companies changed auditors. This is cross-
tabulated by the type of practice of the prior auditor and the new auditor and ranked in 
decreasing frequency of citation. 
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AUDITOR SWITCHING 
Eleven respondents indicated that they changed from one National firm to another. 
The reasons for such a change were varied. They included the following 18% and 
above:-
• No.7: Client merger/takeover with/by another company (27%). 
• No.2: Dissatisfied with the audit firm's overall quality of services provided (18%). 
• No.5: Management change (18%). 
• No.6: Change in company shareholders (18%). 
• No.32: Other reasons ( 27%) supplied not listed on Table 4.3: 
• 
* 
* Did not seem as if they really wanted our account or really cared. 
* Requested by the Natal Law Society to change auditors. 
*Empowerment firm (joint audit). 
No.31 :Other single items of disagreement (18%) not listed on Table 4.3: 
* Poor service and people never available. 
* Conflict of interests. 
Seventeen respondents reported that their companies had switched from a National 
firm to a Local firm. The reasons for such switches were varied. They included the 
following 29% and above:-
• No.1 :The audit fee was too high for services provided (35%). 
• No.3: Lack of communication, lack of responsiveness to our need (35%). 
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• No.4: Poor working relationships with audit partner/staff (35%). 
• No.2: Dissatisfied with audit firm's overall quality of services provided (29%). 
• No.32: Other reasons (35%) made up of single items not listed on Table 4.3: 
* Auditors unable to provide services due to their service commitment to 
Governmental contracts. 
* Affirmative action policy, switch over to "disadvantaged" firm. 
* Infrequent change of audit staff was not acceptable. 
* Company ceased manufacturing. 
* Disclaimer of opinion. 
* Local firm charged lower fees. 
Thirty-six respondents indicated that they changed auditors from one Non-National 
(Local) firm to another Local firm. The reasons for such a change were varied. They 
included the following 14% and above:-
• No. 1 :The prior auditor's fee was too high for services provided (45%). 
• No.2: Dissatisfied with the audit firm's overall quality of services provided (31%). 
• No.3: Lack of communication, including lack of responsiveness to our needs (17%). 
• No.4: Poor working relationships with audit partner/staff (17%). 
• No.6: Change in company shareholders (14%). 
• No.8: Change in audit partnership(14%). 
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• No.32: Other reasons (19%) of single items not listed on Table 4.3: 
* Prior auditor deceased. 
* Conflict of interests. 
* Change due to new Bookkeeper's advice. 
Over half (55%) of the eleven respondents switching from a Local firm to a National 
firm indicated that the one reason for change was the desire by management to have 
a National firm (No. 6). Thirty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that there 
was a need for group auditor rationalisation (No. 9). Client merger/takeover with/by 
another company (No. 7) and change in company shareholders (No. 6) each had 18% 
of auditor switches. 
Finally, other factors that also gave rise to auditor switching not listed above are 
contained in Table 4.3. 
The reported reasons for auditor switching are discussed hereafter, in depth, ranking 
from the highest to the lowest response per variable factor, computed using SPSS for 
Windows, in Table 4.3 (from No.1 through to No.44). 
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4.2.4.1.1 THE AUDITOR'S FEE WAS TOO HIGH FOR SERVICES 
PROVIDED 
The analysis of the firms from the KZN Region that switched auditors revealed that the 
most frequently cited reason for auditor switching was the fee variable (31%). This was 
primarily concentrated in the switches from Local to Local (45%), and from National to 
Local (35% ). Thus, the client may often seem to be reduced to selecting an auditor on 
the basis of price rather than in terms of satisfying their needs. It is commonly believed 
that small firms (Local) are somewhat more responsive to client needs than are the 
larger (National) firms, as reflected by the results obtained from this study resulting in 
80% (45%+35%) of clients moving to Local firms because of the lower fees. It is true 
that auditors lose some clients on the basis of fees. In these circumstances, the client 
may simply want to pay the lowest fee possible, or an assertive firm may come along 
and make an offer that cannot be refused. It could also be that client companies are 
not getting real value for the fees that they are paying and would prefer to opt for 
another audit firm which would be amenable to the needs of the client. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if high audit fees 
provided for services rendered is related to auditor switching, had a computed test 
statistic x 2 = 10.66 which exceeds the Critical value of Chi-square (xi 2) of 7.815 at 
0.05 with 3 degrees of freedom (d.f), and the null hypothesis of independence is 
therefore rejected. Using the SPSS for Windows, it is observed that the p value= 
0.013 < 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship between the high audit fees for 
services rendered and auditor switching is rejected. The data supported the conclusion 
that there is evidence of a significant relationship between the reason for auditor 
switching and the specific type of auditor switches. The findings revealed that the 
respondents who were dissatisfied with their auditors due to high audit fees charged 
in relation to services provided opted for auditor switching. 
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These findings were consistent with the findings of: 
*Bedingfield & Loeb's (1974) findings indicated that 47% of respondents considered 
audit fees to be the significant variable surrounding auditor switching, 
*Eichenseher & Shields (1983) findings that fees appear to be highly significant 
overall and in all client-size subgroups, and 
*Beattie & Fearnley (1995) where results indicated that 66% of respondents 
considered audit fee level as being a significant reason for consideration of a change 
in auditor, whereas in Beattie & Feamley (1998) the level of audit fee still significant 
to auditor switching by respondents dropped from 66% (Beattie & Feamley, 1995) to 
49%. 
These findings were inconsistent with the findings of: 
*Burton & Roberts ( 1967) who found that audit fee competition was not a major factor 
in auditor switches, 
*Schwartz & Menon (1985) findings indicated audit fee to be the less significant 
variable surrounding auditor switching, and 
*Addams & Davis (1994) who also found that fees was not the dominant factor for 
changing audit firms. 
4.2.4.1.2 DISSATISFIED WITH THE AUDIT FIRM'S OVERALL 
QUALITY OF SERVICES PROVIDED 
The second most frequently cited reason for auditor changes, revealed by this study, 
was the client's dissatisfaction with the overall quality of services provided by the 
auditor (25%). This was primarily concentrated in auditor switches from Local auditors 
to Local auditors (31%) and from National auditors to Local auditors (29% ). The survey 
results indicate that 60% (31% + 29% ), per Table 4.3, of the clients that switched their 
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auditors moved to a local firm because they believed that local firms are somewhat 
more responsive to clients than are National firms and poor service can be fatal. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if dissatisfaction over 
services provided by the auditor is related to auditor switching, had a computed test 
statistic x 2 = 2.5 which is less than the Critical value of Chi-square (xi 2) of 7. 815 at 
0.05 with 3 d.f., and the null hypothesis of independence is therefore not rejected. It 
is observed that the p value = 0.475 > 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between dissatisfaction over auditors overall quality of services and auditor switching 
is not rejected. We can conclude that there is no evidence of a significant relationship 
between the reason for changing auditor and the specific type of auditor switch. The 
findings of this study were in contrast to the expected results. The results were 
expected to show that dissatisfaction over audit firms' overall services was related to 
auditor switching. These results were both consistent with and in contrast to previous 
research. 
These findings were consistent with the findings of: 
* Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) whose results indicated that 44% of respondents 
considered dissatisfaction over audit services to be a second significant variable 
surrounding auditor switching, 
* Eicherseher& Shields (1983) where the findings indicated that the perceived quality 
of services offered appeared important to clients, which if lacking, would be likely to 
give rise to auditor switching, and 
*Addams & Davis (1994) where findings indicated that the number one factor for 
switching to another auditor centred on the audit firm not being proactive in delivering 
services to the company. 
The findings of this study contrast with the findings of Burton & Roberts ( 1967) where 
the dissatisfaction with current services appeared to be a secondary reason for auditor 
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switching. 
4.2.4.1.3 
4.2.4.1.4 
LACK OF COMMUNICATION INCLUDING LACK OF 
RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR NEEDS 
AND 
POOR WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH AUDIT 
PARTNER/STAFF 
The third Uoint) frequently cited reasons for auditor changes, reported in this study, 
were the lack of communication, including the lack of responsiveness to client needs, 
and poor working relationships with audit partner, each reported at 18% by the 
respondents. The findings of both revealed similar results in terms of their computation 
as they are similar in nature. The findings, of the study of client companies in the KZN 
Region, were primarily concentrated in switches from National to Local auditors (35%) 
and Local to Local auditors ( 17%) . It can be observed that the survey findings show 
that 52% (35% +17%), per Table 4.3, of the clients changed their auditors to a Local 
firm because they felt that communicating with the clients is frowned upon and 
considered unnecessary by auditors. Respondents mention waiting an unreasonable 
amount of time for phone calls to be returned and also indicated that they would have 
valued speaking directly with the person who was their original contact with the firm. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if the lack of 
communication, including the lack of responsiveness to client needs, and poor working 
relationship with audit partner/staff, is related to auditor switching, each had a 
computed test statistic x 2 = 6.66 respectively which is less than the Critical value of 
Chi-square (xi 2) of 7.815 at 0.05 with 3 d.f., and the null hypothesis of independence 
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is therefore rejected. It is observed that the p value= 0.083 > 0.05, therefore the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between the lack of communication, including 
responsiveness to client needs, and poor working relationships with audit partner/staff 
and auditor switching is not rejected. The Chi-square test produced a non-significant 
result (p = 0.083), although, it was approaching significance at the 5% level. The 
results were expected to show that the above two variables were related to auditor 
switching. These results are both consistent with and in contrast to previous research. 
These findings were consistent with the findings of: 
*Eichenseher & Shields (1983) whose findings show that perceptions of the quality of 
working relationships and the accessibility of partners appear to be an important factor 
regarding auditor switches, 
*Addams & Davis (1994) where their findings revealed that auditors make insufficient 
effort to assist their clients in addressing concerns, anticipating problems, or taking the 
initiative to help the company grow. 
The findings of this study contrast with the findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 
1998) where poor working relationships with audit partner/staff was deemed to be less 
significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.5 MANAGEMENT CHANGE 
The fifth principal reason for auditor change was a change in management (16%). In 
most cases this meant a major change in the top executive guidance of the company 
or a change in financial management. When major management changes occur, it is 
to be expected that the new management will seek a completely new deal and will 
commonly bring in new auditors. In this study, of client firms in the KZN Region, 
management change was primarily concentrated around the National auditors, namely, 
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change from a Local audit firm to a National audit firm (55%) and from National to 
National audit firms (18%), totalling 73% (Table 4.3) of the switches to the National 
firm. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if management is 
related to auditor switching, had a computed test statistic x 2 = 15.07 which exceeds 
the Critical value of Chi-square (xi 2) of7.815 at 0.05with 3 d.f., and the null hypothesis 
of no relationship between management change and auditor switching is rejected. The 
data supported the conclusion that there is evidence of a significant relationship 
between the reason for changing auditors and the specific type of auditor change. The 
findings revealed that management change caused auditor switching. 
These findings are both consistent with and in contrast to previous research. These 
findings are consistent with the findings of: 
*Burton & Robert's (1967) findings show that 38% of their respondents considered 
management changes to be one of the major causes for auditor changes. 
*Bedingfield & Loeb's (1974) findings revealed that 54% of their respondents 
indicated that management wished to have a national audit firm, and 
*Beattie & Feamley's (1995) findings which indicated that 25% of their respondents, 
whilst their (1998) findings showed that 35% of the respondents, considered changes 
in management to be a significant factor with regard to auditor switching. 
The findings of the study were considered to be less significant with those reported 
by Chow & Rice (1982), Schwartz & Menon (1985), and Williams (1988) who 
included management change as one of the variables for auditor switching, but failed 
to find the variable significant. 
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4.2.4.1.6 CHANGE IN COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS 
The sixth principal cited reason for auditor switching was as a result of the change in 
the company shareholding (15%). The switch variable was found to be a common 
reason for changing auditors, in the KZN Region, among the four types of switch 
practices. The survey results showed that 62% ( 18%+12%+14%+18% ), per Table 4.3, 
of the respondents found this variable to cause auditor switching. Clients are 
occasionally lost when there is a change in shareholders. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3}, to determine if change in company 
shareholders is related to auditor switching, had a computed test statistic x 2 =0,35 
which is less than the Critical value of Chi-square ( xi 2) of 7.815 at 0.05 with 3 d.f., and 
the null hypothesis of independence is therefore not rejected. It is observed that the 
p value= 0.950 > 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship between the change 
in company shareholders and auditor switching is not rejected. In my opinion thus, there 
is no evidence of a significant relationship between the reason for changing auditors 
and the specific type of auditor switch. The findings of this study, confined to firms in 
the KZN Region which experienced auditor changes, were in contrast to the expected 
results of this study. The results were expected to show that a change in company 
shareholders was related to auditor switching. No comparison or contrast from 
previous research could be found for this variable. 
4.2.4.1.7 CLIENT MERGER/TAKEOVER WITH/BY ANOTHER 
COMPANY 
The seventh frequently cited reason for change in auditors revealed by this study was 
the client merger/takeover with/by another company ( 11% ). This change was primarily 
concentrated where one of the auditing firms was a National firm, namely, National to 
National (27%), Local to National (18%), and National to local (12%), per Table 4.3, 
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respectively. The survey results indicate that 45% of the clients switched to a National 
firm whilst 12% switched from a National to a Local firm of auditors as a result of a 
takeover or merger of clients in the KZN Region. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if client merger/ 
takeover with/by another company is related to auditor switching, had a computed test 
statisticx 2 = 6.21 which is less than the Critical value Chi-square ( xi2) of7.815 at 0.05 
with 3 d.f., and the null hypothesis of independence is therefore not rejected. It is 
observed that the p value = 0.102 > 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between merger/takeover and auditor switching is not rejected. The conclusion, thus, 
is that there is no evidence of a significant relationship between the reason for 
switching auditors and the specific type of auditor switch of clients in the KZN Region. 
The findings of this study were once again in contrast with the expected results of the 
study. The results were expected to show that client merger/takeover was related to 
auditor switching. 
The findings were consistent with those of Bedingfield & Loeb (1974:14%}, and 
Beattie & Feamley (1995:14% and 1998:25%) where client mergers were found to be 
a frequently cited reason for acquired companies to change auditors. 
4.2.4.1.8 CHANGE IN AUDIT PARTNERSHIP 
The eighth frequently cited reason for a change in auditors revealed by this study was 
a change in audit partnership (11%). CEO's place a considerable amount of 
importance on the relationship established between the audit firm's key people and the 
key decision-makers of the company during the course of the proposed process. 
However, when there is a change in the audit partnership and the audit partner that 
served the said client leaves the practice, the said client follows suit primarily because 
of the confidence and trust that was built between the company and the audit partner. 
The survey findings, of client companies that experienced auditor switching in the KZN 
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Region, was almost entirely evenly distributed in terms of change by type of practice 
reflecting a total of 38% (9%+6%+14%+9%), per Table 4.3, of respondents indicating 
this variable as a cause for auditor switching. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if a change in audit 
partnership is related to auditor switching, had a computed test statisticx2 = 0.85 which 
is less than the Critical value Chi-square ( xi 2 ) of 7.815 at 0.05 with 3 d.f., and the null 
hypothesis of independence is therefore not rejected. It is observed that the p value 
= 0.835 > 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship between a change in audit 
partnership and auditor switching is not rejected. There is no evidence, thus, of any 
significance between the reasons for switching auditors and the specific type of auditor 
switch. The findings of this study in the KZN Region, once again, were in contrast with 
the expected results of the study. The results were expected to show that a change in 
audit partnership was related to auditor switching. 
The findings were consistent with the findings of Beattie-& Feamley (1995 &1998) 
where the change in audit partnership was less significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.9 NEED FOR GROUP AUDITOR RATIONALISATION 
The ninth frequently cited reason for auditor switching was the need for group auditor 
rationalisation (8%). This would be the case where it would be preferable to have one 
audit firm for the entire group of companies instead of a few different audit firms for 
companies within the group. It would benefit the company because most of the results 
would be available timeously for group consideration purposes and also consistency 
in preparation of the financial statements in terms of accounting policies and reports. 
The analysis of switches by type of practice from survey respondents showed that 
switching was primarily concentrated in changes to National auditors (46%), made up 
of switches from Local to National (37%) and National to National (9%) respectively 
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(Table 4.3). 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if need for group 
auditor rationalisation is related to auditor switching, had a computed test statistic x 2 
= 14.85 which exceeds the Critical value Chi-square ( xi 2 ) of 7.815 at 0.05 with 3.d.f., 
and the null hypothesis of independence is therefore rejected. It is observed that the 
p value= 0.002 < 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no relationship between the need for 
group auditor rationalisation and auditor switching is rejected. The data, confined to 
client companies that experienced auditor changes in the KZN Region, supported the 
conclusion that there is a significant relationship between the reason for auditor 
switching and the specific type of auditor switches. The findings revealed that the need 
for group auditor rationalisation gave rise to auditor switching. 
The findings were consistent with those of Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) where 
the stated reasons for consideration of a change in auditor were reported as being 17% 
and 28% respectively, but were inconsistent with the findings of Bedingfield & Loeb 
(1974) and Fried & Schiff (1981) where this reason for change was 3% and 2% 
respectively. 
4.2.4.1.10 DISSATISFIED WITH THE RANGE OF SERVICES 
PROVIDED BY THE AUDITOR 
The tenth frequently cited reason for change in auditor, revealed by this study was the 
client's dissatisfaction with the range of services provided by the auditor (7%). This 
reason for change was common to all switches that had taken place by the 
respondents, in the KZN Region, by type of change totalling 33% (9%+12%+3%+9% ), 
per Table 4.3. Client companies have needs for certain types of services, such as tax 
planning, consulting, budgeting, etc. Such services may be found wanting with their 
present auditors and client needs may give rise to a change to another audit firm which 
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is able to satisfy such needs. 
The Chi-square test for independence (Table 4.3), to determine if dissatisfaction over 
the range of services provided by the auditor is related to auditor switching, had a 
computed test statistic x 2 = 1. 79 which is less than the Critical value Chi-square (xi 2) 
of 7.815 at 0.05 with 3 d.f., and the null hypothesis of independence is therefore not 
rejected. It is observed that the p value= 0.616 > 0.05, so the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between dissatisfaction over the range of services provided by the auditor 
switching is not rejected. Based hereon there is no evidence of a significant 
relationship between the reason for switching auditors and the specific type of auditor 
switch. The findings of the study, concentrated in the KZN Region_, were yet again in 
contrast with the expected results of this study. The results were expected to show that 
dissatisfaction over the range of services provided by the auditor was related to auditor 
switching. 
No comparison or contrast could be found for this variable, from previous research 
studies, and this variable could overlap with variables 2 and 3 respectively (Table 4.3). 
Twenty-two other reasons for auditor switching were, however, cited by a less 
significant percentage ( 4% and lower) of companies, per Table 4.3., and are discussed 
hereafter. 
4.2.4.1.11 PERSONALITY CLASHES WITH AUDIT PARTNER 
AND STAFF (4%) 
The Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
personality clashes with audit partner and staff and the specific type of auditor switches 
at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 1.50 <xi 2 7.815 (d.f.=3), and the p value= 
0.683> 0.05. 
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These findings, of the study in the KZN Region, are consistent with the findings of 
Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) where the above variable was also less significant 
to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.12 NEEDED AUDIT FIRM WITH A LOCAL DOMESTIC 
OFFICE (4%) 
The Chi-square test for independence indicated a less significant relationship 
between the client company requiring an audit firm with a Local domestic office and the 
specific type of auditor switch at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 5.37< xi 2 7.815 
(3d.f.), and the p value= 0.146 > 0.05. 
These KZN findings are consistent with the findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 
1998) where the above variable was found to be less significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.13 THE AUDIT FIRM'S GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE WAS 
INADEQUATE FOR OUR NEEDS (4%) 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the firm's geographic coverage being adequate for the client's needs and the specific 
type of auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 =2.13 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f. ), 
p value= 0.544 > 0.05 of client companies that experienced auditor switching in the 
KZN Region. 
No comparison or contrast could be found for this variable from previous research 
studies. 
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4.2.4.1.14 AUDIT FIRM LACKED INDUSTRIAL SPECIALISATION 
OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE (3%) 
A Chi-square test for independence indicated a less significant relationship between 
the audit firm's lack of industrial specialisation or technical expertise and the specific 
types of auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 6.89 < xi 2 7.815 (3d. f.), 
p value= 0.075 > 0.05 . 
These findings, of firms in the KZN Region that experienced auditor changes, are 
consistent with the findings of Eichenseher & Shields (1983) where the above 
variable was also less significant to auditor switching, but inconsistent with the 
findings of Haskins & Williams (1990) and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) 
respectively where the above variables were the significant factor related to auditor 
switching. 
4.2.4.1.15 OUR COMPANY DECISION TO BECOME A LISTED 
COMPANY (3%) 
A Chi-square test for independence, of companies that experienced auditor switching 
in the KZN Region, revealed a less significant relationship between the company's 
decision to become a listed company and the specific type of auditor switches at the 5% 
level of significance, x 2 = 3.72 < xi 2 7.815 (3.d.f), p value= 0.294 > 0.05. 
No comparison or contrast could be found for this variable from previous studies. 
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4.2.4.1.16 THE AUDIT FIRM CONTINUED TO MAKE MAJOR 
MISTAKES (3%) 
Some firms simply lose clients because they make too many technical errors for the 
client to accept. 
A Chi-square test for independence, of firms in the KZN Region that experienced 
auditor changes, showed a less significant relationship between the audit firm's 
continuity to make mistakes and the specific type of auditor switches at the 5% level of 
significance, x 2 =7.01 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.071 > 0.05. 
No comparison or contrast could be found for this variable from previous studies. 
4.2.4.1.17 INACCESSIBILITY OF AUDIT FIRM (PARTNER) 
TO OUR COMPANY (3%) 
Client companies want to see their business advisors, and certain professional 
practitioners apparently have not yet realised that this is a reason for losing their 
clients. 
A Chi-square test revealed a less significant relationship between the client's 
inaccessibility to the audit firm or the partner and the specific type of auditor switches 
at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 2.49 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.477 > 0.05. 
These findings, of clients in the KZN Region, are consistent with the findings of 
Beattie & Fearn ley ( 1995 & 1998) where the above variable was also a less significant 
variable. 
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4.2.4.1.18 THE FORMER AUDITOR TRAINED THEIR JUNIORS 
AT OUR EXPENSE (3%) 
Clients are not impressed when auditors use company time to train their staff at the 
client company's expense as the completed audit does not justify the cost. 
A Chi-square test for independence reflects a less significant relationship between the 
former auditor training their junior staff at the client's expense and the specific type of 
auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 3.71 < xi 2 7.815 (3d.f.), p value 
= 0.294 > 0.05. 
These findings, of client companies in the KZN Region, are consistent with the findings 
of Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) where the above variable was also less significant to 
auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.19 HIGH TURNOVER OF AUDIT ENGAGEMENT 
STAFF/PARTNERS (3%) 
Anytime the service provider on the account changes, that client relationship is put in 
danger. No consideration is given as to who the client wants to deal with when the 
regular contact leaves. Rather, someone is assigned to the client, based apparently 
upon who has the least amount of work. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the high turnover of audit engagement staff/partners and the specific type of auditor 
switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 4.95 < xi 2 7.815 (3.d.f), p value= 0.175 
>0.05. 
The findings of this KZN Regional study on auditor switching are consistent with the 
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findings of Addams & Davis (1994) and Beattie & Feamley (1998) where the above 
variable was a less significant factor to auditor switching, but are inconsistent with the 
findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995) where high turnover of audit engagement staff 
was a significant variable to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.20 WRITE DOWN OF FIXED ASSETS AND/OR INVENTORY (3%) 
This problem arises from disputes in which the auditor advocates a lower asset 
valuation than that of the client. 
A Chi-square test for independence showed a less significant relationship between 
the write down of fixed assets and/or inventory and the specific type of auditor switches 
at the 5% level of significance, x 2 =3.71 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.294 > 0.05. 
These findings, in respect of respondents, are consistent with the findings of Burton 
& Roberts (1967), Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) and Addams & Davis (1994) where the 
above variable was less significant to auditor change. 
4.2.4.1.21 NO REFERENCE TO REASONS TO SWITCH (2%) 
This refers to one respondent who provided no evidence to indicate which accounting 
dispute, principle or reason, other than that contained in Table 4.3, gave rise to auditor 
switching. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
having no reference to any reason to switch and the specific type of auditor switches 
at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 1.09 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.777 > 0.05. 
This finding, of a client company in the KZN Region, is consistent with the findings of 
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Burton & Roberts (1967), Bedingfield & Loeb (1974), and Fried & Schiff (1981) 
where the above variable was also less significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.22 AUDIT COMMITTEE REQUESTED A SWITCH (1%) 
The audit committee requested a switch because of the their concern over the quality 
and reliability of the financial information presented to the Board. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the audit committee requesting a switch and the specific type of auditor switches at the 
5% level of significance, x 2 = 3.46 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.326 > 0.05. 
The findings of this study, of client companies in the KZN Region, are consistent with 
the findings of Fried & Schiff (1981), Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) where the 
above variable was also less significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.23 MANAGEMENT'S DESIRE FOR A PRESTIGIOUS 
BRAND-NAME AUDIT FIRM (1%) 
Clients may desire to enhance their own reputation among interested constituencies 
( eg. Creditors, Shareholders) by choosing an audit firm with a better perceived 
reputation than that of the incumbent auditor. 
A Chi-square test for independence indicated a less significant relationship between 
management's desire for a prestigious brand-name audit firm and the specific type of 
auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 5.89 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value 
= 0.116 > 0.05. 
The survey findings, in respect of firms if the KZN Region that experienced auditor 
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switches, are consistent with the findings of Haskins & Wiliams (1990) where the 
above variable was the least important factor to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.24 ROTATION POLICY TO CHANGE AUDITORS (1%) 
The quality of audit work received may improve by changing auditors every five years. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the rotation policy to change auditors and the specific type of auditor switches at the 
5% level of significance, x 2 = 5.80 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.121 > 0.05. 
These survey findings, pertaining to respondents in the KZN Region, are consistent 
with the findings of Burton & Roberts (1967), Fried & Schiff (1981), and Addams & 
Davis (1994) where the above variable was also deemed a less significant variable to 
auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.25 WE DISAGREED WITH THE AUDITORS ON CERTAIN 
ACCOUNTING MATTERS (1%) 
Disputes over accounting principles seldom appeared to be the primary reason for an 
auditor switch as only one respondent supplied this reason for changing auditors. 
A Chi-square test for independence uncovered a less significant relationship betvveen 
disagreement with the auditors over certain accounting matters and the specific type 
of auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 5.89 <xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p 
value= 0.116 > 0.05. 
These findings, of clients in the KZN Region that experienced auditor switching, are 
consistent with the findings of Williams (1988), Johnson & Lys (1990), Addams & 
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Davis (1994), and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) where disagreement over 
accounting principles was less significant to auditor switching but inconsistent with the 
findings of Burton & Roberts (1967), Bedingfield & Loeb (1974), and Fried & Schiff 
(1981) where the above variable was a significant factor to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.26 NEED FOR A NATIONAL. RATHER THAN LOCAL 
AUDIT FIRM (1%) 
Only one respondent indicated switching from a Local audit firm to a National audit firm. 
The reasons may be varied. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the need for a National, rather than Local, audit firm and the specific type of auditor 
switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 5.89 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.116 
>0.05. 
This finding , confined to a client company in the KZN Region that experienced auditor 
switching, is consistent with the findings of Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) where 
the above variable was less significant to auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.27 FINANCIAL DISTRESS (FAILING COMPANY (1%) 
Only one respondent indicated switching from a National audit firm to a Local audit firm. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
financial distress and the specific type of auditor switches at the 5% level of 
significance, x 2 = 3.46 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.326 > 0.05. 
This survey finding in the KZN Region is inconsistent with the findings of Schwartz 
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& Menon (1985), Wilson & Grimlund (1990), Haskins & Williams (1990), and 
Lennox (1999) where financial distress was the significant factor in auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.28 DISAGREEMENT WITH AUDIT OPINION (1%) 
One respondent switched auditors from a National audit firm to a Local audit firm as a 
result of a disagreement with the opinion expressed by their former auditors. 
A Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
disagreement with the auditors over the opinion expressed by them and the specific 
type of auditor switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 = 3.46 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), 
p value= 0.326 > 0.05. 
This finding of a client company in the KZN Region, that experienced auditor switching, 
is consistent with the findings of Schwa rtz & Menon ( 1985), Williams ( 1988), Haskins 
& Williams (1990), Johnson & Lys (1990), and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) 
where disagreement with an audit opinion was a less significant variable to auditor 
switching, whilst the findings of Chow & Rice (1982), Smith (1986), Crasswell (1988), 
Roberts, Glezen & Jones (1990), Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993), 
Krishnan, Krishnan & Stephens (1996), and Pragasam & Sands (1996) found the 
above variable to be a significant factor in auditor switching. 
4.2.4.1.29 TIMING OF REVENUE RECOGNITION (1%) 
One respondent had desired to recognise revenue in advance of the time advocated 
by the auditor. The respondent changed from a National firm to another National firm 
due to the above difference of opinion. 
A Chi-square for independence test showed a less significant relationship between 
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the timing of revenue recognition and the specific type of auditor switches at the 5% 
level of significance, x 2 = 5.89 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.116 > 0.05. 
This KZN Regional finding is consistent with the findings of Burton & Roberts (1967) 
and Bedingfield & Loeb (1974) where the above variable was also found to be less 
significant to auditor changes. 
4.2.4.1.30 UNCERTAINTY OF RECOVERY OF BOOK VALUE 
OF ASSETS (1%) 
Only one respondent indicated the above reason for auditor switching from a National 
audit firm to a Local audit firm. 
The Chi-square test for independence revealed a less significant relationship between 
the uncertainty of recovery of book value of assets and the specific type of auditor 
switches at the 5% level of significance, x 2 =3.46 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.326 
> 0.05. 
This KZN Regional survey finding is consistent with the findings of Bedingfield & 
Loeb (1974) where the above aspect was also deemed less significant to auditor 
switching. 
4.2.4.1.31 OTHER SINGLE ITEMS OF DISAGREEMENT 
Four respondents, from client companies in the KZN Region that experienced auditor 
switching, provided the following reasons for changing their auditors: 
• Poor service and people never available. 
• Conflict of interests. 
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• Unnecessary disclaimer on audit report due to uncertainty of recovery of assets. 
The above reasons could not be analysed singly for the Chi-square test for 
independence, but were combined reflecting nearing significance at the 5% level of 
significance, x 2 = 7.64 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.054 > 0.05 (Table 4.3). 
No comparison or contrast could be found for the above. 
4.2.4.1.32 OTHER REASONS 
Sixteen respondents, of client firms in the KZN Region that experienced auditor 
changes, provided other reasons not contained in Table 4.3 for changing auditors: 
• Did not seem as if they really wanted our account. 
• Requested by the Natal Law Society to change auditors. 
• Empowerment firm (joint auditors). 
• Auditors unable to provide services due to their commitment to Government contracts. 
• Affirmative action policy, switch over to a "disadvantaged" audit firm. 
• Infrequent change of audit staff was not acceptable. 
• Manufacturing plant closed down. 
• Disclaimer of opinion. 
• Local firm charged lower fees. 
• Prior auditor deceased. 
• Conflict of interests. 
• Changed due to advice of new Bookkeeper. 
The above reasons could not be analysed individually for the Chi-square test for 
independence but were combined to reflect a less significant relationship, in terms of 
the above reasons, and the specific type of auditor switches at the 5% level of 
significance, x 2 = 5.26 < xi 2 7.815 (3 d.f.), p value= 0.153 > 0.05. 
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No comparison or contrast could be found for the above. 
4.2.4.1.33 NON-RESPONSE VARIABLES 
Variables 33 to 44, appearing on Table 4.3, disappointingly received no responses in 
the mail-survey carried out by the researcher and thus could not be analysed. 
4.2.5 CONCLUSION 
This part of the study presents the results of the statistical analysis performed on the 
sample data obtained by means of a mail questionnaire survey of client companies that 
experienced auditor switching, in the KZN Region, during the period 1 January 1998 
to 30 June 1999. This section of the study begins with a description of the response 
rate to the main study. This was followed with a presentation of the descriptive statistics 
which showed the direction of auditor switches by type of practice from 7 5 respondents. 
The study did not find an overwhelming tendency for companies to select a Non-
National (Local) firm as their new auditor. In fact Local firms had more clients before 
and even after the switch as the study sample was made up of relatively small 
companies, in the KZN Region, which apparently are more likely to select a Local firm 
as their auditor. Thereafter, the empirical data was analysed by using the inferential 
statistical Chi-square tests for presentation and analysis by using the SPSS for 
Windows computer programme. 
The data indicated that, when an audit switch does occur, it is the result of a major 
change within the company or it is as a result of the need for additional services beyond 
those which the current auditor has been offering. 
Based on a sample of 75 companies, which had recently changed auditors in the KZN 
Region, the following observations can be made: 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS PAGE 150 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
* 
* 
the variable the previous audit fee was too high was found to be the most 
frequently cited reason for changing auditors and there was also supporting 
evidence of a significant relationship between the reason for switching audit 
firms and the specific type of auditor switches. The reasons for switching were 
also associated with the type of switches, and 
the second most frequently cited reason for auditor switching was 
dissatisfaction over the overall quality of services provided by the auditor. 
The findings of this variable were, in contrast to the eXpected results of the 
study, less significant to auditor switching . The results were expected to show 
that dissatisfaction over audit firm's services did impact on auditor switching. 
Most of the survey findings are consistent with prior empirical research whilst certain 
of the results are in contrast with the findings of prior research. The differences in 
results possibly may be explained by differences in the population of companies 
examined. The population of this study included mostly small companies, in the KZN 
Region, whose auditors were mainly local firms. What is true of these companies may 
not be true for larger companies, namely, Burton & Roberts (1967) examined the 
largest companies in the United States of America, Carpenter & Strawser (1971) 
examined only companies that issued securities for the first time (large companies) 
whilst Bedingfield & Loeb(1974) examined a broad spectrum of companies of different 
size, Addams & Davis (1994) examined privately held companies, and Beattie & 
Fearnley (1995 & 1998) examined listed companies. Thus, because of the size of 
companies in this study there might not have been as much pressure to change to a 
National firm (as compared to the companies in, for example, the Burton & Roberts 
(1967) study). 
The final chapter highlights the findings of the study and includes suggestions for 
future research. 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS PAGE 151 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
CHAPTER 5 
REVIEW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to empirically test the determination of and investigation 
into the factors that contribute to auditor switching in South Africa. Empirical data were 
gathered from companies that had recently changed their auditors in the KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN) Region. Secondly, the data were analysed to determine whether differences 
existed in the auditor switch by type of practice with respect to the accounting firms 
involved in the auditor switches. In most of the tests designed to achieve these 
purposes, statistical defensible results were obtained using the non-parametric Chi-
square test for independence at the 0.05 level of significance. 
This chapter serves to encapsulate the findings of the preceding chapters, a brief 
discussion of the findings of the empirical study, and making recommendations to the 
profession in the KZN Region and in South Africa so as to improve the auditor-client 
relationship and thus to possibly reduce the incidence of auditor switching. 
Furthermore, the varied and diverse reasons for auditor change made it impossible for 
all the dimensions of the discipline to be discussed within the jurisdiction of this study, 
consequently creating the need for future research. The chapter concludes by making 
salient or tentative recommendations for future research opportunities. 
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5.2 REVIEW 
The history and development of auditing and auditor switching were reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Although the objectives and concepts that guide present-day audits were 
almost unknown in the early years of the 20th century, audits of one type or another 
have been conducted initially from the beginning of recorded history in both the private 
and public sectors. The original meaning of the word auditor, which was one who 
hears, was appropriate to the era during which the government accounting records 
were approved only after a public reading during which the accounts were read aloud. 
From medieval times on through the Industrial Revolution audits were carried out to 
determine whether persons in positions of official responsibility in the government or 
private sector were acting and reporting in an honest manner, failing which the option 
of auditor switching was applied by client enterprises. 
During the Industrial Revolution, as manufacturing concerns grew in size, the owners 
began to use the services of hired managers. With this separation of the ownership 
and stewardship, owners turned increasingly to auditors to protect themselves against 
the dangers of errors and fraud committed by managers and employees. When such 
protection was not forthcoming on the part of auditors, it gave rise to auditor switches 
by the owners. Outside users of financial reports (usually only balance sheets), 
primarily bankers, were also concerned as to whether the reports were distorted by 
error or fraud. Before 1900 audits were carried out on all recorded transactions which 
was consistent with the primary objective, namely, to detect errors and fraud. 
During the first half of the 20th century, the direction of audit work began to move away 
from fraud detection towards whether the financial statements reflected a full and 
fair presentation of the financial position and operating results. This shift in emphasis 
was as a result of the increasing number of shareholders and the corresponding 
increased size of entities. Auditors became more responsible to the governmental 
sectors, stock exchanges representing these new investors, as well as third parties who 
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relied upon the financial information. When the Public or Private sector found their 
incumbent auditor lacking in certain respects ( eg. services, etc) they would switch to 
another auditor who was able to satisfy their needs. 
As large-scale companies began to emerge in the UK, USA, South Africa and other 
countries, auditors began to sample select their transactions, rather than examine all 
the transactions. Auditors and business managers generally began to accept the 
proposition that a careful examination of relatively few transactions randomly selected 
would give a cost-effective, reliable indication of the accuracy of other similar 
transaction from the same population. 
In addition to sampling, auditors became aware of the importance of internal control. 
Testing was the rule, not the exception, and the degree of testing decided upon was 
largely dependent on the effectiveness of internal control. Auditors found that by 
studying the client's system of internal control they could identify the areas of strengths 
as well as areas of weakness. 
The increasing use of computers and statistical sampling techniques had significant 
effects on auditing methods but have not altered the auditor's responsibility for 
detecting errors and irregularities. Auditors have been required to develop new 
approaches for testing internal control and financial statement balances. The auditors' 
methods and techniques have evolved and been developed to facilitate auditing 
around, with and through the computer systems, with the computer being used as an 
audit tool. 
The present structure of the accountancy profession in South Africa is characterised 
by dissension and fragmentation. A number of attempts have been made over the years 
to unify the provincial societies, the SAICA, and the PAAB, but these have proved to 
be unsuccessful. In 1991 the PAAB initiated a project styled the Future of Accounting 
Education in South Africa (FAESA). In March 1994 a report was submitted to the PAAB 
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by the Central Working Group of the FAESA Project. The FAESA Report has set the 
scene for a number of changes which are presently taking place in the accounting 
profession in South Africa. This process of wide consultation has yielded 
recommendations, including the formation of an Interim Representative Council {IRC). 
This transformation is directed towards a common, coordinated registered accountancy 
profession that is representative of the South African population which will be regulated 
by a single national law for the first time in history. It is hoped that the new structure 
will make the accountancy profession accessible to all persons who are desirous of and 
have the ability to become an accountant. It is anticipated that during 2001 the 
Accountancy Profession Bill, will be introduced in Parliament, for scrutiny and 
comment, and that the Representative Council of Accountants (successor to the 
PAAB) will effectively come into operation in the year 2001. Auditing is still evolving, 
and as new problems appear it will of necessity be further modified and improved to 
meet the needs of the auditing profession. 
Chapter 3 provides insight on the auditing- switching phenomenon, based on a review 
of related literature, from past studies, even though the findings of many of these 
studies have been inconclusive and somewhat inconsistent. The review of major 
studies on auditor switching reported conflicting results. There is no consensus among 
all prior studies about the factors that influence client companies to change their 
auditors. Previous studies on auditor switching have typically centred on the 
demographics of auditor change and managements' volunteered for change. Several 
studies contradicted the findings of one another, hence, the current study attempts to 
investigate the factors that contributed to auditor change in South Africa. Previous 
studies used historical, secondary data in reaching their conclusions and even the 
study that used primary data obtained their information from client company 
management of auditor switches that took place many years before the study was 
conducted. In this study, the perceived shortcoming is counteracted by obtaining 
current data from client companies, which experienced auditor changes, so as to 
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achieve a classification of results. 
Current factors contributing to auditor switching in South Africa were determined by 
virtue of an empirical study. The methodology and findings are documented in Chapter 
4. The mail survey questionnaire method was used in the empirical investigation of 44 
switch variables (Appendix C )and the questionnaire analysis and response data was 
analysed using the SPSS for Windows program (Table 4.3). Some of the variables 
were found to be statistically significant, using the Chi-square test for independence, 
in the anticipated direction, and therefore help understand some of the factors that 
influence managements' decision to opportunistically switch auditors. Chapter 4 also 
presents these results, their statistical significance, and the meaning of those results. 
It would be sufficient to report at this stage, that auditors have, to a certain extent 
addressed these issues, but there is still a lot to be done in improving the degree of 
services offered to client companies in lieu of the audit fees paid by them. 
5.3 IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
The potential implication of these findings, in terms of auditor switch factors, are quite 
significant. The implication of these findings is that when a company's CEO or 
Manager changes a professional practising audit firm for another, he is guided by the 
expected reactions from shareholders. Thus auditor switching per se may not be 
contrary to the investors' interests. 
The ascertaining of the process of the auditor-client relationship, and the reasons for 
breakdown of this relationship, are important to both clients and audit firms. A failed 
relationship signifies various implied costs to the client, who pays in terms of the delays 
involved in the new auditor selection process, the time-consuming initial meetings, and 
the slow development of a relationship with the new audit firm. In addition, there are 
apparent monetary costs in the form of search costs of finding a new auditor to replace 
the previous auditor. 
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From the auditor's point of view, the knowledge of the reasons behind auditor switches 
is important to assist in retaining his clients. The subject of auditor switching is still 
controversial, and practice development remains a problem area for audit firms 
because a loss of clients over a period of time may create reputation problems for audit 
firms and could lead to an exodus of further clients. 
The results of the study reflect that the audit fee was too high for services provided 
was the significant factor for switching auditors, followed closely by dissatisfaction 
with the audit firm's overall quality of services provided. The results of the survey 
show that meeting client needs is an overwhelming issue. 
Given the intensive competitive environment prevailing to gain new clients and retain 
present business, audit practitioners need to develop new strategies and provide 
training to staff to promote good client relationships in terms of fees charged, services 
provided, and communicating with clients. 
Client loyalty simply cannot be taken for granted. Although fees are naturally 
important, auditors should spend less partner/manager time number-crunching to 
manipulate the audit fee just a bit higher/lower on each engagement. Rather, more 
emphasis should be placed on training manager and staff on cultivating clients, 
enhancing present relationships, and staying on the cutting edge technology in order 
to proactively assist a client in its quest for greater profitability. 
The obtaining of a new engagement is the fulfilment of a solid relationship that begins 
when a practitioner reaches out to a potential client at a social or business function. 
The auditor makes progress in that relationship by asking the right questions, to 
encounter real needs, and by educating the prospective client on how the audit firm's 
services can fulfill those needs. Once the relationship succeeds in winning the 
engagement, the auditor must not only complete the work as agreed but also be 
observed as a problem-solver while repeatedly strengthening that relationship. In this 
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way, more audit engagements can be acquired and fewer active clients lost. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
The primary purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of the auditor 
switching phenomenon by client companies. The incentive for studying auditor 
switching springs from a need to understand better the nature of the demand for audit 
services. By examining situations where a break in the auditor-client relationship 
occurs, it may be possible to identify those factors that are critical in auditor selection 
decisions, thereby providing a basis for assessing the importance of various 
measurements of the audit product. This line of research has direct implications for 
evaluating the effects of switches in the competitive nature of the auditing profession. 
A secondary purpose of this research was to determine if certain previously researched 
variables were related to auditor switching. Based on a sample of 7 5 companies which 
had recently experienced auditor switches, auditor switches were found not to be 
associated with any particular industry group, but were found to be significantly higher 
among smaller companies. Auditor switching by client companies was analysed by 
means of a mail survey questionnaire and measured through the use of descriptive and 
inferential statistical techniques. The Chi-square test for independence was used to 
test 44 variables as to whether there is a relationship between two or more variables 
in the study. The investigation outlined numerous results regarding reasons for auditor 
switching. Thirty-two of the forty-four reasons (variables) for auditor switching were 
analysed for the 75 respondents to the survey. There were no responses for 12 
variables (Table 4.3). The results of the study were contradictory to the expected 
results of this research and to prior studies about the factors that influence clients to 
switch their auditors, except for the following three variables which were significantly 
related to auditor switching at the 0.05 level of significance, per Table 4.3, namely, 
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• The audit fee was too high for services provided. 
• New management chose to replace auditors. 
• Need for group auditor rationalisation. 
The first conclusion drawn is that with the exception of the last item, the 32 reasons 
clients gave as to why they left their previous audit service provider could have been 
prevented. The second thing we can learn from this study, per Table 4.3, is that the 
audit fee which was deemed to be too high for services provided appeared to be the 
most frequently cited reason for auditor switching, followed by, dissatisfaction with the 
audit firm's overall quality of services provided, lack of communication/responsiveness 
to client needs, poor working relationships with audit partner/staff, management 
change, change in company shareholders, etc. Inspection of the direction of auditor 
switches showed a tendency among companies changing auditors to choose a different 
type as successor (Table 4.2). Small companies were more likely to cite as a reason 
for change the changing needs of the company. Large companies were more likely to 
cite merger/takeover, change in audit partnerships and group auditor rationalisation as 
a reason for change. The reason for change was also associated with the type of 
change. In general, economic factors were found to dominate the auditor change 
decision; in selecting a new auditor, however, dissatisfaction with the audit firm's 
overall quality of services provided (i.e. a behavioural consideration) was more 
important than the range of services provided. The last and perhaps the most 
important observation is that technical issues are almost last on the list of why clients 
change auditors. 
The study highlights several factors as important determinants for auditor switches by 
client companies in South Africa. The data developed in this study confirm the 
generally accepted hypothesis that most small companies prefer to employ the same 
auditor over long periods of time. Further, the data indicate that, when an auditor 
change does occur, it is the result of a major change within the company or it i·s as a 
result of a need for additional services beyond those which the current auditor has 
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been offering. The data did not show any empirical evidence that competition within 
the profession was occurring in the area of fee competition or looser principles. 
The results therefore support the view that there are some perceptions among client 
companies CEO or Manager as to what constitutes acceptable reasons for auditor 
switches, but there undoubtedly exists scope for greater efforts from auditors to 
counteract these perceptions. 
5.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This is the first known study of auditor switching in South Africa using clients' 
perceptions of the reasons for changing their auditor. The investigation also employed 
current data as opposed to historical data to measure the independent and dependent 
variables in the same time frame. The research was accomplished using the Chi-
square test of independence at the 0.05 level of significance. 
The increasing knowledge about the investigation into the factors that contribute to 
auditor switching in South Africa can provide useful information to practitioners in 
preventing breakdowns in their relationships with their clients and in devising new 
marketing strategies to maintain and increase their practice. Further research into both 
the demand and supply characteristics of this market should assist in the development 
of appropriate responses to perceived problems surrounding the auditing profession 
in South Africa. 
Consequently, client companies will benefit from improved quality service and fees 
charged in lieu of services provided by the auditors who will be in a better position to 
satisfy their needs. 
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5.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The literature review provided a theoretical perspective into auditor switching by client 
companies, and the empirical study provided an insight into what the actual reasons 
for changing auditors were. The conclusion of this study suggests areas for future 
investigation. Whether the findings will be reproduced under different conditions with 
a different target population awaits further research. The following thoughts, although 
hypothetical, are offered to stimulate other researchers' thinking on this important 
dimension of auditor switching. 
This study investigated auditor switching in the KZN Region. This restriction to a 
specific geographical region may influence the overall acceptability of the results in 
South Africa as a whole. To overcome this limitation, there is need for research to be 
undertaken on a larger scale within South Africa in order to ensure a greater 
generalisation of the research findings and to validate comparisons with similar 
international studies. A comparative analysis could thereafter be undertaken, which 
can provide useful guidelines on auditor switches, a phenomenon of con~ern both to 
auditors and to the public generally, including third parties that rely upon services 
rendered by professional practitioners. 
Although there has been found to be a general congruence between the findings of the 
direct and indirect methods of eliciting reasons for auditor change (Eichenseher & 
Shields, 1983:31 ), further research using a variety of methods would be beneficial. In 
particular, in-depth interviews with auditor switchers would provide additional insights 
into the behavioural aspects of auditor switching. In addition, further research could 
explore the extent to which auditor switches could be averted by fee reductions from 
the incumbent. 
Client size has seldom been considered in the research on auditor switching. This 
study had a sample majority of non-public (private) companies. Future research in 
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auditor switching may investigate the relationship between the factors that contribute 
to auditor switching and the clients' intention to switch their auditors from different sub-
samples of clients, based on their size. 
Since the focus of this study was on the investigation into the factors that contribute 
to auditor switching in South Africa, based upon the attributes of auditors as influencing 
the decision to switch auditors, any relationship that may have existed among the 
different perceived attributes of auditors was not considered to be of interest to this 
study. If such relationship exists and if the data show that they are statistically 
significant, it may indicate that some of the perceived attributes of auditors that do not 
appear to have a direct bias on the clients' intention to switch auditors may, in fact, do 
so indirectly through their effect on other perceived attributes of auditors. For example, 
switches due to affirmative action policies may impact negatively on auditor's credibility, 
expertise, etc. Such relationships should be investigated and their effect be accounted 
for in subsequent studies. 
The researcher is of the opinion that future research should explore the roles played 
by management and the external investors in the auditor selection decision. When 
such evidence is combined with the findings on the extent of auditor switching, 
interested parties have a better basis to determine the cause and effect of auditor 
change. 
Finally, future research into the factors that contribute to auditor switching should be 
considered so as to find ways and means of reducing the loss of clients by 
practitioners. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA-COLLECTION TECHNIQUES AND SELECTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Data-collection techniques allow researchers to systematically collect information in 
order to answer the research questions in a conclusive way" (Varkevisser, 
Pathmanathan & Brownlee (1991:142) and Sharma & Sharma (1996:41). A survey 
is essentially a method of obtaining data from a group of respondents chosen to 
represent a particular target population and are gathered at essentially one point in 
time by means of direct contact, namely, through personal interview, telephone 
interview or mail questionnaires (Singleton, Straits & Straits (1993:239), Dillon, 
Madden & Firtle, (1994:139), Cooper & Schindler (1998:287), and Aaker, Kumar & 
Day (1998:217). Simon & Burstein (1985:185) state that the choice between mail 
surveys, personal and telephone interviews is judgmental in order to decide on the 
technique to be deployed. 
2. DATA-COLLECTION USING MAIL SURVEY 
The data-collection method adopted for the survey entailed the use of a mail survey, 
a self-administered questionnaire by the postal services or a courier service. In a mail 
survey, the researcher sends a structured questionnaire, to a sample of respondents 
who then complete it in their own time and thereafter return it to the research unit 
(Martins, Loubser & VanWyk (1996:150) and Dillon, Madden & Firtle (1994:141). 
Mail survey questionnaires provide one of the best means of eliciting information from 
a population that is widely dispersed and may prefer anonymity (Wallace & Mellor, 
1988:132). According to Sommer & Sommer (1997:140), Sharma & Sharma 
(1996:49), and Bailey (1994:148-149) selecting the mail survey method enjoys the 
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following potential advantages when compared to the personal interviews or telephone 
interviews: 
• Relatively low cost 
• Time savings. 
• Standardised wording. 
• No interviewer bias. 
• Provides a greater assurance of anonymity to resl>ondents. 
• Collected information may be more reliable. 
• Original data can be obtained directly from the respondents. 
• Questionnaire may be completed at the respondent's convenience. 
• Securing information. 
In evaluating the data collection technique used in this survey, Cooper & Schindler 
(1988:311) state that the optimal survey method selected is the one that is instrumental 
in answering the research questi~ns and dealing with the constraints imposed by 
budget, time and human resources. 
3. DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
According to Schnetler (1989:44) "a well designed questionnaire is the culmination of 
a long process of planning the research objective and formulating the problem". The 
most difficult aspect of a questionnaire is its construction (Sommer & Sommer, 
1997:128). The data collection method influences the question wording, sequencing 
of the questions, the format of the responses and the questionnaire layout. For this 
study the mail survey was chosen as the data collection technique and administered 
by the researcher to ensure its prompt return (Aaker, Kumar & Day, 1998:306). Due 
recognition was given to some of the key characteristics which should be possessed 
by a good questionnaire design as stated by Sharma & Sharma (1996: 50-52) and 
Melville & Goddard ( 1996:43) for the proper phrasing of questions to avoid ambiguity 
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and to facilitate questionnaire administration. 
4. VALIDATION 
A valid measuring instrument is one which produces accurate results on the subject 
under investigation (Schnetler, 1989:89). It is important to note that "a measure cannot 
be a valid measure unless it is a reliable measure, but a measure can be reliable 
without it being a valid measure of the variable of interest" (Graziano & Raulin, 
1996:88). 
The content validity of a measuring instrument is the extent to which it provides 
adequate coverage of the items under investigation (Cooper & Schindler, 1998:167). 
According to Bless & Higson-Smith (1995:137) content validity is achieved by 
referring to the literature relating to the area of the study. In attempting to ensure 
content validity, a literature search was undertaken and proved quite productive in 
indicating the various dimensions of the variables. In this regard the questionnaire 
design enjoyed high content validity and the techniques used were evaluated by pre-
testing thus ensuring that the instrument measured what it was supposed to measure. 
DeVaus (1990:56) states that the "validity of a test depends on the use to which it is 
put and not on the test per se". 
Construct validity secures its purpose when the researcher "makes a list of the 
different pieces of information that the instrument is required to uncover and then 
designs questions to secure that information" (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:138). The 
measuring instrument was confined to the variables to be tested in the area of auditor 
switching. The research variables (questions) were drawn from a review of literature 
used in similar studies and source-books of questionnaires used for other studies but 
broadly relating, in the main, to the scope of interest. 
The questionnaire used in this study was structurally designed to elicit information from 
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the respondents. Similar studies in auditor switching by Burton & Roberts (1967), 
Carpenter & Strawser (1971), Bedingfield & Loeb (1974), Eichenseher & Shields 
(1983), Addams & Davis (1994), and Beattie & Feamley (1995 & 1998) have shown 
that the questionnaire has been successfully used as a research instrument. Hence, 
this study will use a questionnaire, drawn up from questions and ideas utilised in prior 
studies which were then adapted and modified to satisfy the parameters of the stated 
objectives, the limitations and scope of the study. 
Moser (1969:218) states that "most survey questions are concerned with either facts 
or opinions". The questionnaire formulated related to factual information in a grid 
format together with a question called "other'', at the end, to enable respondents to 
make additional comments if any. Schnetler (1998:45) states that "although the 
emphasis is on accuracy, a factual question does not always guarantee a factual 
answer''. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the questionnaire developed and 
procedures used measure what they are supposed to, and to secure internal validity, 
the following precautions were taken: 
4.1. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION 
According to Sharma & Sharma (1996:52) the questionnaire "should be attractive and 
lucid to answer, and undesirable and unwanted questions should not be asked". 
The questionnaire for this study was self -administered which comprised of the following 
three sections: 
• Section 1 : Change in Auditor by type of Practice. 
• Section 2 : Nature of items in Disagreement. 
• Section 3 : Auditor change by type of Change. 
APPENDIX PAGE166 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
The questionnaire comprised of 44 structured questions which elicited information from 
respondents selected for the survey. Ten questions pertained to items in 
disagreement whilst the remaining 34 were attributable to reasons for change, and 
included specific problems with the predecessor auditor. A copy of the questionnaire 
is included in Appendix C. Once a list of the subject matter for the questionnaire has 
been compiled, the actual process of questionnaire construction including layout, 
format, sequence and wording requires attention. 
4.1.1 LAYOUT 
According to Sommer & Sommer (1997:135) a self-administered questionnaire "must 
begin with an introductory statement, present the questions in an easily read and easily 
answered format, and with a note of appreciation. Zikmund (1994:412) and Neuman 
(2000:270) point out that the layout is crucial for mail questionnaires because there is 
no friendly interviewer to interact with the respondent, instead the questionnaire's 
appearance persuades the respondents. Alreck & Settle (1985:194) mention that the 
"appearance and quality of the mailing piece and its contents have a very important 
effect on mai I survey response rates". 
The purpose of the covering letter is to introduce the respondent to the research study, 
explain the project and win the cooperation of the recipient, and must do so entirely on 
its own (Aireck & Settle, 1985:206). The cover letter was prepared and typed by the 
researcher. The cover letter is presented as Appendix B. 
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4.1.2 FORMAT 
According to Sudman & Bradburn (1983:229) "a well-formatted questionnaire can 
significantly reduce errors and increase motivation". The questionnaire is divided into 
three sections: 
• Section 1 : This section has a choice question, requesting information on the switch 
from prior auditor to the new auditor. 
• Section 2 : This section concerns selecting items in disagreement, if any, if the 
change in auditor was as a result of any disagreement between the 
client company and the auditor. 
• Section 3 : This section concerns the factors that caused or were instrumental in 
the auditor switch decision by the client company. 
4.1.3 ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Each questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter which provided details of the 
purpose of the study. The researcher was personally involved in the questionnaire 
despatch. According to Schnetler (1989:24) "any indication that the researcher had 
been personally involved in the questionnaire or its despatch results in increased 
returns". The researcher followed the ways to increase mail questionnaire response 
as set out by Neuman (2000:270) and supported by Singleton, Straits & Straits 
(1993:265) and Bailey (1994:161). 
The questions were also directed towards applying the various descriptive and 
inferential statistical tests used to generate the quantitative analysis using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) program. The SPSS program was 
used for compiling tables, cross-tabulations and for computing nonparametric statistics 
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(Norusis, 1998:309). However the non-parametric Statistic Chi-square was used in 
most of the statistical analyses. The SPSS program provides the facility for computing 
a Chi-square test. The 0.05 level of significance was considered a point of reference 
for analysing the results in this Chapter (Norusis, 1998:318). 
4 .. 2 PRE-TESTING 
According to Singleton, Straits & Straits (1993:270) "the basic reason for conducting 
a pre-test is to determine whether the instrument serves the purpose for which it was 
designed or whether further revision is needed". As quoted by Churchill (1992:357) 
"the researcher who avoids a questionnaire pre-test and tabulation of replies is either 
naive or a fool". Churchill (1992:357) also advises that pre-test is the most 
inexpensive insurance the researcher can buy to ensure the success of the 
questionnaire and the research project. The questionnaire was given to a few friends 
and work colleagues who are lecturing in the field and in professional practice and who 
were familiar with the nature of the study. Fowler ( 1988:1 03) also lends support that 
every questionnaire should be pre-tested, no matter how skilled the researcher. 
Virtually every questionnaire could be changed in some way to make it easier for the 
respondent to meet the research objectives. Obviously, the closer the final instrument 
is to perfection, the better the research process. The researcher's work colleagues 
made a few suggestions which were useful in editing and ensuring proper construction 
of the document. 
5. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Statistics is "a collection of theory and methods applied for the purpose of 
understanding data" (Hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs, 1998:2). According to Sandy (1990: 
1-3) statistics is used in the analysis of data to aid in decision making and the term 
designates "a summary measure of the numerical characteristics of a sample". The use 
of statistics for this study was the non-parametric statistics since the data was in 
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nominal form. In using non-parametric statistics no explicit assumption regarding the 
normality of distribution in the proportion is made (Sekaran, 1992:259). There are 
basically two types of statistics: Descriptive and Inferential (De Vaus, 1990:126). 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics are those which summarises patterns in the responses of people 
in a sample (De Vaus, 1990:126). The objective of descriptive statistics is "to provide 
summary measures of the data contained in the elements of a sample" (Kinnear & 
Taylor, 1996:568). Categorical data can be classified into a one-way frequency table 
or into contingency tables. According to Babbie (1992:389) in a one-way frequency 
table, the researcher is concerned about the extent of occurrence of a phenomenon, 
which lists each observed value of the variable with its frequency of occurrence. In this 
study, the one-way frequency table and the contingency table was constructed by using 
a statistical package SPSS for Windows. This study has four levels of the variable 
(National to National, National to Local, Local to Local, and Local to National) and 
44 levels of the variable switch factor (As per Table 4.3). 
Instead of presenting data in frequency tables using absolute numbers, the use of 
percentages is also an important tool for analysis. A researcher comparing the four 
types of auditor switches will not gain a clear picture of their distribution from the 
absolute numbers, but by expressing them as percentages he renders them 
comparable and is able to draw conclusions thereon. Singleton, Straits & Straits 
(1993:428) points out that percentages distributions "provide an explicit comparative 
framework for interpreting distributions". Percentages tell you the size of the category 
relative to the size of the sample. 
Descriptive statistics facilitate initial data analysis, but the researcher is also interested 
in making statistical inferential to the population from the sample. Hence the use of 
inferential statistics to present the data in a statistical format so that important 
APPENDIX PAGE17C 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
relationships and analysis become more meaningful. 
5.2 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Inferential statistics "is a collection of methods for making inferences about the 
characteristics of the population from the knowledge of the corresponding 
characteristics of the sample" (Hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs, 1998:18). Inferential statistics 
can be categorised as parametric and non-parametric and allow the researcher to draw 
inference from the sample to the population (Sekaran, 1992:259). Thus inferential 
statistics "allow the researcher to make judgements about the population based upon 
the sample results" (Kinnear & Taylor, 1996:600). The purpose of inferential statistics 
is to enable the researcher to determine "whether or not a difference between two 
treatment conditions occurred by chance or is a true difference" (Dunham, 1988:311). 
The non-parametric Chi-square test for independence was used in this study. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The research design and methodology incorporated an examination of the procedure 
in establishing empirical data for the research study. The questionnaire design was 
validated on the basis of the research instrument being properly constructed and pre-
tested and hence facilitated the application of the statistical tools for the analysis to be 
meaningful and useful. The mail survey questionnaire method was used and 
administered by the researcher to facilitate data capture and analysis. 
Finally, the questionnaire analysis and responses were captured by the researcher with 
the assistance of experts based at the University and guided by the Supervisor. The 
data were analysed with the aid of the SPSS for Windows program which allowed for 
the application of suitable statistical tests, thereby enhancing the quality of the findings 
of the study. 
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8 July 1999 
The Chief Executive 
Dear Sir 
APPENDIX B 
MrH.GARACH 
c/o Department of Accounting & Auditing 
P 0 Box 1334 
DURBAN 
4000 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
am currently engaged in post - graduate studies in the Department of Auditing 
at the University of South Africa and am conducting a nationwide survey of persons 
in top management positions in South African companies. The main purpose of this 
survey is to examine the issue of client satisfaction with their auditors. The relating data 
will be used in my Masters Degree dissertation, and hence, I am requesting your 
assistance in completing this research. 
As I am sending out only a limited number of questionnaires, I urgently need your co-
operation. Your name was selected as part of a sample of companies who recently · 
changed their auditors and your response is crucial to the accuracy and success of this 
study. I know that your time is very valuable, but please take some time to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire. Since the questionnaire is based on your own experiences, 
you will find that it is very easy to complete. The entire questionnaire should not take 
more than 15 minutes of your time. A postage-paid return envelope is enclosed for your 
convenience. If you feel that another person in your organisation would be more 
knowledgeable than yourself about the performance of your auditor, please forward the 
questionnaire and this letter to that individual. 
All the information requested will be held strictly confidential... the answers will be 
analysed only in the aggregate, and the results presented in a summary form without 
any references to the individual respondents or companies. 
I would like to thank you in anticipation of your co-operation. Without your valuable 
assistance, I will not be able to complete my dissertation. 
~~JJ]r~·-················ H GARACH ./ 
APPENDIX 
(031) 3371940 
(031) 3085550 
PAGE172 
AUDITOR SWITCHING 
APPENDIX C 
SECTION 1 : CHANGE IN AUDITOR BY TYPE OF PRACTICE 
Please place a cross ( X ) in the appropriate boxes to indicate the switch from 
prior auditor to new auditor. 
Prior auditor was 
New auditor IS 
NATIONAL 
Fm.M 
D 
D 
NON-NATIONAL 
FIRM (LOCAL) 
D 
D 
SECTION 2 : NATURE OF ITEMS IN DISAGREEMENT 
Please place a cross ( X ) in the appropriate box if the change of auditor resulted 
from disagreement in respect of any of the following items : 
2.1 Write down of fixed assets and I or inventory D 
2.2 Timing of revenue recognition D 
2.3 Asset valuation D 
2.4 Uncertainty of recovery ofbook value of assets D 
2.5 Effective date of transactions r---1 u 
2.6 Changes in depreciation methods D 
2.7 Changes in inventory valuations D 
2.8 Extra provision for tax liability D 
2.9 Less disclosure D 
2.10 Other single items of disagreement (please mention) D 
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SECTION 3 : AUDITOR CHANGE BY TYPE OF CHANGE 
Please place a cross ( X ) in the appropriate box indicating reasons which 
contributed towards the decision by your company to change auditors. 
3.1 The auditor's fee was too high for services provided. D 
3.2 We were not satisfied with the audit firm's overall quality of 
services provided. D 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
Auditors lacked ethical standards D 
Not satisfied with the range of services provided by the auditor. D 
The audit firm's geographic coverage was inadequate for our D 
needs. 
3.6 
3.7 
Changed at banker's (or other third party's) request. D 
Management's desire for a prestigious brand-name audit firm. D 
(Need for big SIX audit firm ) 
3.8 New management chose to replace auditors 
3.9 Disagreement with audit opinion. 
3 .1 0 Change at creditors demand. 
3.11 We disagreed with the auditors on certain accounting matters. 
( as indicated in Section 2 ) 
3.12 Client Merger I takeover with I by another company. 
3.13 New financing of company 
3.14 Needed audit firm with local domestic office. 
3.15 Need for group auditor rationalisation. 
APPENDIX 
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D 
D 
D 
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3.16 Need for national, rather than local, audit firm. D 
3.17 The former auditors trained their juniors at our expense. D 
3 .18 Change in audit partnership. D 
3.19 High turnover of audit engagement staff I partners. D 
3.20 Financial distress. (Failing company) D 
3.21 Change in company shareholders. D 
3.22 Our company received negative media publicity. D 
3.23 Audit committee requested the switch. 0 
3.24 Audit firm lacked industrial specialisation or technical expertise. D 
3.25 Personality clashes with audit partner I staff. D 
3.26 Poor working relationships with audit partner I staff. D 
3.27 Rotation policy to change auditor. D 
3.28 Our company decision to become a listed company. D 
3.29 The audit firm could not expand with us. D 
3.30 The audit firm continued to make major mistakes. D 
3.31 Lack of communication, including lack of responsiveness to 
ourneeds. D 
3.32 Inaccessibility of audit firm (partner) to our company. D 
3.33 No reference to reason for switch. D 
3.34 Other reasons . ( Please indicate ) D 
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